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ABSTRACT
This thesis seeks to explore how management practices developed in the U.K. using three of the 
big four railway companies as case studies. It will be argued that the managers in the UK, whilst 
aware of the debates on "Systematic" management and US practices, pioneered their own 
approach. Many of these practices were begun before amalgamation in 1923, but were only fully 
developed afterwards.
We begin by exploring the history of management with an outline in Chapter Two on 
management ideas from the turn of the 20th century to 1939. This is followed by an analysis of 
management practices from circa 1900 to the amalgamation of 1923 in Chapter Three. Chapter 
Four introduces the railway companies within the context of their commercial environment.
Chapter Five addresses the problem of achieving control of conveyance operations was 
addressed using similar methods by all companies. The key difference lay in the extent to which 
techniques were applied: the LMS developed centralised Train Control which enabled a 
systematic analysis of information to be made. The GWR and LNER introduced localised Traffic 
Control which did not allow such systematic analysis.
In Chapter Six we see how the LMS employed management consultants to study terminal 
work using Time and Motion studies. Both the GWR and LNER emulated LMS practice by 
1939. However these techniques were not the only solution. The LMS identified particular 
problems after amalgamation which it was felt could be solved by such analysis. The GWR on 
the other had concentrated on the transhipment freight, with encouraging results.
Chapter Seven examines how railways perceived and interacted with their external 
business environment. New services were offered on the basis of research directed at identifying 
customers and the services they required. Agents of all companies would investigate 
opportunities for business and advise customers on their best options. The LMS and GWR had 
sophisticated Research Departments dedicated to the collection of commercial and economic 
information regarding the traffic available.
If we take the essence of what these were trying to achieve: a rational and scientific 
approach to management problems, then the railway companies appear in a favourable light. 
Whatever criticisms are made of the railways, it was not a failure to adopt new management 
methods.
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Chapter One 
The Analysis of Management Practices
The role of management in generating competitive advantage is not often 
addressed explicitly. Relatively little is known about how management methods fit 
within the overall structure of company activity. Some analysis of business institutions 
has involved a historical approach, whilst theory such as that of Principal Agent models 
has stressed modelling the firm’s behaviour. In such analysis the objective is to 
examine how management functions in terms of various attributes such as information, 
contracting, transactions costs, as well as minimising and maximising activity.1
This thesis examines the role of ideas and techniques combining to form 
management practices. It then examines their influence in the shaping of business 
policy. We will consider the analysis of management ideas within the context of their 
adoption by companies. It is an attempt to develop some understanding of how 
management techniques affected firms: how did management respond firstly to the 
technological and operational constraints imposed by their industry and secondly to the 
commercial environment? The collection and utilisation of management information 
forms an important part of our study. Management information will be analysed as a 
means to achieve management control over the commercial and operating aspects of the 
firm’s business.
Three railway companies form the basis of this study; the London and North 
Eastern Railway, the London Midland and Scottish Railway and the Great Western 
Railway.2 The period under consideration, from 1923 to 1939, covers most of their 
history. The reasons for the choice of companies reflect the task in hand: firstly they 
were large, complex organisations that required a great deal of management 
information. The environment in which they operated presented a severe test of 
management skills with competition from new technology, extensive regulation and
See M.Rickets (1994) The Economics o f Business Enterprise, (Second Edition) Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, for a discussion of these concepts as they relate to organisations. The comments 
of Bengt Holmstrom on JoAnne Yates paper in P.Temin (ed.) (1991) also relate to the 
interaction of theory and empirical studies. Inside the Business Enterprise: Historical 
Perspectives on the Use o f Information, University of Chicago Press.
Henceforth known by their initials LNER, LMS and GWR respectively.
declining markets. Secondly, despite their size and importance relatively little has been 
written on how they conducted their business. The technical and engineering literature 
is extensive, but the business material has not been well covered, with some notable 
exceptions. What has been written concerning their performance has left us with the 
view that these businesses were generally moribund with little innovation.3 This thesis 
will demonstrate that in several key aspects this was not the case. Managerial 
innovation was present in many areas of policy in all three companies.
The development of information systems from ad hoc to systematic to scientific 
management ideas in association with the problems of controlling large scale,complex 
operations has been addressed in several works.4 This chapter begins with a review of 
how the internal operations of firms has been viewed by a variety of scholars, followed 
by a historiographical review of management history. Then it is possible to view the 
development of railway management in the wider context of how management 
developed in Great Britain from the Industrial Revolution to the turn of the twentieth 
century. We can then place railway management within the context of the wider 
development of management ideas such as the so-called "scientific" and "systematic" 
management movements. The historical analysis of management reflects the divide 
between the two approaches of the United States and Britain: the later develops mainly 
accounting based information, whilst the former involves much broader categories of 
information. Before we can examine management history, we first need to be clear 
about what is being addressed. That is we need a model of management.
For a story of management failure see D.H.Aldcroft (1968) "The Efficiency and Enterprise of 
British Railways, 1870-1914" Explorations in Economic History, Vol. V, and for the inter-war 
period, British Railways in Transition: The Economic Problems o f Britain's Railways since 
1914, Macmillan; R.J.Irving (1976) The North Eastern Railway Company, 1870-1914, Leicester 
University Press, presents the case of the NER as an exception in pursuing "best practice."
Most histories of management focus either on the development of factory organisation or the 
growth of labour relations within firms. See for example D.Wren (1972) The Evolution o f 
Management Thought, John Wiley and Sons, New York; D.Nelson (1975) Managers and 
Workers: Origins o f the New Factory System in the United States, 1880-1920, Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press.
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Figure 1 Model of Management Control
4A Model of Management Control
There have been many systems of management which address different 
questions of management and organisation. In this thesis, one particular element will 
be examined, that of management control. By focusing on management control and 
defining what exactly we mean by control, we will be in a position to assess how 
management functioned within organisations.
At its most basic, control can be seen as the means by which objectives are 
achieved. Management practices are then the tools with which to achieve this, but do 
not guarantee that events will proceed as expected, that is they do not automatically 
give control. Control compared performance to given indicators, and adjusted 
behaviour accordingly.5 Management practices interact with the element that was 
being targeted for control providing information about the "reality" in which business 
operated. The overall process of management control can be described by a circular 
process of "programming," planning, execution and evaluation [see Figure One]. 
Programming, defined as "the major programs that the organisation will undertake and 
the approximate amount of resources that will be allocated to each," is informed by 
the strategy determined by management.6 Thus strategy is exogenous to this thesis: 
it is how such plans were implemented by managers that interests us here.
Feedback and the achieving of control within firms have been analysed by 
some economists.7 Firms use control "variables" to achieve targets, determined by 
their chosen strategy. They also need to "..learn something about the world in which 
it [the firm] operates."8 Feedback from the process provides information on 
performance. According to this model control helps firms deal with limited 
knowledge, uncertainty and multiple objectives.
R.N.Anthony (1988) The Management Control Function, Harvard Business School Press, p7. 
The main definitions of management control are taken from Anthony.
Anthony The Management Control Function, pl5 and p i 19.
See R.M.Cyert and J.G.March (1992) A Behavioral Theory o f the Firm, Second Edition, 
London: Blackwells.
8 Cyert and March A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, pp217-218.
5The process by which management techniques were turned into practices will 
be used to examine how control was achieved within the railway companies. The 
notion of control was used explicitly in the use of Train/Traffic Control for the 
solution of Conveyance problems. In Terminal activity, Time and Motion Studies and 
Transhipment analysis provided information so as allow for planning and 
standardisation of routines. Commercial control was found in the market research of 
the companies, which created the service.
However we have to be clear about what exactly it was that was being 
controlled. That is, what was the relationship between inputs and outputs, and how 
could they be altered? For manufacturing the Systematic Management movement was 
clearly defined, as we shall see in Chapter Two. It involved integrating the processes 
of production, materials handling, purchasing, within an overall "model" which could 
then be used to conduct the business. For the railways, the Terminal and Conveyance 
functions of transport could adopt a similar approach. However, as a service industry, 
with emphasis on maintaining and attracting clients, we have to define more clearly 
what it was that was being supplied. Therefore we need to consider what exactly the 
service provided by the railway was.
The Business of Transportation
For a transport service to be considered effective, several elements have to be 
combined: loads have to be delivered on time, in a good condition and at the right 
price. Whilst this is a basic requirement, to improve the service a schedule of arrivals 
and departures needs to be in place to match the needs of customers. Speed will be 
an important variable to control as related by the time it takes a load to traverse a 
given distance. Additional services such as delivery from terminal and storage will 
be important particularly if there is competition. On the railways in our period, the 
type of loads on offer also influenced the nature of the service. Some were in bulk 
which made investment in task specific equipment viable. Other loads were sent in 
batches using several wagons. Custom loads were also dealt with and these often 
involved the use of specialist crews, wagons and schedules. Transport had to be 
provided at once, so no inventory could be made and stored. This meant that an
6important control variable would be the maximising of existing capacity. The fixed 
costs of the transport infrastructure were high and the capacity of lines and terminals 
had to be maximised.
The purpose of transportation was to add value to the commodities being 
carried, but in doing so a great deal of what could be characterised as "fabrication" 
was done by the companies. This ranged from the construction of private sidings to 
the packaging of products. In addition there was the loading of wagons which often 
involved more than just the placing of a load. Much thought was given to the design 
of packaging, especially if the commodity was dangerous. Careful loading was 
ensured by experimentation, before procedures were standardised. Regulations and 
working instructions were issued both by individual companies and the Railway 
Clearing House,(or RCH). It was important that all staff knew the labels pertaining to 
chemicals and realised the limitations of the commodity when loading.
Before we outline exactly what systems were used to attract revenue, we need 
to address the role of costs in shaping management control. As we shall see in 
Chapter Three, costs were studied under the rubric of railway statistics. These costs 
reflected a problem which has dogged the railways throughout their existence. Clearly 
there was a relatively high ratio of fixed to variable costs, although more correctly the 
fixed costs should be seen in part as sunk costs. However, what these were, and their 
relationship to the marginal cost of providing an extra wagon or train was largely 
unknown. We shall see in Chapters Five and Six how physical measures were 
available to offset the lack of financial estimates, but the problem still remained. The 
nature of the business meant that what we might call conventional cost analysis was 
extremely difficult. How, for example, were joint costs to be distributed between 
passenger and freight working, never mind between the many commodities carried on 
a freight train. The huge variety of consignments offered for transport made operations 
complex in the extreme, and this was reflected in the pricing of the service. This led 
the railways to develop systems by which they could collect and interpret commercial 
information.
The railways were not slow in attempting to develop traffic to enhance their 
revenue position. Commercial management practices consisted of three stages: finding
7traffic, determining the services required, and quoting the rate required to attract the 
custom. The rail network offered services from within a given market area, full of 
both traders and competitors, especially in our period, road hauliers. They had to 
assess both the nature and quantity of traffic on offer, subject to competition. The 
nature of the information gathering process and the decisions to offer specific services 
will be discussed in the main body of the text.
The task of the commercial arm of the firm was to link the operating 
department of the railway to the trading customers. Control of commercial activity 
involved the monitoring of objectives such as revenue maximisation and the 
minimisation of costs. Commercial control was the ability to set prices and deliver 
specified services. These would be set according to the market research and targeted 
toward customer needs. This necessitated linking the control of the operating process 
to that of the commercial. This was achieved by regular meetings of Goods' 
Conferences and Superintendents' Committees. The Railway Clearing House decided 
on network wide price and service according to the inputs from company research and 
decisions. Companies would determine the transport requirements of customers and 
then calculate the price. In the initial stages of a rate offering, this would be referred 
to the Railway Clearing House for discussion. Then application would be made to the 
Railway Rates Tribunal for authorisation. Management control was vital because of 
the complex pricing of services. The market place was dynamic due to changing 
competitive conditions and level of services offered. Whilst there was a strong link 
between these, new technology also drove what was available. All this activity 
required information concerning the marketplace and the requirements of individual 
customers.
The business environment surrounding the railways affected what management 
practices were developed. The standard rate was used as just that: a standard.9 From 
the nature of the carriage conditions and the competition within the region, prices 
would be determined. Using a standard as a starting point it functioned through the 
use of a commodity classification which determined the charges according principally
9 For more on the pricing system see Chapter Seven.
8to "what the traffic could bear." This implicitly required a knowledge of how demand 
fluctuated as price changed: that is the elasticity of demand for transport. The basis 
for charging was related to a belief in transport as adding value.10 This involved the 
cross subsidy of traffic and was a source of much criticism from those outside the 
industry, especially those carrying high valued products. Given that the whole 
purpose of transport was to add value to the products carried it does not seem so 
outrageous that the companies should base their charges on the proportion of a good’s 
value. Transport extended the market for products, helping to realise economies of 
scale and specialisation in production. This was to create problems for the railways 
in that they would be seen as a public good largely because of this.
The operational aspects of rail transport were less capricious but equally 
complex. Terminal activity required the movement of loads through depots using vast 
amounts of manpower and /or many types of machine. Packaging and storage became 
increasingly accepted as part of the railways’ job. The growth of road competition 
combined with the depression in several key trades made it important for the railways 
to offer these services. This meant combining operational and commercial aspects of 
their business to reflect the changing environment.
The problems of management control faced by the railways can only be 
appreciated if we have a wider appreciation of how other businesses had addressed 
such difficulties. This leads us to consider the history of British management.
The Development of British Management
Any discussion of the history of British management history has to begin with 
the analysis offered by S. Pollard's The Genesis o f Modem Management (1965). It 
remains the only comprehensive guide to how business was carried on during the 
Industrial Revolution and has provoked responses from accounting historians in recent
Perhaps the best known text on this is W.M.Acworth (1905) The Elements o f Railway 
Economics, Clarenden Press, Oxford, although almost all texts discuss the principles involved. 
What follows is drawn largely from the second edition of Acworth, revised in 1924 by 
W.T. Stephenson.
9years.11 First we need to define what exactly we mean by management and to 
distinguish it from entrepreneurship, a task that is made easier by using the 
formulation adopted by Pollard. He borrows from F.Redlich to distinguish between 
what entrepreneurs do and the process of management.12 The former takes strategic 
decisions, the latter the tactical ones. So entrepreneurs will take decisions concerning 
the objectives of the company whilst the management ensures that the task is done. 
Similarly, M.Casson views the entrepreneur as "someone who specialises in taking 
judgemental decisions about the co-ordination of scarce resources".13 A.Chandler 
reflects all the above definitions when he splits his categories into formulation and 
implementation, entrepreneurial and operating; the entrepreneur decides on resource 
allocation whilst operation is left to managers.14
Sometimes the managerial function may offer scope for entrepreneurial 
behaviour and the two often interact. Usually the key difference is that the manager's 
recommendations have to be vetted by the entrepreneur, as in the case of a Board of 
Directors. Managers can have a great deal of influence on how businesses objectives 
are formulated but it is where the final decision is made that may be said to count for 
most. Delegation to management is in itself a strategy that can reap huge rewards or 
signal failure. But for the purpose of this thesis, the formulation of strategy is taken 
as being exogenous to the management practices under discussion.
For the purpose of this thesis the managers will be seen as developing and 
implementing management controls to maximise revenue and minimise costs. Whilst 
they provided reports to the Board of Directors, it was the former two objectives that 
dominated much of their time.
S.Pollard (1965) Genesis o f Modem Management, Edward Arnold See J.R.Edwards and 
E.Newell (1991) "The Development of Industrial Cost Management Accounting Before 1850: 
A Survey of the Evidence" Business History, 33, and R.K.Fleishman and T.N.Tyson (1993) 
"Cost Accounting during the Industrial Revolution: the Present State of Historical Knowledge" 
Economic History Review, XLVI, 3, for the most recent surveys.
Pollard Genesis, p3.
M.Casson (1982) The Entrepreneur: An Economic Theory, Oxford: Martin Robinson, p27. 
A.D.Chandler (1962) Strategy and Stmcture, London: The MIT Press, p i 1.
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Early Management Practices
The above definition of management allows us to place the development of 
management within a context. The Industrial Revolution created some new industries 
and extended many others. Some of the key elements associated with industrialisation 
were the result of management decisions. This changed the nature of the management 
information required.
The onset of industrialisation required greater control of many processes. To 
produce steel, mine coal and make steam engines, the engineering became more 
complex. This then had an impact on the business decisions being made. The 
business environment was made more complex, necessitating more information upon 
which to base management decisions. Temperature, weight, bulk and speed all had 
to be monitored to enable control to be maintained. The market which these products 
were sold into was also becoming more complex. Economies of scale and scope could 
only be captured if the right products were produced on time and of sufficient quality. 
New products and markets focused attention on understanding what clients wanted.
All this made management practices a vital ingredient of industrialisation. In 
the first instance it was measures designed for internal accounting that were then used 
to inform managers of their environment. The lack of published material on cost 
accounting such as instructional texts, references in journals etc., has led to the 
conclusion that cost accounting was not well developed.15 According to this view, it 
was not until Garcke and Fells’ "Factory Accounts" in 1895 that cost accounting 
developed. However this confuses the process of diffusion through education with that 
of practice: the widespread secrecy surrounding many industrial processes would have 
militated against such diffusion.16 Instead of assuming that costing was not done we 
might look for a substitute and this we might find in the information required for
See D.Solomons "The Historical Development of Costing" in Solomons (ed.) (1968) Studies in 
Cost Analysis, Homewood: R.D.Irwin. H.T.Johnson and R.Kaplan Relevance Lost: The Rise 
and Fall o f Management Accounting, Boston: Harvard University Press summarises similar 
ideas.
Fleiscman and Tyson "Cost Accounting during the Industrial Revolution" Economic History 
Review, XLVI, 3, p507.
costing as used by engineers who were by definition involved in operations and often 
in commercial activity. Indeed we may argue that the defining characteristic of an 
engineer is someone "..who does for one pound what any fool can do for two."17 
Thus performance details could always be used for management calculations. If such 
costing systems did exist, it should be of no surprise that many early records of such 
analysis have not survived, given their informal nature. Also the existence of cost and 
financial accounts as a unified whole should not necessarily be taken as the only 
indicator of managerial sophistication. Despite Pollard's extensive use of company 
archives his conclusion that "..entrepreneurship in the industrial revolution did not 
develop to any significant extent the use of accounts in guiding management 
decisions,"18 can no longer be sustained.
Although Pollard did consider the broader management methods recent 
scholarship has focused almost entirely on cost/management accounting: there is very 
little regarding the training of managers and foremen, industrial relations, purchasing, 
factory layout etc. Thus the issues that, it will be argued, concern management as it 
has developed in the 20th. century - control, organisations etc. - have not been 
addressed in the context of the Industrial Revolution. Given the size of such 
institutions as the Royal dockyards and landed estates, it is doubtful whether another 
of Pollard's conclusions that "..there could be no precedents for modern management 
problems before.. 1750. .because the whole economic environment [was] different" will 
be sustained after further research.19
The organisations that seem to show most knowledge of cost accounting 
methods, whether by virtue of operational size or survival of records is unclear, are 
metal working, textiles and mines. What they all have in common is that the
E.Sargent "Frederic Duckham and the Millwall Docks 1868-1909" Transactions o f the 
Newcomen Society, 1988-89 Vol. 60, p67.
S.Pollard (1965) Genesis, p248.
Pollard Genesis, p51.
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complexity of operation was increasing and for many this meant more information for 
controlling business.20
The textile industry moved from the putting out process to more centralised 
production in mills. The centralisation of work and use of machinery on a large scale 
meant that co-ordination had to be effective. Whilst it was true that control was 
important for combining the activity of domestic producers under the old putting out 
system, the constraints were different. Large amounts of fixed capital were invested 
in the mills which had to be justified as factory owners attempted to capture economies 
of scale and scope. Some of the calculations demonstrated considerable attention to 
detail: the Strutt archive reveals expenses measured down to one-thousandth of a 
pence, and the allocation of costs to activities where the process performance may be 
measured via quarterly cost comparison. The exact value of such precise allocations 
of expenditure is a moot point but it does demonstrate an interest in the minutia of the 
production process. Nor was this the only example: the Marshall mill records indicate 
that forty different categories of expense were calculated for the biannual accounts. 
Depreciation was allocated to the department which was incurring the cost, a practice 
not always followed by others. This seems to be a function of the increasing 
complexity of the production process and the need to monitor the various aspects for 
errors if not inefficiency.
Similar evidence is found in the metal working industry: the Carron company 
provided monthly reports of costs per ton with an explanation for any fluctuations and 
weekly evaluation of blast furnace performance.21 In 1768 there was even a "time and 
motion" study conducted of coal extraction and the 1770's saw the adoption of transfer 
pricing.22 Carron was not alone either, in use of such tools. The Darby company used 
weekly accounts to examine the fuel efficiency and maintenance record of each steam
For what follows see J.R.Edwards (1989) "Industrial Cost Accounting Developments in Britain 
to 1830: A Review Article" Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 19. No 76 and 
R.K.Fleischman and L.D.Parker (1991)"British Entrepreneurs and Pre-Industrial Revolution 
Evidence of Cost Management", The Accounting Review , April 1991.
See in addition Fleishman and Parker, "British Entrepreneurs,"The Accounting Review, April 
1991.
22 Edwards "Industrial Cost Accounting," Accounting and Business Research.
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engine, allocated overheads and used extensive analysis for making decisions on 
investment, technology use and vertical integration.
Evidence of quite advanced accounting methods has also been described in the 
pottery factories of Josiah Wedgwood and the engineering firm of Boulton and Watt.23 
Wedgwood broke down his expenses into fourteen categories and used cost data to 
help him price products in line with what we might call a marketing policy which 
included very clear notions of fashion and consumer behaviour. Again we see great 
attention to detail with, in 1794, estimates of the cost of crests and cyphers painted on 
his products and records of "..the cost of enamelling seven different patterns on 36 
different products, and then the cost per inch of different sizes".24 Indeed it appears 
that there were many of the features associated with modern enterprises present such 
as a policy of product differentiation, a clocking-in scheme, the use of science and 
advertising, all supported by what might be described as a system of management 
accounting.
The management of Boulton and Watt used an approach akin to what we might 
now call production engineering. Stock had to be controlled in order to ensure 
adequate throughput and the layout of the machine shops was ordered to aid the flow 
of work. The increased specialisation and division of labour that often accompanied 
factory organisation implied increased planning if output was to be maximised. Power 
sources, machine layout, storage of stock and raw materials had to be co-ordinated if 
operations were to proceed smoothly. Time could all too easily be wasted if there was 
no attempt to reduce handling and maximise throughput. In many cases this was not 
an option. For example a blast furnace could not be said to work if it was not possible 
to adequately load the coal and ore of sufficient quantity into the retort. Proper 
control/co-ordination was required as part of the system as a whole, before attempts 
could then be made to fine tune its performance.
See N.McKendrick (1970) "Josiah Wedgwood and Cost Accounting in the Industrial 
Revolution" Economic History Review XXIII and E.Roll (1930) An Early Experiment in 
Industrial Organisation, Longmans, respectively.
McKendrick (1970) "Josiah Wedgwood," Economic History Review, XXIII, p58.
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Perhaps the most important question concerning the above case studies is the 
degree to which they were typical. Given the paucity of information about so much 
of the internal decision making of large, let alone medium and small sized businesses, 
it is that these techniques were used at all that is important. Indeed it might also be 
argued that the very existence of factory organisation was limited and so management 
was not very important to the economy as a whole.25 The existence, in certain firms, 
of quite advanced methods of managing show that the business community was well 
aware of the need to monitor their operations and plan for the future. This was part 
and parcel of the technological organisation necessary for such production: as Edwards 
and Newell have phrased it, accounting was a "social technology".26
To summarise this brief review of management practices, we can identify 
several areas where companies used what we might call modern techniques: basic 
costing led to comparisons between alternative projects and included the calculation 
of overheads. The change in profits as a result of capital investment was also noted 
in a calculation reminiscent of modem retum-on-investment calculations.27 Whilst all 
the above examples imply that there were calculations made to enhance company 
performance, it was the arrival of the railways that led engineers, politicians and 
company officials to devise new methods of control. This was particularly so in the 
United States.
Management Information and the Firm in the United States
This section attempts to bring together the business and management history 
literature. It is largely focused on the United States because the history of 
management practice is more developed in the US literature. Studies of how strategy 
and structure interact have been published, but little has so far been written on the role
See M.Berg (1985) The Age of Manufactures London: Fontana and R.Samuel (1977) "The 
Workshop of the World" History Workshop, 3, for evidence that small scale, hand manufactures 
persisted long into the 19th. century.
Edwards and Newell "Development of Industrial Cost Management Accounting," Business 
History, 33, p35.
Edwards "Industrial Cost Accounting Developments," Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 
19, No. 76, p311.
15
of information in the firm. The work of Alfred Chandler on how strategy and 
structure function can be extended by the analysis of management information.28 The 
work of JoAnne Yates and others has begun to do that.29 We begin with a review of 
Chandler, followed by the work of those concerned with the history of business 
information.
The work of Chandler that most concerns us here is that contained in Strategy 
and Structure. Chandler describes the growth of the multi-divisional firm with 
reference to the market and industrial structure of the firm. So in the case of the 
railroads in the US, long distances created a need for divisions based upon geography 
to cope with the complexity of operations. Other firms, such as steelworks, would be 
organised on functional lines between processes or on product lines. The more that 
firms integrated vertically, the greater the need to create viable units of management. 
What Chandler concluded was that the changing administration of the company and 
its pattern of growth were closely related.30 This process of administration was broken 
down into Strategic and Tactical decisions. Strategy was long term and based upon 
views about the appropriate industry for the firm: "..the determination of the basic 
long term goals and objectives of an enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action 
and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals." Tactical 
decisions involved the day to day running of operations given that strategy. From this 
structure developed, the ". .organisation through which the enterprise is administered." 
This included "..the lines of authority and communication" between offices and ". .the 
information and data that flow through these lines.."31 This view of business
8 A.D.Chandler (1962) The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business, 
London: Harvard University Press and (1990) Scale and Scope: The Dynamics o f Industrial 
Capitalism, London: Harvard University Press.
9 JoAnne Yates (1989) Control Through Communication: The Rise o f System in American 
Management, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press; P.Temin (ed.) (1991) Inside the 
Business Enterprise: Historical Perspectives on the Use o f Information’, N.R.Lamoreaux and 
D.Raff (ed.) (1995) Coordination and Information: Historical Perspectives on the Organisation 
o f Enterprise, University of Chicago Press; H.T.Johnson and R.S.Kaplan (1987) Relevance 
Lost: The Rise and Fall o f Management Accounting, Harvard Business School Press; Boston 
Mass.
0 Chandler Strategy, p3.
31 Chandler Strategy, pl3 and pl4.
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administration tends to merge the role of entrepreneurs and managers. However it 
does not detract from the central message of the analysis: strategy and structure are 
closely related. New demands created a need for new equipment which in turn led to 
a drive for more efficiency. According to Chandler's model this lead to a change in 
business structure: the original structure reached a point at which it could not continue 
to function efficiently.32 As business responded to changing technology and expanding 
markets, it was necessary to formalise the previously informal means of 
communication. As Chandler put it, "Channels of communication and authority as 
well as the information flowing through these channels grew more and more 
inadequate."33 It is this change that Yates explicitly addresses.
JoAnne Yates describes the nature of internal communications which helped 
form the strategies and structures sought by business. Communication was used in 
order to achieve control which Yates defines as: "Managerial control - over employees 
(both workers and other managers), processes, and flows of materials - is the 
mechanism through which the operations of an organisation are coordinated to achieve 
desired results." At the end of the nineteenth century "..formal internal 
communications emerged as a major tool of management, exerted toward the goal of 
achieving system and thus efficiency."34 However it was not "..growth per se that 
required the development of the internal communication system, but the managerial 
philosophy that evolved in response to growth."35 Thus the development of 
management ideas and techniques into practices was from the supply side. People 
recognised the increasing complexity of business and began to think about it. 
However without a model of management control it is very difficult to assess which 
way round the causality works.
In Yates’ analysis the notion that systematic management was a precursor to 
scientific management is rejected. The latter was part of the former, as it dealt
Chandler Strategy, pp384-86. 
Chandler Strategy, p393. 
Yates Control, pxvi.
Yates Control, p2.
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specifically with shop-floor activity. "Scientific management" was promoted by those 
critical of US railroads, such as Judge Louis Brandeis in the Eastern Rates case of 
1911.36 Systematic management was more concerned with the overall application of 
method to the running of business. The main elements of this were the replacing of 
individual knowledge with that of the organisation. That is, it was codified by the 
writing of organisation manuals and books of working practices. Managers at the top 
of the hierarchy made decisions rather than those on the spot, although there would 
have been some allowance for decisions which were either relatively unimportant or 
which could not be transposed to management. Also the levels of management were 
responsible for those below, creating a hierarchy where authority was even more 
rigorously defined and enforced. It was this diminishing of the individual’s role which 
has been most commented upon by both critics of such methods, and those seeking to 
explain how complexity was dealt with in organisations.37 As Yates has said, 
systematic management "..contributed to the decline of ad hoc, word-of-mouth 
management and to the rise of formal internal communication. "38 In another
work this is elaborated on by introducing the concept of "ideology. "39 This is not used 
in the political sense but in the context of a belief system: ideologies "..shape both the 
environment in which people understand situations and define options, and the 
decisions they make."40 Thus Yates notes the interaction of information and 
management ideas that help the firm perceive its environment and act accordingly to
Yates control, pl5. The Eastern Rates Case was famous because Brandis noted that if the 
railway companies wanted to increase their rates, they should first improve their efficiency by 
using scientific management.
See M.Jelinek (1980) "Towards Systematic Management: Alexander Hamilton Church" 
Business History Review, 54; and J.Litterer (1963) "Systematic Management: Design for 
Organisational Recoupling in American Manufacturing Firms" Business History Review, 27.
Yates Control, p l l .
JoAnne Yates (1994) "Evolving Information Use in Firms, 1850-1920" in L.Bud-Frierman 
Information Acumen, London: Routledge.
Yates (1994) "Evolving Information Use in Firms," Information Accumen, p27.
what it sees. Thus "..publications, associations, consultants and contacts, serv[ed] as 
a template for managerial strategy and practice. "41
For Control Through Communication Yates draws from three US companies - 
the Illinois Central Railroad, Scovill Manufacturing and E.I.DuPont de Nemours and 
Company, (chemicals), - to map the development of management methods and in 
particular the use of information technologies. On the Illinois Central the story told 
is one of managerial reform in the face of regulatory pressure. Under Stuyvesant Fish 
in the 1880's and 1890's, the company reformed its management practices. From the 
concerns of finishing construction and ensuring safe operating, the company had to 
monitor its operations and ensure that the hierarchy functioned smoothly. As 
Chandler has noted, the railroads in the US pioneered management technology in 
overcoming the problems of long distance coordination and control. Regulations and 
circulars were produced on the Illinois Central from its inception, but under Fish they 
took on a new meaning as part of the company’s corporate memory. The key to 
Yates’ argument is that this replaced the individual: "Rule books were introduced to 
provide a more complete and permanent organisational memory that transcended the 
individual. "42 This was the route to the systemisation of information: no longer would 
performance be related to the individual. With the setting of standards for 
performance and the creation of organisational memory, it was possible for "best 
practice" methods to be diffused through the organisation.
In Scovill Manufacturing the transition toward more systematic management 
began with incorporation in the 1850's.43 Prior to this it seems that oral 
communication dominated internal communications. The move to open a New York 
store in the 1850's provided the impetus to change how operations were managed. The 
changing technology of communications, and associated cost reductions, led a gradual 
change. This was presided over by C.P.Goss and M.L.Sperry who as Secretary and 
Treasurer helped devise many of the management systems. Chief among these was
Yates (1994) "Evolving Information Use," Information Accumen, p27. 
Yates Control, p i57.
Yates Control, Chapter 6, pp 159-200.
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an improved book keeping system and adoption of communication technologies such 
as the telegraph and internal telephone. However company growth, from a thousand 
employees in the 1890's to four thousand in 1914, prompted further more far reaching 
changes.44 The problem lay in how to coordinate the activity of the many foremen; 
the use of the circular and written instructions was seen as an important element in 
achieving management control. Reports were commissioned to inform management 
of the needs of foremen and workers. This in turn lead to the creation of an 
infrastructure for collecting, collating and analysing information. Efficient means of 
information retrieval and storage then became important.
Communication between managers grew laterally as the telephone encouraged 
communication. Any decisions were usually confirmed in writing and the growth in 
the number of operating divisions increased such contacts. By 1919 the number of 
reports generated had risen to over two hundred a year, leading to the setting up of a 
statistical office.45 The primary task of this office was to standardise reporting and the 
design of forms: it was to act as a "clearing house of reference" for the company.46
Finally Yates describes the activities of Du Pont.47 As with Scovell 
Manufacturing, early management was oral with occasional written reports and letters. 
The growth of a systematic approach to management came only after a split in the 
family in the 1880's. Lamont Du Pont left, frustrated at the conservative management 
practices, to found his own company, the Rapauno Chemical Company. These 
techniques were then transferred back into Du Pont at the turn of the century. Sales 
and production data were collated using the telegraph and standardised reporting 
formats.
It was the use of Committees to manage that marked the change between the 
old order and the new. The most important of these was the High Explosives 
Operating Department, or HEOD. It coordinated plant working by standardising
Yates Control, p i69.
Yates Control, p i87.
Yates Control, pl90.
Yates Control, Chapters 7 and 8, pp201-270.
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procedures and equipment. This was accomplished by the instillation of 
communications throughout the organisation. Of all the techniques developed by Du 
Pont it is probably the Return on Investment,ROI, calculation that is most famous.48 
This was a financial measure to assess performance across divisions and over time. 
Such summary information was also provided by a chart room where diagrams and 
charts were displayed on hangers in front of managers.
Yates concludes by noting that it was neither changing technology nor size that 
determined the use of systematic management. Other railroad companies were smaller 
than the Illinois Central, yet had more systematic management. Scovill was innovative 
in management organisation as it grew, and when it stopped doing so problems of 
control arose. The implications from Yates’ study are that management reform was 
necessary for sustained growth and successful performance. We come back to the 
problem that there is no measure of performance that enables a clear conclusion one 
way or the other as to the role of information systems in company performance. What 
we can say is that the case studies reveal the importance of management information 
in shaping strategy and structure. For example the Du Pont Committees, a change in 
structure, were a response to the need to control the organisation as it grew more 
complex. The information received by managers would then go on to influence 
strategy.
Similarly in studying Dow Chemicals' use of information, M.Levenstein 
defines the role of information within the firm in terms of monitoring and planning.49 
The former distinguishes between the monitoring of both internal processes and that 
of people's honesty and effort. The planning function is spilt into two - the long and 
the short term. The type of information required by these categories differs: 
monitoring information requires rapid collection and use. Planning information also 
requires that some data be collected before a decision is reached, to supplement that 
gathered from the monitoring functions.
Yates Control, pp265-266. This was calculated from various statistics but was basically 
turnover divided by earnings as a percentage of sales.
See M.Levenstein "The Use of Cost Measures: The Dow Chemical Company, 1890-1914." in 
P.Temin ed. Inside the Business Enterprise: Historical Perspectives on the Use o f Information.
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Why should the late 19th century see such changes in how firms were run? In 
Yates’ view it was the interaction of the supply and demand of information technology 
and the size/structure of the firm and market, as well as the ideology. She suggests 
that fashion and fads might cause firms to adopt given systems as it imparts a certain 
kudos. Citing evidence from Scovill Manufacturing, where "several" reports 
instigated earlier under attempts at systemisation were discontinued, Yates concludes 
that at least part of the technologies were taken up as a "fad" and had no real use.50 
However it is clear from reading some of the literature, such as System, from the early 
part of this century that the introduction of office techniques required a learning 
process, and perhaps this accounts for the process Yates observes.
Taking the source material first, L.Jenks discussed the growth of management 
ideas in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.51 He distinguished between three 
phases in the growth of management ideas: the "ad hoc" use of ideas developed out 
of individual company requirements, uncodified by publications or professional 
examinations. Secondly, there was a structured approach to management with "little 
clusters of socially sustained norms and concepts whose communication beyond the 
individual firm was rare." The third approach was when "In making decisions about 
organisation and procedures it became the norm for firms to take account of what 
others were doing.." That is the development of a "professional" approach to 
management through journals, texts, etc and research establishments in the 
transmission of specific management skills. We propose to use material such as Jenks 
suggests. As he notes: "It is quite possible, by diligent scrutiny of handbooks, 
textbooks and public relations releases to characterise certain states of opinion as 
"prevalent" and to state what have been widely regarded as "standards" both as to 
procedures and goals."52
Yates (1994) "Evolving Information Use in Firms," Information Accumen, p45.
L.H.Jenks (1960) "Early phases of the Management Movement" Administrative Science 
Quarterly, V.
Jenks "Early Phases of the Management Movement," Administrative Science Quarterly, pp423- 
424.
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Apart from Yates' general analysis there have been more specialised studies 
that cover various aspects of management and information. These can be split into 
those that examine what we may define as techniques, and those that describe ideas.
S.Dolman described how firms developed Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) in an 
attempt to relate their net earnings to the capital invested.53 As technology developed, 
high capital costs became common in many areas of industry, such as railways and 
chemical plants. Tracing the origins of DCF via Du Pont's Return on Investment 
(ROI) calculations the study stresses the importance of journals, professional 
associations and texts in the diffusion of ideas.
The role of the business school also appears to have been important: "The 
relationship between academic researchers and industrial managers was also a 
fundamental element in the history of the utilisation and diffusion of modern capital 
budgeting methods."54 DCF develops from the needs of engineers to monitor capital 
investment. The solution builds on the work of others, especially in the field of 
railroad engineering. By 1952, ATT were encouraging the use of such methods 
through the medium of their manual Engineering Economy. This coincided with the 
rise of the management consultancy and demand for textbooks. For example, Joel 
Dean published Capital Budgeting, in 1951 and he was both consultant and academic.
Conformation of this is also provided in another quarter by a study of the 
progress function by Dutton et al.55 This technique related the effect of cumulative 
production on the cost structure of a given product at the level of the firm (ie they are 
not experience curves that tend to do the same task for a whole industry). In the first 
instance it was aircraft production that provided most of the empirical data. Once 
again trying to make sense of complexity was the motivation for this development as 
"Progress Functions provided management with a relatively simple technology for
S.P.Dulman (1989) "The Development of Discounted Cash Flow Techniques in US Industry" 
Business History Review, 63.
Dulman (1989) "The Development of Discounted Cash Flow Techniques," Business History 
Review, 63, p584.
J.M.Dutton, A.Thomas & J.E.Butler (1984) "The History of Progress Functions as a 
Managerial Technology" Business History Review, 58.
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dealing with a phenomenon of great underlying complexity. "56 Here again it was the 
communication between the engineers and academics which helped lead the way. In 
addition there was also an important role for government. Early research and 
development efforts had not resulted in the expected quality or quantity of aircraft. 
As in Yates' study, individuals are important carriers of management reform. 
T.P.Wright of the Civil Aeronautics Administration is singled out as an early 
champion of the Progress Function.
Although the nature of the technique is important it may only be properly 
understood if placed within the context of the organisation within which it is applied. 
Studies of how management information developed within institutions have proved 
useful. A study of accounting information within the US Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) is a good example.57 The 1887 Act of Congress demanded that 
there should be comparability of accounts between railroad companies as information 
asymmetry was a major problem for investors and legislators. With rate control, the 
other key element of the act came a requirement for data. Annual statistical 
compendiums on railway performance were collated and published and more readily 
comparable balance sheets produced.
Estimates of the cost of railway services became important as part of the rate 
control function. Railway companies started using cost studies which could be 
produced in courts as evidence. These would become important especially as the 
average ton mile was rejected as a unit of cost measurement. Instead special studies 
were produced on a per case basis. Eventually the ICC approached the issue of rate 
regulation by using long run marginal cost estimates. This was developed by Max 
Lorenz at the Bureau of Transportation Economics in Washington. Many variables 
were taken into consideration, including traffic density, price levels, trainweight, 
cargoes and even including operating practices and conditions of loading.
Although the special studies did provide some guide as to rate setting the key 
problem was how to arrive at the legislated notion of a ''fair return" on assets. This
6 Dutton et al (1984) "The History of Progress Functions," Business History Review 58, p204.
7 See P.J.Miranti (1989) "The Mind’s Eye of Reform: The ICC's Bureau of Statistics and 
Accounts and a Vision of Regulation, 1887-1940" Business History Review, 63.
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was a difficulty that plagued not only the railways but all regulated utilities. In 1913 
railway assets were valued but this took some time and the criteria were not clear: 
should assets be valued at cost when purchased or at "reproduction" costs? The 
valuation reports were intended to aid the ICC in their decisions on mergers. The 
valuation reports were not suitable for this as the key variable for this decision was 
identified as discounted future earnings rather than the asset value. The basis upon 
which the information was collected differed enough to ensure that it was not suitable 
for use in other areas of management or regulation.
This study of information use within the ICC draws an interesting parallel with 
Yates' analysis, except here the agent of change is the regulating body rather than an 
individual such as Fish or Du Pont. However both acted to change management 
practices. The effect of war on management may have a similar effect. Robert Cuff's 
description of the Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics in the US supports this.58 
The expert concerned in this case was one Edwin Gay from the Harvard Business 
School who established data gathering to provide information for planners in World 
War One. He aimed to provide information which would enable the government to 
more effectively control resources vital to the pursuit of the war. The initial analysis 
was to coordinate shipping so activity was split between the Shipping Board and War 
Trade Board. The Shipping Committee collected data on size, draft, carrying capacity 
and speed of each ship. From this initial success a War Industries Board was 
established.
Gay was able to build upon a wide range of both formal and informal contacts. 
He was the first Dean of the Harvard Business School, and he aimed to install notions 
of "more professional business practices" to businessmen. In this he had the assistance 
of A.W.Shaw, a publisher of System magazine, who had also pioneered the use of the 
case study as a teaching aid at Harvard. Shaw used his influence to help codify 
business practice and eventually took up a post as head of the Commercial Economy 
Board, to which some Harvard faculty followed.
R.D.Cuff (1989) "Creating Control Systems: Edwin F. Gay and the Central Bureau of Planning 
and Statistics, 1917-1919." Business History Review, 63.
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The use of accounting information to achieve management control has been an 
important subject. This was highlighted in a historical context by the study by 
H.T Johnson and R.S.Kaplan in their discussion of management accounting and its use 
in industry.59 This has engendered a debate on the role of management accounting 
information and the influence of ideas in the business world.
The main thesis of the book is that accounting information has lost its relevance 
since the early part of this century: "Today’s management accounting information., is 
too late, too aggregated, and too distorted to be relevant for managers' planning and 
control decisions."60 Managers lost the ability to understand their business because 
they were recruited from the ranks of those involved in administering rather than 
producing. Academics do not escape blame either. Since the 1920's at least, the work 
of academics is seen as generally lacking relevance in many areas. While it is 
conceded that most of the literature on management accounting was being written by 
academics, it is claimed that the models developed, such as agency theory, information 
economics and operations research, were simplified in the extreme.61 This is 
contrasted with the advances made in 19th century management accounting which 
came from practitioners such as Andrew Carnegie and Pierre Du Pont. Between 1925 
and 1980 It is claimed that "..virtually no new ideas have affected the design and use 
of cost management systems," between 1925 and 1980.62 Financial information was, 
and is, driving internal management decisions. Accurate product costing is not 
possible with all the potential problems that involves in deciding product mix. The 
need to produce data to a "financial accounting" timetable shifts the focus from 
management, ie operational, decisions. This forms the basis for the authors to conduct 
a wide ranging historical survey over the history of mainly US management 
accounting. The key to whether this thesis is accepted or not depends crucially on
9 Johnson and Kaplan, Relevance Lost.
0 Johnson and Kaplan Relevance, p i. This criticism forms part of a wider debate on Activity
Based Costing, Kaplan in particular was offering as a solution to the need to obtain better 
information for product costing.
’* Johnson and Kaplan Relevance Lost, pp 175-176.
62 Johnson and Kaplan Relevance Lost, pl76.
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how management accounting is defined. As we shall see in discussing the growth on 
management in the industrial revolution, this has important consequences. The source 
material accounting historians use has influenced the conclusions drawn. Instead of 
examining the internal mechanisms of the firm the focus has been on the development 
of codified practices and professional standing rather than what managers and 
engineers were doing at the time.
Whilst Johnson and Kaplan have used history as a framework with which to 
criticise present management, their analysis has been applied in a historical context by 
Gregory Thompson.63 Drawing explicitly on the premise that management accounting 
had failed to deliver information on product costs, the experience of the Southern 
Pacific railroad is used as a case study. This study’s conclusions agree with those of 
Johnson and Kaplan: because of the regulated environment, there was less pressure to 
develop accurate cost estimates. The use of economic theory and accounting 
information is described, with an emphasis on understanding how ideas described 
reality. Many cost calculations were revealed as inadequate because they failed to 
reflect the behaviour of the activity under consideration or because information was 
misused in some way. For example it was not until 1915 that passenger and freight 
costs were separated, thereby enabling managers to assess the contribution such 
operations were making to profits. Cost calculations via regression analysis were 
attempted in the 1920's but it was not until the 1930's that they were regularly used 
in cases before the ICC.
This thesis aims to prove that given the operating and commercial constraints 
of the time, the British railways did attempt to manage using systematic methods of 
management. However the thesis also endeavours to examine how in general 
management control in large organisations works, using the railways as a case study. 
It describes how the railway companies achieved management control of the 
conveyance, terminal and commercial functions. Beginning with a review of the ideas
i3 See G.L.Thompson (1993) The Passenger Train in the Auto Age: California's Rail and Bus
Industries 1910-1941, Columbus Ohio State University Press; (1989) "Misused Product Costing 
in the American Railroad Industry: Southern Pacific Passenger Service Between the Wars" 
Business History Review, 63; (1995) "How Cost Ignorance Derailed the Pennsylvania Railroad's 
Efforts to Save its Passenger Service, 1929-61." Journal o f Transport History, Third Series, 
Volume 16, No. 2.
that were being discussed at the turn of the century by writers on scientific and 
systematic management, we consider what general approaches to management control 
were available to railway managers. Then the pre-amalgamation management activity 
of the railway companies is examined. We then go on to discuss the specific 
approaches to management control for conveyance, terminal and commercial activity.
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Chapter Two 
The Development of Management Practices
The increasing complexity of tasks in business toward the end of the 19th. 
century led to the development of practices designed to support managers. This meant 
more than just a new accounting system: it was engineers who devised many of the 
measures and tests which enabled complex tasks to be performed in a manner which did 
not bankrupt the company. Their concern was the internal production process rather 
than the post-hoc results of financial performance required for external use. It was this 
that created the environment within which "scientific management" could flourish. 
H.Johnson and R.Kaplan place this movement in the years 1880-1910, for the US, as 
it did not become accepted in Britain until after the First World War.1 Then the move 
toward the "Rationalisation" of British industry involved discussing the issues arising 
out of the scientific approach to management. As Hannah has observed "What is clear 
is that within their varied management structures of the 1920's and 1930's, British 
manufacturing companies were directing a good deal more resources to management 
problems than previously."2
This chapter explores some of these ideas by drawing on the literature 
developed by British and American authors. This anglo-american approach is 
necessary because the latter influenced the former.3 Despite the lack of widespread 
acceptance initially, there was a continuing trans-atlantic debate on new methods of 
management. Both sets of authors will be discussed as their work comprised what was, 
in effect, a single coherent literature. We will see how the scientific approach to 
management developed and how its were ideas implemented according to some of the 
consultants involved. The planning and monitoring of operations will be described as
See Kaplan and Johnson,Relevance p47. Also S.Kreis "The Diffusion of Scientific Management: 
The Bedaux Company in America and Britain, 1926-1945" in D.Nelson (1992) (ed.) A Mental 
Revolution: Scientific Management Since Taylor, Columbus: Ohio State University Press which 
discusses how one particular consultancy used scientific management.
Hannah Corporate Economy, p86.
See Chapter 3 "The Rationalisation Movement" in Hannah The Rise o f the Corporate Economy.
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they were related in general to the implementation of management control. Operations 
were carried out according to information collected and analysed by managers shaping 
the future of the company. This will be extended to include the role of scientific 
management in the office, as even here there were economies to be realised in part by 
the adoption of the scientific model.
The Scientific Approach to Management
How were people thinking about the problems of management at the turn if the 
century? The answer to this question requires that we define more clearly concepts of 
standardisation, system and efficiency. These were seen as a way for managers to 
achieve better control over the business environment. We will see how management 
was seen as a hybrid art/science with implications for the setting up of management 
practices.
However, a word of caution is necessary. The implementation of these 
management practices was not always a panacea. For example, a trenchant critic of the 
whole scientific management movement was J.J.Gillespie, who in 1938 published The 
Principles o f Rational Industrial Management. His main criticism is worth quoting in 
full:
The assumption that the search for exact knowledge, by the use of scientific 
method, plus the instruments of that method, make management scientific, is, 
to be blunt, plainly ridiculous. Scientific method is only a tool of management, 
an important one no doubt; there is, however, no virtue in scientific 
management as such; its virtue and its vice is a reflection of the ability and the 
character bearer. The further assumption that because management uses 
codified knowledge, management is therefore scientific, is in much the same 
category as calling a poet a scientist because he used codified knowledge of the 
principles of versification. "4 
However this re-enforced the notion of what was seen as scientific; it was not mere 
codification of knowledge although undoubtedly this was more important than Gillespie
4 J.J.Gillespie (1938) The Principles o f Rational Management, London: Sir Isaac Pitman and Son,
pvii.
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suggests. It was the method of approaching management in a scientific manner that was 
recognised, the subordination of scientific management to what we might call the 
personal qualities of a manager that Gillespie suggests would be of greater value.
It was important to ensure that information could be made useful to managers. 
What information could be collected and how should it be used? A.H.Church, writing 
in 1914, recognised this in defining what led to "executive success." He stated that it 
"Depends upon three elements: 1) recognition of what facts are truly significant; 2) 
accurate record and convenient presentation of these facts; 3) judicious action based on 
a study of the facts.1,5 However, Church was also aware of the pitfalls in using 
scientific management as a panacea. In 1914 he stated that both the words "scientific 
management" and "efficiency" had been "the stock-in-trade of numberless amateurs and 
pretenders" such that "the value of the movement was magnified beyond all reason.."6
Harrington Emerson used the term "high efficiency." This was not financial or 
social". .but an engineering problem; and to the engineering profession, rather than any 
other, must we look for salvation. "7 The scientific method was stressed even more by 
others: "Just as the scientist in the laboratory tears apart a complex substance...so the 
man who would practice "scientific management" analyses his problems."8 If science 
was to be made to reveal the secrets of production it needed expertise which at the same 
time reflected "specialised common sense," something that experts were not always 
endowed with.9 That is to say both the method and the results could be codified 
according to the scientific approach. This view relied on the ascertaining of certain 
facts that would then form the basis of such analysis; the management process was 
seen as something which was susceptible to the reductionism of science. Thus to most
A.H.Church (1914) The Science and Practice o f Management, New York: The Efficiency 
Magazine Co. p347. Church was a British electrical engineer who moved to the USA in 1900.
Church The Science, piv.
H.Emerson (1919) (4th. edition) Efficiency as a Basis for Operation and Wages, New York: 
The Engineering Magazine Co. Emerson was a consultant who is perhaps best remembered for
giving evidence in the Eastern Rates Case, before Judge Brandeis, in 1914.
Anon. (1922) Scientific Management Applied, London: A.W.Shaw and Co. p8.
Anon. (1922) Scientific Management Applied, p i 1.
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commentators the term scientific meant". .the gathering and organisation of facts.. "10
These ideas formed the basis for the implementation of new management plans. 
That is to say they had to offer something to businessmen otherwise there was no point 
in using them. The scientific approach to management offered the means to increase 
"efficiency” however it was measured. This need not have been just increasing 
productivity: Church saw it in terms of accuracy of work and speed of throughput.11 
A leading British practitioner put it like this in 1918: "You can put your business 
squarely on these facts. You can make your plans and do your work in accordance 
with facts, and not in a muddling or arbitrary way. That is what Efficiency means. ”12 
There was a direct association between the scientific method and efficiency; it was 
"Replacing opinion with facts.." Some confusion did exist in the conclusion that 
efficiency did not equal system; one could be in place without the other.13 Presumably 
this meant system did not necessarily produce efficient working. What "system" 
offered was the possibility of achieving efficiency via organisation and method in 
approaching management control.
If scientific management delivered efficiency, how did this translate to the 
workplace? The standardisation of procedures after a scientific approach to the process 
under examination, seems to have been the key. In operational terms this meant the 
setting up of a planning framework, usually an office, that would do the necessary 
initial investigation and then monitor the process once it was running.
The scientific approach to management , and scientific management in 
particular, was cited in attempts to rationalise industry. The Rationalisation movement 
as it was called, was the British attempt at putting management and business 
organisation on a more scientific footing. Rationalisation was defined as:
10 H.N.Casson (1918) (2nd. Edition) Factory Efficiency, London: The Efficiency Magazine, p32 
& 52.
11 See Emerson Efficiency, p86 and Church Science, p201.
12 Casson Factory, ppl7-18.
13 H.N.Casson (1918)(2nd. Edition) Factory Efficiency,London: The Efficiency Magazine, pl3,
67-69 & 75.
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"Rationalisation, by which we understand the methods of technique and of 
organisation designed to secure the minimum waste of either effort or material. 
They include the scientific organisation of labour, standardisation of both 
materials and products, simplification of processes, and improvements in the 
system of transport and marketing"14 
Rationalisation recognised the role of the scientific approach to management: economic 
progress was to be realised by using "the mechanism of thought evolved by the physical 
sciences ... applied to the solution of business problems with far reaching results."15 
This process was framed in terms of observation, collection and analysis of data which 
utilised the scientific method: "..the man who has ceased to talk about my experience 
and is beginning to talk about my experiments, is at least beginning to understand the 
full significance of the scientific approach."16 Rationalisation was "that movement 
towards a new approach to the general task of direction and control which is described 
as scientific management."17
In a sense Rationalisation was more than a management concept; one economist 
described it thus: "The aim of the rationalisation movement is to eliminate waste and 
inefficiency 'scientifically and logically' by some sort of joint action between all the 
firms within one industry."18 This view is confirmed in a more recent view of the 
inter-war period: Rationalisation described the "..solution to the problems of [those] 
industries which entailed elimination of excess capacity and reduction of costs through
Appendix B, pi 54 of L.Urwick (1927) The Meaning o f Rationalisation, Commissioned by a 
Committee consisting of, amongst others, the Professor of Accountancy and Business 
Organisation, the London School of Economics; the honourary secretary of the Management 
Research Groups and Directors of the Federation of British Industry.
L.Urwick (1929) The Meaning o f Rationalisation, London: Nisbet and Co. ppl7-18.
Urwick (1929) The Meaning o f Rationalisation, p32.
Urwick (1929) The Meaning o f Rationalisation, p27 and p58.
P.Sargent Florence (1933) The Logic of Industrial Organisation, London: Kegan Paul, Trench 
Trebner & Co, p87. See also E.A.G.Robinson (1935) The Structure o f Competitive Industry, 
London: Nisbet & Co. pl69.
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reorganisation into larger production and marketing units."19 As we shall see in 
Chapter Three, the railways were amalgamated for similar reasons. Being a network 
industry meant that the railways were always likely to be the subject of amalgamation.
The Rationalisation movement had a wider economic, social and political context 
which does not concern this thesis. However, the task of railway management after 
1923 was to ensure that the broad principles of rationalisation and scientific 
management were carried out. In addition we will see in the next chapter how 
individual companies were responding to claims that they were not managing according 
to scientific principles. For the moment we need to develop further what we mean 
by management control.
Management Control
The implementation of a new set of management practices was often preceded 
by the introduction of a Planning Office. For manufacturing the task was simple: to 
set up the management practices in conjunction with the engineers in charge of the 
process. The form of management control here was very much the establishing of a 
Programme [see figure 1]. Their task was to collect, collate and analyses information 
to ensure proper coordination of operations. The scheduling of material was part of 
this planning process as it concerned the timing of material as it flowed through the 
plant. The dispatching of material was not just the point at which the work process 
began, but also the function of monitoring the progress of material. The overall control 
function may then be seen to be embodied in the Planning office and with this planning 
came, it was hoped, control.
For Church, control was one of five factors that made up the manufacturing 
process. In order these were design, equipment, control, comparison and operation. 
These encapsulated the functions of the Planning Department with monitoring carried 
out by the comparison of variables. Thus experience was guiding management actions 
while at the same time many were denying the "rule of thumb" techniques that utilised 
such experience: the difference was in how that experience was perceived and utilised.
19 S.Howsen and D.Winch (1977) The Economic Advisory Council 1930-1939, London:
Cambridge University Press.
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The basis for comparison was time, quantity and "number" in addition to the monetary 
value: "Control is the central brain which receives information from comparison.." 
Indeed Church placed control at the centre of management when he said that "Systems 
of control are, at present, the battleground of the different schools of management.."20 
Control was exercised by communicating information from the workplace to the 
Planning office and then distributing the resulting decisions. To achieve this degree of 
control required the detailed knowledge of the analysis of processes provided by the 
setting of standards. Whilst Church saw control as just one of the factors in the 
manufacturing process we will see it as far more than this.
Management Control and The Planning Process
Many contemporary general management texts offered an insight into the effects 
of Scientific Management on business.21 We will focus on one example, F.M. Atkins’ 
Factory Management, that covered many aspects of scientific management applicable 
to manufacturing.22 We will then be better able to see how such broad notions of 
efficiency, standardisation and planning were applied in practice. He began with the 
setting up of the business itself: the construction or purchase of the buildings, plant and 
machinery and the selection of staff. Then he examined the various procedures 
recommended to lead to the best results: the setting of specifications and standards and 
the control of processes by information collected from documentation.
In designing how operations were to be carried out there had to be due 
consideration to be given to the product ie what sort of production process was 
involved - continuous or "jobbing". In defining a product in terms of its design and
20 Church The Science and Practice o f Management, p89-91 & p362.
21 See W.O.Lichter (1924) Planned Control in Manufacturing, New York: The Ronald Press
Company; F.A.Parkhurst (1917) (2nd. Edition) Applied Methods o f Scientific Management, 
London: Chapman Hall; C.Day (1918) Industrial Plants, New York: The Engineering
Magazine, and Various Anonymous authors (1915) The Library o f Factory Management,
London: A.W.Shaw & Co. For what developed in the inter-war period as a whole see 
L.P.Alford and J.R.Bangs (1944) Production Handbook, New York: The Ronald Press 
Company.
22 P.M.Atkins (1926) Factory Management, New York: Prentice Hall. Atkins had some 
experience as a consulting engineer and was an instructor in Commerce and Engineering at the 
University of Chicago.
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specification it was important to determine ultimately how the various parts of the 
process interacted. If we begin with the two key inputs of labour and materials we may 
understand more of this process.
Starting with labour the employers normally knew what type of person was 
suitable for the task in hand and recruited appropriately. As one text put it "Since the 
raising of efficiency is the first purpose and final aim of scientific management, it 
follows that the training of workers is the pivotal task.. ',23 The workers may have had 
some special skill when they arrived or they might be trained to the firm’s need. 
Materials were ordered in the same way but with more explicit documentation. The 
physical quality of inputs had to be set at a suitable level to ensure that the output 
would appear with sufficient quality. The selection of materials was the province of 
the engineer but once selected a specification was drawn up that reflected minimum 
engineering requirements. This was a trade-off between the technical requirements of 
the final product and the economics of price and supply. The specification was then 
embodied on a specification card for the use of the Planning Department and this 
ensured that the details would not change from delivery to delivery.
The purchasing of materials had to be maintained so that the plant could run at 
capacity: any delay would prove costly given the tight margins factories were running 
on. A requisition was issued for the material and depending whether the work was 
categorised as stores, which were brought in, or "worked materials" that were partly 
fabricated within the plant, the order would be placed with suppliers. The purchase 
order then acted as the means of monitoring the order, doubling as the contract between 
the vendor and the factory, other copies going to the Accounts, Purchasing and 
Receiving Departments. Thus the relevant parts of the organisation had the information 
they needed to watch the progress of material inputs. Once the materials were in place 
production could beginning by their being "dispatched" through the production process. 
The control and co-ordination of these disparate elements was a major problem for the 
management process solved by the Planning Department.
Anon (1922) Scientific Management Applied, London: A.W.Shaw & Co. p73.
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Management Control: Planning and Standardisation
Once the business procedures were understood from a technical point of view, 
standards could be developed. Seen as the "..exercise of foresight," it was to this 
office that the reports from time and motion studies came and the technical product 
specifications, as did the routing of material.24 The use of standards rendered the task 
of foresight easier, decreasing the uncertainty as to the outcome of future operations. 
The "duty" of the Planning Department was "..to compile and keep the official records 
of the standard practice instructions, the rules governing the policy of the business, and 
those concerning and defining the duties of employees." Books of Standards, 
Directions and Policy were the means to this end.25
The time and motion study was important in setting standards for scientific 
management. Its function was, according to those who lauded its virtues, to ascertain 
the performance of the process as a whole not just to intimidate the workforce. This 
included the paying of piece rates to the workers which depended on the productivity 
of labour relative to capital. There were allowances made for "personal necessities" 
and tool changes which demonstrate how precise these studies were supposed to be. 
The alleviation of fatigue could also be aided by such tests although there were specific 
tests designed (and marketed) for this. According to to one author "It is really a kind 
of analysis plus a definite measurement of the result of that analysis in terms of at least 
one unit, time."26 The factors that had to be considered when assessing such analysis 
both influence the setting of, and are influenced by, standards. That is to say, in, for 
example, steel machining, the conditions under which a study was conducted should as 
far as possible allow for differences in the material or machine used. Thus there could 
be an allowance for variance around what might be called the average piece of steel 
which was independent of the operator’s performance. Ideally the standard was then 
set which reflected this and should these not be reached questions were asked of the
A.H.Church (1914) The Science and Practice o f Management, New York: The Efficiency
Magazine, p485. For what follows see also Anon (1922) Scientific Management Applied.
Anon (1922) Scientific Management Applied, p i62.
Anon. (1922) Scientific Management Applied, p i75.
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operator and/or his tools. The study could be located in a laboratory situation or in the 
workplace. The latter was the ideal spot, but in some cases the laboratory offered 
superior testing facilities as the elements of the process were more easily isolated.
Once the standard was agreed upon, it had to be made part of the working 
instructions of the shop-floor. The "instruction card" carried the information required 
to complete a given task with the agreed methods. It included both technical details and 
the time it should take to do, leaving "..nothing to the imagination". The workers’ 
perception of these tasks was not left to chance: evening lecture courses were 
recommended and indeed the instruction cards were seen as "textbooks for the benefit 
of workers.."27 So with standard instructions in place, the manufacture of products 
could commence.
In describing a "typical" re-organisation of an engineering works in Manchester, 
the extent of pre-planning is revealed.28 The original system was described and a scale 
model of the works constructed and data collected on the operations within the plant. 
Restructuring was not meant to end after the initial introduction of scientific 
management, but to continue. Indeed the system once in place was designed to inform 
managers just when they should amend the organisation. Information was gathered in 
most systems monthly, weekly and daily, with regular meetings recommended. These 
depended on both the company’s managerial needs and those of the process. Emerson 
suggested five categories deserved monitoring, those of materials purchasing, 
maintenance and operation , standardisation, standard costing and dispatch.29
These were "..standard methods for the control of the manufacturing process" 
that led to the ". .acquisition of habits. "30 Standards formed the basis of what we now 
call Budgeting, but then was only just being formulated explicitly as such. By the 
1930's the notion of a formal budget was already well established in many plants. In 
one account published in the "British Management Review" the Chief Accountant of
27 Anon. (1922) Scientific Management Applied, p205.
28 See Anon (1922) Scientific Management Applied, p 121-22.
29 Emerson (1919) Efficiency, pl21
30 Atkins(1928) Factory Management, pl58.
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Dunlop Rubber Company describes his experience.31 Clearly budgeting was more than 
just comparing standards although the two were related. It represented an attempt to 
look into the future by an "..exact and rigorous analysis of the past.." The relating of 
the expenditures from different departments made coordination easier and explicitly 
used past experience: "By setting up such a system we learn by our mistakes, thus 
gaining experience and attaining increased control over our affairs." This was an 
explicit attempt to integrate the functions of planning and monitoring into a single unit 
of administration.
In general, then, standards implied predetermining the results and this was 
described as "..the main characteristic of the modem method." Indeed they were seen 
as "scientific certainties modified by experience."32 Operating standards were first 
written for the finished product and then extrapolated back to the material 
requirements. These were in many respects the centre of the scientific approach to 
management and the creation of a company memory: "The establishment of standards 
for operation and methods is simply one way of carrying over from one person to 
another and from one period to another, the results of careful scientific investigation 
to determine the procedure for the performance of the daily tasks about the plant."33 
Just as in science the task of setting standards came from classifying circumstances so 
that managers and operatives would know what to expect.
Thus it made other workers about the plant implicitly more aware of other tasks 
on the shop floor. It was an attempt to codify best practice within the company with 
standard machinery completing a task in a standardised time lessening the doubt 
associated with business. However once this was in place there could be no relaxation 
of managers. Inherent to the whole concept of a scientific approach to management 
was the need to monitor operations, thereby improving them.
F.R.M.DePaula (1936) "The Principles of Budgeting in Modern Business" British Management 
Review, Vol. 1, No. 2.
Emerson (1919) Efficiency as a Basis for Operations, pl52.
Emerson (1919) Efficiency as a Basis o f Operations, p i58; Church (1914) The Science and 
Practice o f Management, p i 15.
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Monitoring: Execution and Evaluation
For continuous processes like a steel works monitoring was easy enough as the 
output could be recorded and compared to a standard rate. For "jobbing" tasks it was 
more complex: the equipment needed to be set up and any specialised parts ordered. 
Workers were allocated by "time tickets" and materials by "material issues". 
According to Atkins once a part was completed it was inspected under the authority of 
an "inspection ticket" and then moved to the next phase by a "move ticket". A 
"dispatch board" monitored the movement of material around the shop-floor and a 
"schedule card" the progress of the order itself. Given that so many of the operations 
were controlled by forms and other documentation their design was of some importance 
as we will see in the use of scientific management in the office. Suffice it to say that 
they provided the basis for "serviceable aid in the utilization of standard methods of 
procedure. "34
The overall movement and co-ordination of assembly and sub-assembly was 
achieved by the "master schedule" using the pre-determined standards to estimate how 
the final product would eventually come together. This involved forecasting the level 
of sales and combining these with the productive capacity of the factory. Sales 
estimates were prepared based on past experience and the expected level of activity in 
the economy. Schedules for labour and materials were also completed to co-ordinate 
the workforce and others were compiled for tools, advertising etc. In fact most of the 
company's operations would be outlined in this way to ensure minimal wastage. The 
financial schedule would reconcile the income and expenditure of the plant as a whole 
thereby checking profitability as a whole. The master schedule was distinguished by 
Atkins as not being a budget because of its connotations with the comparing of receipts 
with expenditure. In other words it was a purely physical measure of throughput, not 
a financial instrument of control.35 In addition, all through the process it was 
considered essential to inspect the work to ensure that the standards were being 
maintained in terms of both quantity and quality. So these various forms and
Atkins (1926) Factory Management, p i80.
Atkins (1926) Factory Management, p262.
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documents acted as the agents of control for management on a day to day, job to job 
basis, with the managers and foremen working to the standards established by the 
Planning Department. The means by which the movement of jobs through the factory 
were controlled appear in the literature as Routing.
This involved "The arrangement of the operations into orderly and 
systematic sequences.. "36 and had to take into consideration the nature of the equipment 
design and working procedures to be effective. For a continuous process the 
arrangement of the route was crucial but obvious; in most cases one operation clearly 
followed another. However it also meant that any failure on the part of the 
management could be catastrophic: for example the steel making process requires that 
rolling mills be in a certain position in the batch and that the steel be of the correct 
temperature. If it was not, a major problem could arise. In jobbing the setting up of 
a routine is far more complex because of the individual nature of the product. The 
construction of the factory should ideally have taken account of the routing problem in 
its design. The likely progression of work from one machine to another was assessed 
so that handling was minimised. Allowance had to be made for any future expansion 
of facilities to minimise costs. The installation of mechanised handling methods made 
plant layout an issue of growing importance, as we shall see. The key problem was to 
integrate the process with the site, workforce and existing infrastructure. The direction 
in which material was to move, whether in bulk or batches, its weight and strength 
were considered as part of the initial design in companies following scientific 
management. In addition "Routine" itself was described as ". .the nerves of business..", 
as "..standardised procedure; standing orders...that become second nature - partially 
sub-conscious or automatic."37 An "operation route card" ensured that time and 
handling were minimised by standardising how items moved through the factory.
Once the product was completed it could either be stored or shipped 
immediately, so there would often be a warehouse alongside the loading bay. This was 
subject to detailed analysis of the best location of storage areas relative to loading and
Atkins (1926) Factory Management, p i66
R.E.Simpson "Routine - The Nerves of Business" System, September 1925.
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the packaging of products involved "research and experimental work.." and this 
included such minutiae as the testing of package strength in a revolving drum. Whether 
a product was disassembled for shipment or sent complete depended both on the loading 
gauge of the transportation mode and the criteria for charging ie was it by cubic 
capacity or weight.
Overall, then, the texts advised that the key to implementing a programme of 
scientific management was the establishment of a Planning Department to oversee the 
reorganisation of the work by measuring what each employee was capable of, and 
ensure that his value to the business was maximised. As with the shop-floor this was 
to be achieved both by studying the behaviour of costs and by time and motion studies. 
One example refers to the planning department as the repository of standard practice 
instructions and the responsibility of each employees. Books of standards and details 
of the company strategy and objectives were recommended for consultation within the 
planning department.
Implicit in much of the above discussion is the role of information processing: 
the decisions on standards and specifications had to be made by the managers on the 
basis of their experience and the information presented by reports collated from forms. 
The process by which data was collected and processed was also subjected to the 
scientific approach to management. For manufacturing this was the planning office and 
other offices supporting production. For the railways it will be important when we 
come to consider the establishing of centralised control mechanisms.
Systematic Management In The Office
However, it is not so much the changes of documentation that is the focus of 
this thesis, as to understanding how they reflected changing management ideas. The 
role of scientific management in the office will be discussed in the context of the 
collection, collation and analysis of information, corresponding to the functions of 
forms, reports, memos, letters and the visual display of information. Forms were the 
principle source of data collection, and storage. Once these have been defined and their 
place in the management process established, the place of the office will be considered. 
The collection of information will be examined in the discussion of Forms, whilst the
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collation and analysis of information are looked at within the wider context of the 
office itself.
The number of staff in manufacturing industry involved in the generation of 
management information and its analysis rose in Britain from about 8 per cent pre 
World War One to nearer 15 per cent in the mid 1930's.38 Whilst the shop-floor 
organisation dealt with just one aspect of the tactical decisions to be made, the notion 
that scientific method could just as well be introduced into the actual decision making 
process was soon realised. The office was, indeed is, where the information was 
collated and analysed. One recent definition is as follows and serves just as well for 
the office of the past:
"An office is a place where people read, think, write and communicate; where 
proposals are considered and plans are made; where money is collected and 
spent; where businesses and other organisations are managed. "39 
To take the definition of the office a stage further, its function can be seen as the 
collection, collation and analysis of information. This would both determine and be 
determined by management practice. It was, according to a writer in the inter- war 
period, a source of goodwill acting ". .as a clearing house for all incoming and outgoing 
documents, .and preserves the records which make up the firm’s daily history and which 
become the basis of all future planning."40 Office communication with other parts of 
the company and the outside world were by means which included forms, memos, 
letters, manuals, visual displays of information, meetings and committees. Scientific 
management changed the way in which the collection of information was accomplished 
and technology the environment it which it was used. Where previously management 
had relied on experience and relatively simple calculations now the data had to be 
collected and collated according to, once again, a "system": the increased complexity 
of production saw to this. The development of mechanical aids to accounting and the
Hannah (1983) The Rise o f the Corporate Economy, pp71-72.
V.E.Guilicano (1982) "The Mechanisation of Office Work" Scientific American, July 1984, 
ppl25-134, (quote p25).
W.Attwood "8 Incentives Which Stimulate Office Workers" Business, January 1931.
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telephone are just two examples of this radical transformation in the information 
technologies used to process data from ever more complex processes. The insertion 
of aids such as tabulating machines, calculating machines and copiers was often 
regarded as an opportunity to reform the office as a whole.
In the case of the railways statistics were collected on the basis of forms known 
as Returns. Forms were also used to display information as part of the Train Control 
process. A wider consideration of their role within organisations enables us to 
appreciate how developed the railway Train Control systems were. However, an 
appreciation of the extent of Systematic Management practices in British business in 
general during our period is difficult to gauge.
Collecting Information: The Form
Starting with the collection of information, the form is the main unit of analysis. 
What the origins of the form were is unclear, although it appears to be derived from 
legal documents. Administrative requirements led to the development of office forms, 
and in the late 19th., early 20th. centuries the design and use of forms was becoming 
ever more sophisticated.
Because the nature of data collection varied from department to department and 
firm to firm, early commentators discussed the broad criteria of design as well as the 
particular aspects that they found useful. The form was clearly recognised as a vital 
part of almost every office by the 1920's as the following definition suggests: "Forms 
are for getting orders set down and necessary facts recorded in such a uniform manner 
as to be readily interpreted and quickly usable."41
At the heart of any analysis of management techniques, the form functioned to 
collect information and communicate it to the office. Once data was collected the form 
provided a storage function within a filing system after the information had been 
transferred to other documents and uses. The movement of the form itself around the 
organisation was a function of where the data was entered, who received the form in 
its "raw" state and who needed a copy of the form and which section needed the
41 "Do Your Printed Forms Pass This Test" J.M.Shappert, Director Metal Stamping Company
System, March 1924.
44
processed information. In general, form design reflected the route through the 
organisation it took and the functions expected of it, for example as confirmation of 
delivery to set specifications, an invoice, or a record of events such as a railway return.
The basic description of any form is that it contains areas of space delineated 
for information entry. It was suggested in one text that the spaces provided were laid 
out according to how the form would be filled in ie the spaces would appear on the 
form in the same order as the information was appearing to the operative thus taking 
into consideration the very hand movements made each time a form was entered up.42 
Invariably instructions were printed, with room for the date and/or reference numbers. 
The size and type of print used could indicate special instructions or draw attention to 
important points; colour could fulfil a similar function. The type of paper and the 
number of copies required also influence design. Whether the form was intended for 
long or short term storage effected the quality of paper used and maybe the filing 
system used for retrieval. The process by which designs evolved depended on the 
perception by management of the task in hand ie what would be the form’s ultimate 
destination. To take one example, a commentator noted the design of an invoice, 
describing how "..the infinite variety of styles, shapes and sizes.." 43 created much 
unnecessary work. The specification of the form was standardised for both goods 
inward and outward and colour coding introduced with, for example, pink outward 
copies going to the accounts department, white and yellow to the requisitioning 
department and the yellow form stored in the originating departments files; standardised 
design enabled the files and associated cabinets to be made to a given specification. 
The elimination of writing was made possible by printing instructions on the form.
The form, properly designed, could speed up work not only by regularising 
filling them out, but as part of a mechanised system of data processing. At the 
beginning of our period mechanical accounting machines were just being introduced: 
by the end of the thirties they were common in many organisations. Integrating the
Atkins (1926) Factory Management, pp235-36.
"Why we use a Standardised Invoice" R.B.Hobson, System, August 1924.
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form into a mechanical accounting system had always been of some concern to works 
managers. As an article in Business from 1938 states, three main points in the 
planning of forms should be considered: 1) How are they going to be filled in ie by 
machine or hand; 2) Can continuous stationary be used (presumably in conjunction with 
a mechanised machine feeding system) and 3) Will the forms be duplicated by a 
machine.44 This particular commentator saw well made forms being as important as 
tools, being able to increase the output and provide an effective means of direction and 
control. Another article suggested that forms should be standardised in the same way 
that engineering specifications were.45 The use of the typewriter or calculating machine 
usually meant that a review of past form design was desirable. The introduction of 
machines into the office prompted, in many, cases the old methods to be modified in 
order to achieve increased efficiency. There were a number of machines on the market 
and although advice was available from the manufacturers it was often recommended 
that the company tested machine performance for itself.46 Different companies had 
varying specifications for, on the face of it, the same tasks; experiment revealed which 
were the most suitable for the individual office. The measure most often used to 
indicate the savings possible was that of labour time saved. This implies that the more 
skilled an operator, the more specialised the division of labour, the greater the gains. 
One commentator noting this recommended that "labour minutes" should be calculated 
which would in turn lead to the "number of clerk minutes" required per day.47 Once 
again the measurement of inputs and output was the key to effective systemisation and 
this required a thorough understanding of office routine.
See "Planning the Office Forms so as to Speed Up Works Management" F.Lloyd Parsons 
Business, May 1938.
"Can we Standardise Business Documents" Anon, Industry Illustrated, November 1936.
Sir Woodman Burbridge, Chairman and Managing Director of Harrods Ltd. in "Why we are 
Spending £25,000 on our Office" System March 1923; B.S.Trevor "How to get the Utmost from 
Your Office" ibid, February 1927 and C.E.Day "Mechanised Accounting to this Firm means 
Fitting Their Machines to Your Systems." Business, 1937.
C.G.Barstow "Are You Getting 100% Service From Your Calculating Machine" System, March 
1922 and H.W.Simpson "The Day-to-Day, Hard Cash Savings of Modem Office Machinery" 
ibid, September 1927.
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The reasons for mechanisation were neatly summarised by a member of the 
Accountant General's Office of the General Post Office: increased economy, ie 
decreasing labour cost, for the same (or more) output; increased office efficiency, 
meaning the accounts produced quicker and more accurately; more selling efficiency 
involving better sales and publicity and finally "..the need for improved control of 
works processes, more detailed or earlier statistics of output."48 However, it is not 
proposed to discuss in detail the implications of mechanical aids to offices as there are 
several studies which address this.49
We may see the form as a formalised document for the collection of information 
on a regular basis. That is to say the process of collection had been standardised, 
within the rules set by individual organisations. The specialisation inherent in the use 
of a form implies a specialised division of information within the firm in departments 
that need such data. In order to be made so, the data collected had to be presented in 
a form in which it could be made usable and this is revealed in the documents produced 
as a result of the collation of information.
Collating Information: The Report
Information was of little use unless it was collated and used in the formulation 
of policy. The report can be seen as a result of analysis of either a group of people 
such as a committee, or by an individual processing information. There were many 
different types of report depending on the individual organisation’s requirements. 
These were rarely discussed in the management literature in material form probably 
because they were a mixture of extended memos and in some cases, short books. Clear 
writing was stressed in all books on business correspondence and the use of writing had
F.W.Fox "Office Machinery: An Examination From First Principles" Industry
Illustrated, October 1933.
A.L.Norberg (1990) "High Technology calculation in the Early 20th Century: Punched Card 
Machinery in Business and Government" Technology and Culture, 31; JoAnne Yates (1993) 
"Co-evolution of Information-Processing Technology and Use: Interaction between Life 
Insurance and Tabulating Industries." Business History Review, 67; M.Campbell-Kelly (1992) 
"Large Scale Data Processing in the Prudential 1850-1930" Accounting Business and Financial 
History, Vol.2 No. 2, and (1994) "The Railway Clearing House and Victorian Data Processing" 
in L.Bud-Frierman (1994) Information Acumen.
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long been the province of the clerk. Diagrams and graphs representing processes and 
statistical analysis also began to appear. The use of graphs to present information had 
been for long the preserve of the engineer, and they were soon introduced in the 
discussion of management problems. According to an "office routine consultant" in 
1925, "Few businessmen today could control their enterprises... without the aid of 
graphic charts."50 This does not mean that information was necessarily made clearer 
by the employment of visual information. Some flow charts, in their depiction of a 
process, seem to confuse more than they enlighten.51 Statistical knowledge was 
becoming important and many engineers would have had a knowledge of such 
techniques. However it would often need interpretation for the businessman or 
manager untutored in the ways of the "efficiency engineer" or consultant.
The use of visual display was not confined to simple statistical calculations or 
graphs. The display of information in the Planning Department was seen as a crucial 
component of its overall activity. Illustrations of such boards appear in many texts and 
articles showing some very sophisticated examples.52
A report once completed became an input into the decision making process by 
being read and discussed by the relevant managers. The formal forum for this was the 
meeting with a structured agenda and contributions entered into the record as minutes. 
The degree of formality and structure depended on the type of functions under 
discussion. A works meeting would be relatively informal compared to a meeting of 
the Board of Directors. It is likely that many decisions had been reached before the 
actual meeting through informal consultation, the meeting serving to authorise the 
decision. However the meeting also acted as a means to air grievances and resolve 
disputes as well as occasionally causing them.
The above description has provided some of the background to how information 
was analysed using reports and forms. By describing what was perceived as being the
"Business Charts that make Figures Talk in Percentages" System, March 1925.
See C.E.Knoeppel (1918) Installing Efficiency Methods, New York: The Engineering Magazine, 
especially p42,44-46.
For example, see Knoeppel Installing,pl32.
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function of these documents we can approach their application in a specific context 
without having to return each time to the criteria underlying their design. The thesis 
is not concerned with the specific design of forms, more what they can tell us of what 
management practices were.
This chapter has outlined how the scientific approach to management was 
developed. Planning and standardisation were important in the establishing of a 
"System" of management. The process would then be monitored by the office acting 
as a filter for flows of information from the business process to the managers. In terms 
of our model of management control, the Execution and Evaluation functions were 
important parts of the office task. They provided the inputs for the Programming and 
the Planning functions.
The main task of the later chapters is to consider how management developed 
on the railways after amalgamation in 1923. To appreciate the process of change and 
to understand the context of operations we need to know how they were managed just 
prior to amalgamation from the turn of the century to 1923. The absence from this 
chapter of any mention of "scientific management" on the railway is not an accident. 
In Britain the railway sector maintained a literature, and a debate, all of their own. 
This chapter has provided the wider background: it is now time to examine more 
specifically the management practices of companies prior to 1923.
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Chapter Three 
Railways and Management
This chapter provides an introduction to the development of railway 
management practices. As we have seen in Chapter One, the provision of a fast, 
reliable transportation service required formidable technical skills. It outlines the 
debate on how railway management was performing which occurred as a prelude to 
amalgamation. This reveals differences in how a scientific approach to management 
was perceived. Important evidence for this comes from the debate over the use of the 
ton mile statistic as against systems of what came to be known as Train Control. It will 
be argued that one was a measure of output, and the other an instrument of control, and 
that this itself illustrates how varied conceptions of a scientific approach to management 
were. In addition, for the Conveyance function, the introduction of Train Control was 
an important development. Its rise on the Midland Railway, (MR), will be discussed 
here as an introduction to its growth on the LMS, described in Chapter Four. Finally 
we will introduce the structure of the railway companies as they were after the 
amalgamation of 1923, placing them within the context of the market environment they 
faced.
Early Railway Management
In his discussion of 19th century American railroads, Alfred Chandler stated that:
"Because the cost of constructing and equipping railroads was so much higher 
than that of all previous business ventures, railroad transportation became the 
first modern high-fixed cost business, and so the first in which continuous 
capacity utilisation became a major concern...In order to achieve the traffic 
necessary to maintain profitability .. a road's traffic department had to set rates 
and to schedule flows in ways that would come close to assuring the continuous 
use of equipment. "1
A.D.Chandler(1990) Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism, p55.
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This well describes the experience of railways in Britain, but with some important 
qualifications, as Chandler points out. Whilst admitting that the railways were the 
largest enterprises in the economy, with a higher density of traffic than in the US, he 
says that "..British railroad managers were less challenged to pioneer new methods of 
organisation and of internal control than .. in the United States..". Hence Britain's 
railways ". .did not provide models for industrial management as did the US railways. "2 
This assertion will be examined here.
The development of the railways can be split into two phases: construction and 
operation. Railway construction required the construction of earthworks on an 
unprecedented scale throughout the country. Although the canals had left a legacy of 
management skills and a workforce, the navvies, well used to such work, the scale and 
speed of construction was unique up until that time. It was not just the management of 
the permanent way and buildings that was important. Before any work could begin an 
Act of Parliament was required. This stated the terms upon which the railway could 
operate. This necessitated often quite substantial legal fees. For example the Great 
Western Railway spent £88,710 before construction, most of which went on securing 
Parliamentary approval.3 This process was an opportunity for the state to examine the 
effects of a proposed route, to hear any objections and to set the initial scale of rates: 
it was also an opportunity for other railway companies to try and block competing 
routes. The purchasing of land and settlement of compensation claims together with 
representing the company before parliament was more than an overhead on the expense 
sheet as it could affect the future performance of the business. The legal process itself 
would become an important forum for many aspects of the company's business and as 
such part of the management process, with the drawing up of siding agreements and 
negotiations before the Railway and Canal Commission.
Chandler Scale and Scope, p253; For details on the initial phase of railway development and 
how the companies developed management practices see T.Gourvish (1972) Mark Huish and 
the London and North Western Railway: A Study o f Management; G.Channon (1972) "A 
Nineteenth-Century Investment Decision: The Midland’s London Extension" Economic History 
Review, Vol 25, and P.Bagwell (1968) The Railway Clearing House in the British Economy 
1842-1922, Unwins.
E.T.Macdermot (1982) History of the Great Western Railway, Volume One, Revised by
C.R.Clinker, Ian Allen, pl5.
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The next stage involved the bringing together of the construction gangs which 
required the co-ordination of the builders, the accountants and lawyers to ensure that 
the project was completed on time - an early example of project management. There 
were materials to purchase and transport to the required site, the employing of 
hundreds if not thousands, of "navvy" labourers gangs involved in the work and the 
construction of huge works of civil engineering.
However, it was the operation of the railway that presented the greatest 
challenge and one that became more difficult as the network expanded.4 Once steam 
traction was the norm, investment in such machines was necessary, and there was no 
model for such operations suitable to railway management: certainly turnpikes and 
canals gave some clues, but they were not as complex and did not have the engineering 
constraints railways did. Speed in particular led to the possibility of accidents and 
required rapid communication between sections of line. The level of investment and 
amount of cash flow could not be adequately served by existing accounting methods. 
Fraud and "railway manias" were so damaging to all concerned that legislation was 
eventually passed in 1868.5
Railway management can be split into two periods, covering what we might call 
Primary and Secondary management tasks: the first period of the nineteenth century 
reflected the need to run the railway to minimum standards of safety and involved the 
use of standardised operating procedures regarding signalling, brakes, plus division of 
revenue between competing lines and the like. The second began from the turn of the 
century and is what we are concerned with here: the growth of systems to improve the 
performance of the company. That is to say moving from a concern with running trains 
safely to increasing their speed, punctuality and loading.
The earliest attempts to control the movement of trains came with the use of the 
telegraph in the 1840's.6 At this point we can also draw a distinction between control
4 This section is based upon Gourvish Mark Huish and the LNWR, Chapter 1.
5 See H.Pollins "Aspects of Railway Accounting before 1868" in M.C.Reed (ed.) (1969) 
Railways in the Victorian Economy, Newton Abbot: David and Charles.
6 P.J.G.Ransom (1990) The Victorian Railway and How it Evolved, London:Heinemann ppl45- 
154.
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as a Primary function in the signalling process and in the Train Control process. 
Information about the position of trains was clearly necessary if safe operating, a 
primary function, was to be achieved. From this more general information could be 
derived: as one commentator put it in 1867, in addition to signalling the telegraph could 
give "..directions connected with the management of the concern, as to the engine, 
carriages, passengers, goods, luggage etc.."7 He went on "..wherever a demand for 
extra conveyance arises , the conversing telegraph.... convey[s] the intelligence to 
headquarters or the nearest depot."8 These can be seen as early attempts at co­
ordination and it was from such indicators that more general train control developed.
Control across companies in a network industry could not be achieved without 
coordination. For many journeys, freight and passengers had to be able to move from 
one company to another. This required some degree of cooperation. This was also 
true of such technical components as signals, brakes and rolling stock standards. There 
was also the need to distribute the earnings from through ticketing and consignment 
arrangements to those involved. Co-operation was necessary for the benefit, and 
profitability, of all. As the rail network expanded there were difficulties over the 
movement of goods and people between networks owned by separate companies. On 
the freight side there was added expense of transhipment for the customer and extra 
warehouses, yards etc. at every point of intersection. Also many loads would be 
carried across the lines of more than one company. So called "running agreements" 
were no solution as freight rolling stock, complete with tarpaulins and ropes had to be 
returned to the originating network, whether full or not. In addition tickets and goods 
invoices had to be economically processed.
The Railway Clearing House began to operate on January 2 1842.9 The initial 
aim was to provide through ticket facilities with both goods and passenger tickets being
D.Lardner (As revised by E.B.Bright) (1867) The Electric Telegraph, London: James Walton,
p206.
Lardner The Electric Telegraph, p206.
See Bagwell Railway Clearing House for much of what follows.
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sent to the RCH for crediting to a company account. The rates were set at a proportion 
of the mileage, with a fixed rate per mile for through wagons and a set demurrage 
charge. Standard forms for the reporting of monthly statistics arose out of the need for 
information to monitor this activity. However, it was not compulsory to belong to the 
RCH and operating and charging practices remained a problem. The task of carrying 
freight was in these early years left to independent carriers such as Pickfords, creating 
the need to charge separately for terminal facilities. This added to the general 
confusion over the pricing policy.
Although the RCH was only a partial solution to the commercial problems of 
network operations there were advances in other areas such as safety and in particular 
the gradual standardisation of signalling and telegraph practices. According to 
P.Bagwell the regular freight operations were made easier by various guidelines 
established between 1847 and 1853, and which "..continued to be applied until the 
railways were nationalised in 1948..1,10
In addition to the distribution of monies and the setting of technical standards 
the RCH gradually assumed more responsibility for pricing. In Chapters Six and 
Seven, we will discuss in more detail the nature of pricing and the role of the RCH. 
For the moment we need to address the debate on railway management that was taking 
place at the turn of the century.
The Debate on Management
The eventual amalgamation of the railway companies by the 1921 Act was 
prompted by concerns over management performance in previous years. As the 
railways had developed, mergers had forced more complex organisational structures 
into existence. This was coupled with concern that the performance of individual 
companies was not what it should be. This, together with the experience of 
government control prompted the eventual grouping.
Perhaps the most useful starting point for the management debate is the 
collection of articles, reprinted by Sir George Paish, from the journal, The Statist. The
Bagwell Railway Clearing House, pp72-73.
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foreword was written by the NER General Manager Sir George Gibb and reflected 
criticisms of the management methods as practised by British railway managers. 
R.J.Irving's study of the NER argues that the introduction of statistical measures 
"..meant that what Paish liked to call "scientific management" had replaced rule-of- 
thumb on the North Eastern Railway. "n By this he meant that sophisticated statistical 
measures were in place as part of the organisation. These measures of ton mileage, 
wagon loading, average receipts per ton mile etc were being used to plan and monitor 
operations. The use of such figures would, in theory, negate the need to per supervise 
personally a large geographically dispersed organisation. However, there were more 
general ways in which railways could use the scientific approach to management. In 
particular this view ignores the specialised Train and Traffic Control systems. It was 
the use of the ton mile that was seen as being indicative of good management practice 
by critics of the railways. The NER was viewed as an example of model management 
practice because it collected ton mile statistics. Irving includes details of this debate 
on management reform.12 However, too much emphasis has been placed on the NER 
both in terms of best practice and the conclusions to be drawn as regards later 
management performance.
The debate has affected the way in which railway management was subsequently 
portrayed. It seems as if all railway managers up until nationalisation have been tarred 
with the same historical brush. The debate has always been framed in terms of the 
criticisms made by Paish and a Departmental Committee of the Board of Trade. This 
Committee was set up in 1907, and reported in 1910.13 The Final Report of the 
Committee was split, as we shall see, between those who supported compulsory 
collection of statistics and those against. This has formed the basis for a number of 
criticisms: D.Aldcroft, for example, admonished the railways for not paying "sufficient 
attention" to improving techniques arguing that they had "..little conception of the
R.J.Irving (1976) The North Eastern Railway, p219.
See Irving The North Eastern Railway, Chapter 11, pp250-266.
Departmental Committee on Railway Accounts and Statistical Returns Parliamentary Papers, 
Vol. LVI 1910.
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economic science of transportation."14 He concludes that as regards ton-mileage, "If 
the railways were to be run scientifically and economically it was essential that it was 
possible for such data should be collected."15
The central critique by Paish was that compared to US performance, British 
trains and wagons were poorly loaded. This problem was compounded by the failure 
to account sufficiently for their activity. That is, most railways did not collect ton mile 
statistics. The ton mile was seen both by historians and contemporaries alike, as a 
measure of "scientific management." This view has influenced historians to conclude 
that railways were not being run well. Yet few have considered what was meant by 
scientific in the context of this debate, nor what the ton mile was and was not capable 
of. We need to consider the debate over the ton mile in a little more depth. Only then 
can later developments in management practices be placed in the proper context. The 
question we have to ask is whether the debate reflected fairly on the railway 
companies? Was this ton mile the only measure of management success or were there 
other more valid claims? Then we can extend this analysis further into the practices of 
the amalgamated companies after 1923.
The Ton-Mile and the Departmental Committee
The ton-mile was a physical measure of output quantifying how much was 
carried a given distance: for example one ton carried ten miles and ten tons carried one 
mile would equate to ten ton miles.16 It did not reflect the cubic capacity of a load so 
that 10 tons of hay would take up more space, and hence require more wagons, than 
10 tons of coal. It was therefore important to bear in mind the operating conditions.17
D.Aldcroft (1968) "The Efficiency and Enterprise of British Railways" Explorations in 
Economic History, Vol. 5 No. 2, pl60 and pl72.
Aldcroft (1968) "The Efficiency and Enterprise of British Railways," pl72.
For an introduction to railway statistics see C.P.Mossop (1923) Railway Operating Statistics, 
London: The Railway Gazette; A.E.Kirkus (1927) Railway Statistics .'Their Compilation and 
Use, London: Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons.
This was stressed by several witnesses, see for example C.E.Grassman of the London, North 
Western Railway (LNWR) pi 10 paragraph 17 of Memorandum of Evidence, Departmental 
Committee on Railway Accounts and Statistics, Parliamentary Papers, 1910 Volume LVI.
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In an attempt to examine the issues of statistical collection the Board of Trade appointed 
a Committee to investigate their use within Britain's railways. This was prompted by 
pressure from the shareholding and trading interests who believed, rightly or wrongly, 
that the railway companies were being poorly managed. The result was a report 
recommending new statutory forms of returns and accounts, but falling short of 
compulsory collection and publication of the ton-mile statistic. The final report of the 
Committee had two reservations, one calling for the collection and publication of the 
ton-mile, the other rejecting even the competence of the Committee in dealing with 
such questions of internal railway management. The evidence presented to the 
Committee was in general against, at least the compulsory, collection of the ton-mile 
and reservations were expressed as to the measure's usefulness. Yard-masters and 
Superintendents were expected to check running and observe yard activity in person, 
not rely on statistics collected by others.
The North Eastern Railway had introduced management reforms at the turn of 
the century which have been described elsewhere.18 The evidence of Philip Burtt, 
Goods Manager of the NER supported the adoption of ton-miles as well as more 
detailed statistics: "[Railways] cannot be administered efficiently without efficient 
information with which to administer and with which to govern, and amongst that 
efficient information I should put knowledge of tons and miles amongst the very 
first.."19 However in his evidence, the Chief Goods Manager of the NER ,George 
Gibb, found difficulty in giving any specific examples of ton-miles improving 
performance. All he could do was ". .point to the whole of my experience. Supervision 
has been totally different more searching, more intelligent, and more fruitful in result 
than it ever was before."20 When questioned further Gibb referred simply to "the daily
See Chapter 9 "Reform" in Irving The North Eastern Railway Company.
Departmental Committee on Railway Accounts, Question 5806. For details of the wider reforms
see R.J.Irving (1976) The North Eastern Railway 1870-1914
Q9723 Departmental Committee on Railway Accounts and Statistics.
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and monthly business" before finally giving engine movement as an example where ton- 
miles could be of use.21
The management reforms introduced at the turn of the century on the NER made 
its officers important witnesses for the committee. In his memorandum of evidence, 
Burtt indicated that the ton-mile was a useful indicator of work done, with ton-miles 
per engine hour giving the overall measure of operating efficiency. The train load as 
a ratio of the ton-mile and the train mile was used by District Superintendents as a 
measure of weight carried and that of wagon to train miles for the load in terms of 
wagons. The wagon load at the starting point indicated to District Superintendents the 
efficiency of wagon loading at each terminal point.
Data collected was said by Burtt to enable the future to be forecast by producing 
a profile of the past.22 Perhaps the most interesting facet of Burtt's evidence was his 
attempt to link the gains made by introducing large capacity wagons, in which the NER 
was a pioneer, to the use of improved statistical method. This seems tenuous at best 
and there was not any evidence of causation in Burtt's evidence. He also suggested that 
in some way the collecting of statistics could help determine rates, something that even 
many of their supporters would not claim for those particular figures.23
The London and North Western Railway (LNWR) had qualms about some of 
the Committee’s views on statistics. However, they did collect much data which was 
of use in running train operations. In a Memorandum of evidence, they stated their 
objections to the collection of the ton-mile as being that it was too slow in its 
preparation (about 2 months), that different units were combined and that the result was 
misleading at best. Furthermore the task they were supposed to fulfil could be achieved 
with the statistics that they already had.24 However the LNWR was not rejecting 
statistical analysis outright, rather questioning the specific value of certain measures.
Q9724, Q9727 Departmental Committee on Railway Accounts.
Departmental Committee on Railway Accounts and Statistics, Q.5108.
Departmental Committee on Railway Accounts, Q.5081 & Q.5141. See also the question
disputing Burtt's claims regarding large wagons, Q.5739.
Departmental Committee on Railway Accounts and Statistics, p i l l  paragraph 13.
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They reported that more useful data was the "..hourly, daily and weekly statistics of 
the loading of every train and wagon." which it appeared the company took.25 
Information from the guard's journal was copied into "train books" for the use of the 
District Superintendent. This was processed every morning for the preceding day's 
traffic in his office and divided into several categories: Mineral and "less important" 
traffic was the first category with the express and regular transhipment trains (ie pick­
up goods trains), which had to run regardless, forming the other. Any light loading was 
reported to the District office and thence to headquarters. The average train load was 
sampled "spasmodically from the guard’s journal in number of vehicles rather than 
actual tonnage either gross or net. The wagon load was taken from each individual 
wagon return. Light loading was also checked by the "loading books" kept at each stop 
where loads were exchanged and these could be regularly inspected by the District 
Superintendent’s travelling inspectors.
Comparison of results was made ". .man with man, section with section, station 
with station, District with District."26 Large stations furnished daily returns and the 
smaller stations monthly and half yearly. The loading of wagons was reported weekly 
and monthly to the District Goods manager, who also received notice of light loading 
once a week. The performance of engines was monitored in daily or weekly returns 
depending on the size of station, large or small respectively. A daily statement from 
the goods "agent" to a district officer contained details of how many wagons were dealt 
with and how quickly they were dealt with, thus providing an indicator of shunting 
performance. Larger stations gave returns on how foremen, inspectors and other 
officials spent their time and on the "power" expended in yard operations viz capstans, 
cartage etc.27 More general reports were also submitted to headquarters by the District 
Goods Managers and District Superintendents.
These figures are an indication that despite the LNWR's broad opposition to that 
object of the "reformers" affection, the ton-mile, the LNWR was collecting much data.
Departmental Committee on Railway Accounts, p i 12 paragraph 19.
Departmental Committee on Railway Accounts, p i 14, paragraph 60.
Departmental Committee on Railway Accounts, pi 15, paragraphs 78,79 & 80.
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The question is to what use did they put it? The Committee heard that "Experts 
attached to the district offices and headquarters are sent from place to place, 
wherever...it is considered the best is not being done.."28 To conclude their 
memorandum, the LNWR stated that they dealt "..day by day in detail by means of 
useful statistics. "29 So the LNWR was not averse to using considerable amounts of 
data for management purposes, but they rejected the ton-mile. The use of an average 
negated the value, so they thought, and this was a common criticism. It was not 
possible to intervene in operations using an average as conditions were so variable. So 
the ton mile could not be used to enhance management control. The GWR 
memorandum of evidence stated this by drawing attention to the myriad operating 
conditions - different traffics over different sections of line, and there was no 
consideration of the terminal cost.
On the GWR similar use was made of the guard's journal but with a monthly 
return instead collated in the District Superintendent’s Office and then to the 
Superintendent of the Line. These showed average loading and the average number of 
minutes late. Poor loading was then discussed in a monthly meeting between the 
Divisional Superintendent and the Goods Manager. The Chief Manager's Office also 
monitored wagon loading on a quarterly basis via a sample of wagon loading for each 
station and inspectors could also, as on the LNWR, make surprise visits to the stations. 
The Board of Directors were also informed of poor loading by the presentation of such 
data as minutes.
As with the LNWR, what is revealed were quite sophisticated information 
gathering mechanisms. For example the average train load was not taken as a useful 
figure but the load of each individual wagon was known at each point. The measure 
of sophistication suggested by the GWR witness Mr T.H.Rendell was that of earnings 
per train mile, as they included terminal costs. As Rendell noted in a reply to George 
Paish, "I think the difference between us is that you are contending for averages, and
Departmental Committee on Railway Accounts, p i 14, paragraph 70.
Departmental Committee on Railway Accounts, p i 16 paragraph 106.
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I say we know the load, because we take it between every point. "30 The Great 
Central Railway (GCR) was represented by its General Manager Mr Sam Fay. His 
evidence reveals some of the problems in discussing the application of statistics. Like 
the GWR there seems to have been much "hands on" supervision of operations with 
inspectors from the Goods Manager’s Office.31 The wagon load was recorded and sent 
to the District Goods Manager where an average was compiled before going on to the 
Chief Goods Manager. Monthly meetings between the Goods and Traffic Offices 
ensured that poor loading could be checked. Returns were similarly received from the 
Train, ie the guard's journal, to the District Superintendent’s Office for daily analysis. 
A weekly report was submitted to the Superintendent of the Line, and the General 
Manager had a monthly return of train loading sheets which he would take to a meeting 
of the Goods and Traffic Offices. Comparative statements of expenditure incurred 
were made every fortnight which were scrutinised by the finance committee.
Given the time taken to produce the data, it is difficult to see how the ton mile 
could be used to monitor performance, since the conditions were so dissimilar. The ton- 
mile can be seen as an "official" cost accounting system producing "..information too 
late and at too aggregate a level to be helpful for operational control. "32 The evidence 
presented to the Committee and its Report reveal that there was some confusion about 
which issues should be addressed in the field of statistical collection. This was 
probably a reflection of the debate which the Committee was attempting to clarify: ie 
were railways being managed properly?
The problem was that it was not clear whether the measures used should reflect 
physical or financial conditions. There was a clear demarcation between operational 
control and the financial implications of such control. The proxy used by the 
Committee for efficient management seems to have been whether ton-mile statistics 
were collected or not. Hence, both the members of the Committee and the witnesses
Departmental Committee on Railway Accounts, Q.4469. Rendell was the Chief Goods Manager 
and former Assistant General Manager of the GWR.
Departmental Committee on Railway Accounts, Memorandum of Evidence, p281.
H.T.Johnson and R.S Kaplan (1987) Relevance Lost: The Rise and Fall o f Management 
Accounting, pl94.
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were sometimes talking at cross purposes. The ton-mile was an average measure which 
reflected the load carried per mile and could not take account of differing loads and 
operating conditions. At best it was an imperfect measure of performance. Railway 
managers were concerned with day to day operations, whilst those supporting the ton- 
mile saw uses beyond that of those internal to the company, in Annual reports and as 
evidence to government. Indeed the thrust of the reformers' argument was that the 
railway industry had been mismanaged and hence needed measures which government, 
shareholders and directors could use. Thus to the reformers it did not matter that the 
information was too late to be of use to managers as they were not the audience at 
which it was aimed. The final report recognised the distinction between the analyses 
of statistics, which, as noted above, was not always clear from the evidence presented: 
"In considering the practical advantage of statistics to those actually 
responsible for the working of a railway, it is necessary to draw a 
distinction between the working returns taken out at short intervals, 
merely embodying detached information for the use of subordinate 
officers in the daily conduct of the business, and the more generalised 
figure prepared for the use of higher officials and directors"33 
This sums up the differing views of the protagonists. As we have seen, the railways 
pursued the aim of combining such experience with a knowledge of management ideas 
in general.34
Most managers felt that they had enough data and experience of railway 
working to interpret such information as was available without the difficulty of using 
and interpreting an average. The regulations the railways were placed under by 
Parliament were many: they could not refuse freight since they were considered 
common carriers, prices were fixed, as were charges for facilities. It was this climate 
which prompted Samuel Fay of the GCR to comment under questioning as to the value 
of the ton-mile: "I think you have got to deal with all sorts of peculiar people in this
Final Report, paragraph 53, Departmental Committee on Railway Accounts and Statistics, 
Parliamentary Papers Vol. LVI, 1910.
See Chapter Two. The work of R.Kaplan and H.Johnson Relevance Lost, also deals with this 
issue.
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country. You have got to deal with Committees of Parliament and I should be afraid 
of anything a Committee of Parliament did, from my experience of some of them. "35 
The Report of the Departmental Committee reflected the conflicting evidence 
of the witnesses. However the Committee recognised the value of the ton-mile statistic 
even if its collection was not recommended as compulsory. The main body of the 
report was endorsed by all members but three were reserved in their comments. Sir 
Charles Owen and two others rejected the endorsement of such statistics. Citing the 
terms of reference of the Committee, these three did not believe that such a body was 
competent enough to deal with such questions. William Acworth, H.Fountains and 
George Paish offered further reservations, this time backing the compulsory collection 
of statistics.
The forum of the Committee, both the report and its evidence, demonstrates the 
confusion surrounding discussions of management reform. By the time of the 1921 Act 
the question of what statistics to collect had been resolved, largely in favour of Paish 
and Acworth rather than Owens. As we shall see the Act recognised implicitly that 
measurement and analysis were important in the running of large scale organisation, 
but did little to encourage it.
What the Committee left was a useful summing up of what management and its 
critics thought they needed from a more "scientific approach" to management. As the 
representative of the Railway Shareholders’ Committee stated, "It is a lamentable fact, 
widely recognised, that for many years this country has lagged behind others in 
scientific organisation. "36 The views of the Committee mostly reflected this and laid 
the foundations for the inter-war system of Returns.
The evidence put before the Committee neglected key aspects concerning the 
use of office machinery and in particular the telephone. Yet as we shall see, at the very 
time the Committee was convening its investigation, the Midland Railway was starting 
to employ Train Control with the telephone as its central component. No mention was 
made of the telephone in the evidence given, nor were questions asked of its value.
35 Departmental Committee on Railway Accounts, Question 7960. Whether he was referring
specifically to this Committee is not clear.
36 Departmental Committee on Railway Accounts, p327.
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Indeed it was explicitly rejected by some commentators as being of no value. The next 
section discusses the systems of Train Control that were being established on companies 
from 1907 onward. It shows that there were attempts being made to utilise a scientific 
approach to management. It also provides some background to the development of 
centralised Train Control under the LMS which we will discuss in Chapter Four.
Train Control
Train control was tried on the lines of several companies including the LNWR, 
L&Y, NER, GWR and MR. It extended the use of the telegraph and the telephone into 
a system of management control. The process of conveyance could be monitored and 
information extracted for use by management. In enabled managers to, in the language 
of our model, Evaluate and Execute plans agreed upon in the form of schedules and 
routes.
It was the MR that led they way, being the most comprehensive and long 
lasting: forms designed before the First World War were still being used after the 
Second. It formed the basis of the LMS system that lasted well into nationalisation. 
The significance of these systems is that they represented at least a partial solution to 
the problems arising out of the debate on management. We will describe the MR 
Train Control system in some depth before describing the L&Y and NER systems. 
This then helps interpret the debate on management practices and provides background 
for the discussion on conveyance in Chapter Five.
When it reported on the Midland’s Train Control in 1921 the Railway Gazette 
described it thus: "The train control system is undoubtedly the most ambitious scheme 
conceived with the object of determining the utilisation of track capacity and plant, and 
of securing a more efficient and economic user.."37 The origins of such a system on 
the Midland stemmed from the need to relieve congestion and improve the relief of 
guards, firemen and drivers. According to a Midland report written in 1914, there was 
a general need to improve overall working "..without increasing the capital expenditure
37 Anon. "The Train Control System of the Midland Railway" Railway Gazette, July 8, 1921.
64
out of all proportion to the expected addition of revenue. "38 The problem of congestion 
was particularly acute. Even building additional running lines was ineffective since the 
stocks of wagons from private sidings spilled into the surrounding depots, interfering 
with main line freight operations. In addition there were 24,760 cases of firemen and 
drivers working more than 15 hours a day, resulting in increased fatigue and payments 
for longer shifts.39 Train Control was the response to both of these problems.
The initial installation of Train Control on the MR was on a 10 mile stretch of 
line in commencing in 1907. The purpose was to control coal train working in the 
Masboro1 area.40 The General Superintendent reported to the General Manager in June 
1908 about its performance. On the basis of this the MR Directors gave the go ahead 
to extend the system.41 Approval was sought for "..up to £5,000 in the provision of a 
control office at Derby.." together with telephone links between Cudworth and Toton 
for the purpose of establishing ". .the first instalment of the improved system of control 
of the working of goods and mineral trains."42 This was agree in 1908.
The Train Control office supervised local workings. On the other hand, 
"..matters of principle are discussed and controlled by the Superintendent of Freight 
Trains.." who represented the General Superintendent at Headquarters.43 The District 
Controllers reported to the Superintendent of Freight Trains and in addition they 
discussed the previous 24 hours' working.
RAIL 491/815 Midland Railway Train Control no author, p2 (An internal document published 
by the Control Office, Derby in May 1914.)
RAIL/491/815 Midland Railway Train Control, p2. It would appear that this calculation was
for the period immediately before the introduction of Control in 1906.
RAIL/2804/8 Train and Traffic Control Arrangements - Re-organisation of Areas and De­
centralisation of Staff. September, 1944, p2.
RAIL/491/165 Midland Railway Traffic Committee Minutes, Minutes 35134 and 35163 "Report 
on Traffic Control," 1914.
RAIL/491/165 Midland Railway Traffic Committee Minute 35163, 1914.
RAIL/491/815 Midland Railway Train Control, p9.
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FIGURE ONE: The MR Train Diagram
Source: Anon "Traffic Control on the LMS" Railway Gazette, February 22, 1929.
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The initial purpose of this plan was the relief of crews and congestion. But this 
soon developed into a more general system of control including coal traffic and rolling 
stock distribution. The basic mechanism was as follows: information was telephoned 
in via certain reporting points by "train reporters." As trains entered or left sections, 
these reporters contacted the District Control Office. The engine number, class of 
train, train identification, time of passing and time cleared were all noted. District 
Control in turn collected information hourly from these points and if necessary 
telegraphed information to the Superintendent at Derby.44
To set up the train required an engine and crew to be brought from the depot. 
The motive power depot informed Control of the situation regarding its locomotive 
stock who were then able to contact the siding staff. As the control office had a good 
overview of traffic requirements from "traffic cards" it was relatively easy to marry 
engine with load. Thus the control office was in a position to co-ordinate engine depot 
working with the load.45
The introduction of a maximum 8-hour day meant that providing relief was of 
some importance. Previously shift arrangements were decided by trainmen contacting 
the nearest depots for relief with no central co-ordination. This was solved by knowing 
the progress of trains simultaneously. In the past crews had missed their relief through 
the train not being where it should have been.46 The performance of crews in meeting 
their trains was monitored by a form recording details and signed by the crew being 
received: should a train be missed then the reason was noted.
Before any crew could move their train, there had to be a means of planning the 
"paths" each train would follow.47 This plan was drawn up on graph paper and divided 
into 24 hour segments, (Fig. 1), and indicated the important stations, sidings and yards 
along the way. This replaced the old method of working with printed pages and forms.
44 RAIL/491/815 Midland Railway Control, pl2.
45 RAIL/491/815 Midland Railway Train Control, p22.
46 RAIL/491/815 Midland Railway Train Control, p5.
47 For what follows see "The Train Control System of the Midland Railway" Railway Gazette, 
July 8, 1921. As the running of Passenger trains was by a public timetable, changes could not 
easily be made. Hence freight movements were fitted in around this public timetable.
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Also shown were cranes, staff stations and water troughs, whilst slow and goods lines 
were shown colour coded red and green. The steeper the diagonal lines the faster the 
train with horizontal lines indicating where and for how long stops were scheduled. 
For any one track none of the lines should meet as this would indicate two trains on one 
track at the same time. Alterations in working could be planned around this. 
Additional paths could be entered on the diagram if the capacity was so desired. This 
system of "diagramming" enabled controllers to co-ordinate freight train movements 
by showing how special workings could be slotted into the overall traffic position. This 
was important in measuring the "workable running capacity" of the line which would 
determine traffic density and associated train movement.48 Once the diagrams had been 
agreed they were written up in the "Midland Railway Freight Train Working Time 
Book," which showed all the times in different type according to the times of passing, 
starting or stopping.
In its description of these diagrams, the Railway Gazette was clearly impressed: 
"The amount of work involved in the diagramming of all the trains for the whole 
Midland system must have been colossal..," clearly the company thought it was worth 
it.49
The movement of the train was monitored by a Train Card which contained the 
name of the crew, the time they started duty, the number of wagons and the destination. 
Also included was an identifying engine number. This card was placed on a Train 
Board and the card moved according to the location of the train. The information 
required for the Train Card was telephoned in from the motive power depot and any 
further details telephoned from reporting points along the route. In addition, notice of 
traffic was provided by the Traffic Card, again displayed on the Train Board, this time 
to the left hand side. Reports every two hours from "..sidings, Inspectors, Foremen 
Siding Porters etc who are stationed at the point where traffic originates.." formed the 
basis for this display.50 This enabled the controller to rapidly assess the wagon
50 RAIL/491/815 Midland Railway Train Control, p21.
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distribution within a district and to speed up the re-allocation of wagons as soon as they 
became available.
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The Stopped Traffic Card was used if there was a build up of traffic "..owing 
to an abnormal run of traffic, or other cause, a consignee is unable to receive his traffic 
it becomes necessary to stop or restrict its despatch from the stating point. "51 Any 
depot could request such authority from the District Control Office, who would inform 
the consigning station. If the traffic originated outside the District, then the Central 
Control Office at Derby was consulted. Whether at the District level or at Derby, the 
Card was completed and information on the type of traffic and number of wagons was 
given to the stations, yards etc involved. As long as the station/yard card was held at 
source, it acted as the authority to restrict the traffic.
The information received by District control was updated every two hours on 
the "Traffic Sheet," by telephone, regarding the traffic on hand at sidings. Every 
morning at 8.0am this was compiled for the coming day’s working, and altered as was 
necessary. This showed the number of wagons available/required and where, details 
of which were communicated to Central control at Derby.
The Railway Gazette gave an example of how Control officers were able to 
analyse workings.52 Study of the train diagrams revealed that it would be possible to 
improve the performance of heavy coal trains to London by retiming them. The 
success of this was gauged by punctuality with 258 out of a sampled 428 trains arriving 
on time and 148 less than 10 minutes late. Unfortunately no comparative figures were 
provided as to punctuality before this.
This review of Train Control on the Midland Railway shows in outline how 
trains were monitored by the use of telephone communication from selected reporting 
points within the District. The changing traffic situation could be recorded and 
displayed on the control board. The management at the Midland Railway were satisfied 
with the system: "The Train Control System has produced an inseparable link between 
the Central Control Offices and the District Controllers, the daily conferences 
establishing an equitable distribution of working difficulties and harmony which is most
RAIL/491/815 Midland Railway Train Control, p23.
"The Train Control System of the Midland Railway," Railway Gazette.
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healthy to work amongst."53 The same report noted improvements in reducing 
congestion, after Train Control was introduced in 1907 (See Figure 2). There were 
2,830 Goods Guards and Brakemen in 1907 giving a wage bill of £240,368. By 1910 
it was £176,124 with 2,200 men.54 Similar effects were experienced by engine crews: 
in 1907 there were 5,936 drivers and crew which fell to 5,780 in 1910. The wage bill 
for the Midland fell from £783,237 to £698,971.55 The full potential of the MR system 
was revealed after the amalgamation in 1923, when it was adopted throughout the 
London, Midland and Scottish Railway.56
The MR had the most systematic application of Train Control. However there 
were other company schemes which utilised some form of control. These schemes 
were not as unified as the MR but did offer some degree of coordination.
The Lancashire and Yorkshire
In January 1912, the L&Y established its first sections under Train Control at 
Wigan and Wakefield.57 This was followed in 1913 by an office at Wakefield. By 
1915 the use of such offices resulted in the establishing of a central control at 
Manchester. The Superintendent of the Line was in overall control, with an Assistant 
responsible for implementation below this.58
The objectives of control were similar to the MR. Engine power, crew and 
rolling stock use was to be maximised along with route capacity. In addition loads
RAIL/491/815 Midland Railway Train Control, p62.
RAIL/491/815 Midland Railway Train Control, p71; Parliamentary Papers, 1908 XCV, 1909 
LXXVI Returns on Hours Worked.
RAIL/491/815, Midland Railway Train Control, p71; Railway Returns, Parliamentary Papers, 
1908 XCV, 1911 LXX.
See Anon. "Traffic Control on the LMS" Railway Gazette, February 22, 1929.
What follows is based on G.Seddon "The Advantages of a Train Control System Embracing all 
Stations" Great Western Railway (London) Lecture and Debating Society, Meeting 9th. 
December, 1920. Seddon was Chief Superintendent of the Line for the L and Y. See also Burtt 
Control, Chapter XI pp 130-143.
In this position was Ashton Davies who, as we shall see, rose to prominence on the LMS. He 
later became Superintendent of the L and Y.
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were coordinated with trains with, it was hoped, an increase in the speed of service. 
Train control was also explicitly seen as a means of reporting on proposed investment 
decisions. How much traffic was passing a point and with what delays? Could new 
sidings or loops reduce such congestion? These were the sorts of questions Train 
Control was designed to answer.
As with the MR, emphasis was placed on the graphical representation of the 
route, but with more sophistication. The Central Control Office consisted of an inner 
and outer circle, the latter being Section Controllers, the former the Chief and Deputy 
Chief Controllers. Spread around the circumference of the room was a complete map 
of the L and Y system. All running lines, junctions, sidings loops and refuge sidings 
were depicted in different colours. Central controllers could see at a glance how the 
entire network was functioning. The Sectional Controllers could also view this but in 
addition had in front of them their own particular section. On these boards "pegging" 
would monitor the movement of trains through the company. Information for this was 
collected by regular telephone reports from signalmen, shunting cabins, stations etc.
The North Eastern Railway
The NER differed from the MR and L and Y in that control was not 
centralised.59 Nor was it universal, as passenger control was only introduced in 1922, 
at York.60 Only Districts with specific traffic problems or areas of congestion were 
included. As with others the maximisation of engine power, crew availability and 
capacity of the route were the stated objectives.
There were 59 reporting points within the Newcastle District linked by 
telephone, plus points such as signal boxes and shunting yards. At Middlesborough a 
display of metal carriers moved around a schematic diagram at the behest of the 
Controller. Details of load, crew, times etc were placed within the carrier. At
See Abstract of Lecture by G.Robinson "Freight Train Control, North Eastern Railway" 
Railway Gazette, February 7, 1913; Anon "Traffic Control, Newcastle, North Eastern Railway" 
Railway Gazette, April 5, 1918.
Anon "New Headquarters Main Line Control, North Eastern Railway," Railway Gazette, 
December 1, 1922.
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Newcastle a more conventional diagram was used, not unlike a signalman's display. 
Information on train movement was sent via telephone and recorded on sheets at the 
Control office. At Newcastle, in place of the carrier, tickets were placed on the display 
board. Rolling stock was monitored via reports every six hours. Any out of the 
ordinary events were recorded in a Report book. Carbon copies of each entry were 
sent to the Divisional and District Superintendents.
Although not a comprehensive centralised system, these examples from the NER 
indicate that they too could appreciate that telephones had a role to play in operational 
management. What they did not do was develop it further to deal with specific routes 
and traffics. This would have led to bottlenecks occurring outside of the route under 
control, thereby negating the overall benefits. The LNER was later to rue the fact that 
the NER had only a partial system, comprising Traffic, as opposed to Train, Control. 
The key differences between these two systems will be examined in Chapter Five.
The Reformers' Response
That there was confusion over what constituted a scientific approach to 
management is clear. The Statist, whose editorials and letters formed the basis of the 
influential book, The British Railway Position, was still claiming in 1914, seven years 
after the introduction of Train Control that "..scientific material about British railways 
is neither compiled nor permitted to be compiled, except by the North Eastern 
Railway."61 This did not go unchallenged, prompting an anonymous reply by "A 
Traffic Manager" who in the ensuing weeks pointed out that there was more to a 
scientific approach to railway management than the ton-mile. He went on to quote the 
advantages of Train Control noting that it was "..infinitely more useful as a guiding or 
saving factor than any amount of ton-mile statistics can possibly be to the operating 
officer. "62 The next letter from the anonymous traffic manager pointed to the variety 
of traffic and conditions involved in rail transport and rejected the use of "meaningless
The Statist, February 21, 1914, p363.
The Statist, February 28, 1914, p421.
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averages."63 The Statist replied with not a little hostility. It noted that such criticism 
proved that managers were not following "scientific management."64 Another 
anonymous letter appeared from "A Railway Director" supporting the stance of The 
Statist. Here once again the issue of personal supervision was rejected: "The truth is 
that your correspondent is not and cannot be in close touch from day to day and from 
hour to hour with the working of his railway."65 Clearly the Director did not 
comprehend the function of Train Control and the role of the telephone in it. As we 
have seen above, even that bastion of the ton mile, the NER, had realised some value 
to such a system.
Many of the reformers were concerned with people outside railway operation - 
shareholders, government and traders. For example there was the evidence of the 
Railway Shareholders Committee, from a Mr W.Burdett-Coutts MP. He noted that 
shareholders had "..no means of gauging the competence of those who control and 
manage the enterprise other than by the dividend paid."66 In other words they were 
concerned with monitoring overall performance, rather than particular issues of 
management. What the correspondence in The Statist reveals is that the ton-mile was, 
in a sense, a fashionable stick with which to beat railway managers. Writers on 
Scientific Management did in general see that "scientific management" was more than 
a measure of output: data needed to be "systematically collected" so as to be "instantly 
available."67 The function of Scientific Management was "..to bring together, analyse
The Statist, March 7, 1914, p486. See also P.N.Norton (1902) Statistical Studies in the New 
York Money Market New York: Macmillan, p i5, for similar criticism of averages in the context 
of money markets.
The Statist, March 7, 1914, p486.
The Statist March 4, 1914, p486.
The Statist March 7, 1914, p326.
F.E.Cardullo "Industrial Administration and Scientific Management" in C.B.Thompson (ed.) 
(1922) Scientific Management, London: Harvard University Press, p62.
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and prove the vast amount of knowledge making up the trade. .This must be classified, 
tabulated, and made available..to all men; whereas formerly it was scattered."68
Terminal Services
In addition to the debate on statistics and management conducted by Paish, there 
was a comprehensive critique of terminal services developed by a businessman, A.W. 
Gattie. The so-called "Gattie System" is interesting for several reasons, for it was not 
just another case of "railway bashing," although to many managers it seemed so at the 
time.69 It contained within it the seeds of Containerisation. Such Containerisation 
would become one of the railways’ more enduring innovations in the late twenties and 
early thirties. As such it is an interesting reflection on how railway management dealt 
with terminal operations. This also illuminates a little known precursor of 
containerisation, the commercial implications of which are examined in a later chapter.
To a modem observer the similarities between the Gattie Clearing House system 
and a modern container Depot are striking. Through the use of a Central Goods 
Clearing House located in London and other important provincial centres, Gattie 
proposed to radically alter how terminals were worked. Containers would be used to 
minimise handling and aid transhipment via the Clearing Houses. Given that 
Containerisation and transhipment were to form important strands of railway strategy 
in the inter-war period, we might view railway managers’ reactions as conservative to 
say the least. David Lamb a later editor of Modem Transport, was at the time a 
railway employee. He remembered how his superiors had requested reports with which 
to demolish Gattie's arguments.70 Whilst we may conclude that this was failure on the 
part of management to comprehend new management practices, we should remember
68 H.K.Hathaway "The Planning Department, Its Organisation and Function."in Thompson 
(1922)Scientific Management, p369.
69 For details of Gattie's scheme, and the difficulties he had pursuing it, see R.Homiman (1919, 
Third Edition) How to Make the Railways Pay for the War, London: George Routledge and 
Sons; Homiman refers to Paish and The Statist on p74. It should be noted that Homiman was 
himself a supporter of Gattie. F.W.West (1912) The Railway Goods Station, London: E. and 
F.Spon Ltd Appendix ppl80-186 gives the not too favourable impressions of a Manager. West 
was London District Goods Superintendent of the South East and Chatham Railway.
70 See Bonavia Railway Policy Between the Wars, p i35.
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the problem of redeveloping existing sites within urban areas. Just as conventional 
terminals could not expand, there was little realistic hope of being able to develop 
massive Clearing Houses. Gattie's case was also hindered in his approach to his 
critics. His New Transport Company was strident to say the least in its dealings with 
those of a different opinion.71
Gattie did not offer a solution for the basic problems facing the railway 
companies. The capacity at yards was limited as traffic had increased beyond that 
originally catered for and problems were being experienced. Benches were crowded 
with goods awaiting transfer, or collection. Contemporary criticism of terminal 
working can be, if not entirely refuted, then tempered by the evidence. Sources 
demonstrate that new methods of working were being considered. Solutions to
these problems usually centred on rearranging the organisations of the shed. In 
addition, as with train control it seems that the 8 Hour Day influenced working 
patterns. This encouraged changes to be made thereby maintaining operations by 
monitoring the hours worked.72 The MR studied conditions in some depth, noting 
arrivals and departures of wagons and speed of handling.73 The relationship between 
incoming and outgoing wagons was noted in chart form. The average wagon load was 
extracted as an indicator of the scheme’s success. Bonus payments were based on 
analysis of speed of handling and "average ton." The variance between that and the 
actual tons handled was minimised as each ton reflected only the conditions pertaining 
to that shed, as opposed to a system wide measure. Further examples were noted in the 
trade press, albeit post World War One. In London, the MR had extended notions of 
control to terminals via cartage operations.74 The telephone was once more used to 
facilitate communication between the various operations. The objective was to 
maximise the use of labour whilst minimising empty haulage. Regular reporting
See Horniman How to Make the Railways Pay for the War, for evidence of this; especially 
Appendix 4, the Correspondence with the Board of Trade.
Anon "Goods Station Working on the Midland Railway" Railway Gazette, December 29, 1922.
See the series of articles T.E.Argile "The Operation of a Goods Shed" Railway Gazette, March
19, March 26, and April 2 1915.
Anon "Midland Railway's New Cartage System" Railway Gazette, November 1, 1918.
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between drays and the yard coordinated delivery. It also monitored the position of the 
dray relative to the pickup puts in the delivery area by using charts and diagrams.
Yard working itself was brought under telephone control on the eve of 
amalgamation.75 The yards in question, at Nottingham and Leicester, were integrated 
within the telephone cartage systems described above. Forms were used to collate 
information from the telephoned reports. The status of wagons and their loads, and the 
position of drays was noted on an hourly basis. A series of diagrams displayed some 
of this information to controllers who then diverted traffic to the relevant positions. 
Standards were set governing the performance of each part of the process. According 
to the District General Manager of the area, improved speed of handling, delivery time 
and throughput were achieved, although unfortunately we have no figures to support 
the specific claims being made. However what is important is not so much the results 
of individual schemes but the methods that were being employed. It is clear that a 
scientific approach to the analysis of information was being pursued in this area of 
operations. The point is that it was not limited to Train Control. These methods were 
not limited to the MR either. For example in 1922 the LNWR at Curzon Street, 
Birmingham was introducing electric trucks for internal movement.76 To facilitate 
this, the company had to understand how the various elements of terminal working 
interacted. Special reports on shunting and wagon accommodation were commissioned 
to this end. It was recognised that the process of mechanisation required "Systematic" 
analysis if it was to be sucessful.
We have seen in Chapter Two how the scientific approach to management was 
embodied in the writings of commentators and academics. The debates on management 
outlined above were important in shaping the thinking behind the plans for 
amalgamation drawn up after World War One. That, and the experience of government 
control, focused attention on what economies would be possible from the amalgamation 
of railways. The next task is to outline the structure of the railway companies as they 
were constituted after 1923, with the focus on those aspects that affected the control of
Anon "Goods Station Working on the Midland Railway" Railway Gazette, December 29, 1922.
Anon "Electric Trucks in Goods Terminal Work" Railway Gazette, June 16, 1922.
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freight operations. In addition we need also to place the railway operations within the 
commercial environment they faced between 1923 and 1939.
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Chapter Four 
The Post Amalgamation Railway Companies
The amalgamation of the railway companies under the 1921 Act was essentially 
a stop gap for nationalisation. For almost all of their existence, railway companies had 
been regarded as almost a public service. They owed their existence to private Acts 
of Parliament and government had always maintained a close interest in their working. 
This, combined with a belief that centralised administration was a means by which 
economies could be achieved, gave rise to thoughts concerning nationalisation. This 
was supported by the experience of the government in running the railways through the 
Railway Executive Committee during World War One. It was also the "logical" 
conclusion of the trend toward merger that had taken place prior to the First World 
War.1
The pre 1914 merger movement had continued after the war, with the MR and 
L&Y combining prior to the 1921 Act, in 1920. The railways became in effect a form 
of cartel, with information sharing, the pooling of receipts and joint working. Under 
the 1921 Act, prices were set under the auspices of the RCH and confirmed by the 
Railway Rates Tribunal, of which more will be said later.
From the late twenties and early thirties, there were moves toward pooling 
railway receipts on certain routes between companies.2 This was to avoid duplication 
of resources, which also extended to such aspects of operations as canvassing and the 
provision of road services. The "Pools" were established between the LMS, LNER and 
GWR for various traffics, based upon the net receipts on competitive routes for the 
years 1928 through to 1930. Pooling was the most visible financial consequence of 
cooperation. The sharing of commercial and operating information was just less 
visible.
See Chapter 8, H.Pollins (1971) Britain's Railways: An Industrial History, David and Charles:
Newton Abbot; W. A.Robertson (1912) Combination Among the Railway Companies, Constable 
and Company. Many of the arguments were rehearsed in the Report and Evidence o f the 
Departmental Committee on Railway Agreements and Amalgamation Parliamentary Papers, 
XXIX.
2 Bonavia The Four Great Railways, pp 171-174.
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The two most important factors for the railways in the inter-war period were 
the regulatory implications of increasing road transport and the decline in key traffics 
due to depression. Government regulation implicitly assumed that railway companies 
were in competition with each other, but this was increasingly not the case. By far the 
most important source of competition was from road vehicles. The nature of this 
competition influenced how the companies cooperated through the RCH. Past decisions 
on price and service had to be considered when evaluating current policy.
This chapter sets the scene for the analysis of the companies’ management that 
follows. We will examine briefly the regulatory framework in place after the 1921 Act. 
Then we will profile each of the companies, relating the organisational structure to 
some of the flows of information which concern us, the Goods Conferences and 
Committees. We will also review the business background to the railways in terms of 
road competition and the depression in the "old" heavy industries. It should be stressed 
that this is not meant to be an all encompassing narrative of the period 1921 to 1939: 
this is available elsewhere.3 What is intended here is to produce a background to the 
use of commercial and operating information.
The 1921 Railway Act, Amalgamation and its Legacy
The task of managing a railway from 1914 onwards, cannot have been an 
attractive proposition. Government control restricted management just at a time when 
traffic was increasing due to the demands of war. Granted, the power vested in the 
Railway Executive Council would have made some tasks easier, but overall the 
business of railways would become increasingly complicated.4
The costs of conducting business were increasing, again due in part to 
government regulation. Wages were increasing at a time when revenues would be 
insufficient to meet them. An 8 hour day was finally to be introduced in 1919. By 
contrast a Rate and fare increase was permitted only in 1917 and 1920. The Select 
Committee on Railway Transportation of 1918 and the formation of the Ministry of
3 See M.R.Bonavia (1981) Railway Policy Between the Wars, Manchester University Press, for 
details of investment and financial performance in this period.
4 See E. A.Pratt (1921) British Railways and the Great War, Selwyn and Blount.
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Transport helped shape post World War One policy. It was against this background 
that reorganisation of the railways took place.
The basis for the 1921 Act was presented in a White Paper of 1920, Outline o f 
Proposals as to the Future Organisation o f Transport Undertakings in Great Britain 
and their Relation to the State. This developed the notion of a grouping with 
representatives from the workers having a voice in the management of the companies. 
It also suggested that revenue gains be limited by appropriating them for the wider 
development of the transport infrastructure.5 Despite, or perhaps because of, the 
radical nature of the proposals, many were dropped. For example, the proposal that 
workers should be represented on the Boards of Directors was not implemented. 
However other limits on management control were in place: the wages and conditions 
of service were determined by statutory bodies further limiting the freedom of 
management.
For the issues of management control addressed in this thesis it was the 
restraints placed upon pricing that had the most impact. The ability of the railways to 
price had always been limited by Government: this was to be further extended into the 
ability to make profits. The Act limited the railways to a Standard Net Revenue, 
which, once reached, would then lead to additional monies being used to reduce rates. 
This formalised revenue maximisation as an objective.
From the point of view of management control the most important aspect of the 
1921 Act, was the phrase "efficient and economical working." This was to be the 
criteria by which the performance of the railways was to be judged. The RRT, 
(Railway Rates Tribunal), was established to monitor operations and report to the 
Minister of Transport. Each year it would hold hearings which heard evidence from 
the railway companies and traders as to the efficiency or otherwise of operations.
Unfortunately we cannot look to this for any detailed assessment of railway 
operations as the all important phrase "efficient and economical" working was never 
defined in any clear sense. No measures were devised or reports ordered to investigate 
aspects of working. Clearly policy had not been well thought through: one of the main
Pollins Britain's Railways, pl47.
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recommendations of the 1918 Select Committee on Transport had been the unified 
ownership of the railways, as only then would it be possible to achieve the required 
economies. How this was to be achieved in the absence of such information was not 
made clear. It is apparent that there was no vision behind regulation: how such 
economies were to be obtained was left to the discretion of railway managers and the 
officials of the RRT. This had an impact on the operation of individual companies as 
the government was unaware of the difficulties posed to the railways by the changing 
business environment. They had no idea of the constraints under which every day 
management was operating. To be fair the management of the companies would 
probably have objected to detailed regulation, but more detailed statistical material and 
formal reports of specific criticisms would have helped both sides. It was not just that 
the regulatory institutions were defective per se: without such guidance as to what 
"efficient and economical working" meant, there was little hope of the objectives of 
legislation being attained. Be that as it may, to appreciate the effects of government 
policy we need to examine the inter-war operating environment in a little more depth. 
Then we are better able to discuss other government initiatives.
Once the Act of amalgamation was passed, there was naturally a period when 
companies and government alike adjusted to the new situation. This was inevitable in 
such a large undertaking, but it soon became clear that the business situation was not 
improving. By 1928 the new Classification and associated rate structure was in place 
and this focused attention on what rates were actually being charged and for what 
service. By now the growth in road competition was clearly identified as a major bone 
of contention by the railway companies, who brought this to the attention of the 
government. This prompted some important changes in legislation.
From 1928 new legislation allowed the railway to operate road transport other 
than C&D. and the 1933 Road and Rail Traffic Act placed the Agreed Charge on the 
statute book. We will consider what the implications of this were in Chapter Seven. 
For the moment it is sufficient to note that whilst government perceived a difficulty for 
the railways with road transport, it was not willing to alleviate it. This was 
compounded by the general economic climate in the thirties especially, as we have seen 
above.
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The means by which government acted can be seen in the reports of the various 
Committees investigating the railway industry. In fact they mirrored the concerns 
regarding the development of the railways after the 1923 merger and the growth of road 
competition. In 1932 the likely consequences of pooling railway receipts was 
investigated and allowed to proceed.6 This was perhaps an admission that the railways 
should have been nationalised in the first place.
Meanwhile the railways were attempting to influence government in a variety 
of ways. The RRT hearings and evidence before the Royal Commission on Transport 
was one way.7 By the late thirties, realising that even when agreement could be 
reached with government on some aspect of policy, there was very little will to do 
anything, the railways established the "Square Deal" campaign. Through this, and 
probably as a result of the continuing information being gathered by government 
through the RRT and previous Committees, the Transport Advisory Council was 
established. The Royal Commission on Transport had recommended that such a body 
should be set up but only late in the thirties was it finally operative.
This anticipated some of the problems that would shape post 1945 railway 
policy, as well as confirming some already existing ideas about past performance.8
The Inter-War Business Environment
Road transport developed out of the demobilisation of men and vehicles that 
occurred after World War One. By the time of the 1933 Road and Rail Traffic Act, 
a system of licences was in place which reflected the predominant types of haulage 
business. The "C" Licence was held by private business such as retailers which carried 
their own goods. "A" and "B" licences were those businesses that also carried goods
See Ministry of Transport, Railways Act 1921 Report o f the Railway Pool Committee and 
Proceedings o f the Railway Pool Committee, both 1932, HMSO.
Royal Commission on Transport - Final Report: The Co-ordination and Development o f 
Transport, HMSO Cmnd. 3751, 1931.
See T.R.Gourvish (1986) British Railways, 1948-1973: A Business History, Cambridge 
University Press, especially Part 1, "The British Transport Commission and the Railway 
Executive, 1948-53," pp29-91.
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other than their own or which were dedicated general hauliers.The extent of road 
competition can be seen from the figures in Table 1:
Table 1: Number of Goods Vehicles Licensed
1929 326,207
1932 366,178
1938 478,115
SOURCE:RAIL/418/209 Review of the LMS Commercial Organisation, 1940, p34.
It was not just the number of vehicles: what they were capable of doing was as 
important. We have figures, also from the LMS on the estimated number of specific 
types of road vehicle available. In 1926 there were 197,378 lorries of up to 3 tons 
capacity; by 1928 this was 241,862 and by 1931 299,927. However the number of 
vehicles above 3 tons remained fairly static over this period at about 55 to 58,000. 
What concerned the LMS was the growth in 6x8 wheelers which could carry far greater 
loads. These increased from 407 in 1926 to 858 in 1928 and 3391 in 1931. It has to 
be remembered that they would in all likelihood carry loads above those proscribed by 
law. This growth was further reflected in estimates of the traffic which had been lost 
to road competition:
Table 2: Rail Traffic Lost to Road Transport - LMS 
Estimated Tonnage
Class 1-6 Class 7-21 Total
1934 13,074 121,386 134,460
1935 44,726 158,694 203,456
1936 110,562 91,323 201,885
1937 131,335 87,927 219,262
1938 566,481 153,610 720,090
SOURCE: RAIL/418/209 Review of the LMS Commercial Organisation, 1940, p35.9
The Classes 1-6 included some merchandise and mineral traffic. Class 7-21, the remainder.
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The increase in Class 1-6 road traffic, from 131,000 to 566,000 tons in 1938, was 
thought to reflect the purchase of "Motor fleets" by the London Brick Company and 
the Manton Brick Company. The relative decline in the rate of traffic transfer between 
1935 and 1937 was seen as a result of the Road and Rail Traffic Act of 1933. 
Elsewhere the company had noted that " no doubt we are only retaining today a 
considerable quantity of traffic...on sufferance."10 Furthermore it noted in regard to 
claims "the annoyance caused to customers and the inconvenience to the manufacturer 
in sending replacements, results in some cases in diversion to road."11 Whilst these 
figures reflect LMS experience they indicate the trend across industry: road was 
replacing rail. Road competition was eating away at sources of traffic, and the railways 
had better improve their performance or face severe financial problems.
The GWR noted the "serious character" of road transport and the LMS how 
their financial position was "increasingly prejudiced" by the same.12 The collection of 
commercial information and its use within specialised departments was encouraged by 
the view that the commercial department was the lens through which the railway 
perceived the customer and vice versa: it was "the means of conserving and augmenting 
revenue. "13 The competition from road was not the only problem. From the turn of 
the thirties a depression in several categories of traffic caused problems. Although it 
is difficult to follow the effect of this directly using the official statistics, we shall see 
in the Chapter concerning terminal working how individual traffics were monitored. 
For a more general picture we can see how some proxy measures changed over time,
RAIL/421/146 Freight Transportation in Container Trucks, 1926, paragraph 79.
RAIL/421/146 Freight Transportation in Container Truck, paragraph 192.
RAIL/250/767 GWR Goods Conference Minutes, "Road Motor Competition" February 17 
1921; RAIL/418/209 Review of the LMS Commercial Organisation and its Achievements, p6.
RAIL/418/162 LMS Chief Goods Managers Conference, "Organisation of the Commercial 
Department" Minute 1, 17 January 1923.
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with what implications for the railway. It is also important to note the different 
proportions of the key traffic categories carried by each company.
Table 3: GWR Percentage of Traffic
MERC. MERC. & MIN. COAL etc.
1928 15.52 15.44 68.04
1934 16.59 14.08 69.33
1938 16.82 12.83 70.35
SOURCE: Railway Returns14
Table 4: LMS Percentage of Traffic
MERC. MERC. & MIN. COAL etc.
1928 18.88 22.88 58.24
1934 17.52 21.52 60.96
1938 17.19 21.16 61.65
SOURCE: Railway Returns.
Table 5: LNER Percentage of Traffic
MERC. MERC. & MIN. COAL etc.
1928 17.6 19.5 62.9
1934 14.9 18.58 67.13
1938 14.45 17.66 67.89
SOURCE: Railway Returns.
Merc. & Min. Category was Class 1-6 Merchandise and Mineral Traffic. Coal etc. included 
Coal, Coke and Patent fuel. This applies for the following tables seven and eight.
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Tables 3, 4 and 5 show that for much of the time the proportions of traffic carried were 
stable. All show an increase in the proportion of coal carried, but this reflects the 
inroads of road transport on the transport of merchandise. The years chosen represent 
the beginning of operations under the new classification to the end of our period, plus 
1934 for comparison.
The industries most heavily hit were the "traditional" heavy industries of iron, 
steel, shipbuilding and coalmining. All these were intensive in their use of railways as 
a means of transportation. However, the picture was not one of unmitigated disaster: 
there were new industries which could utilise rail transport. We need to see how far 
the railways were making inroads into these markets. The motor industry needed 
petrol, or motor spirit, which was carried by rail, as was roadstone for the construction 
of roads. The construction of houses provided traffic as well. For each of these 
categories we can use official figures indicating receipts and tonnage. We have to 
acknowledge that because the statistics relate to the classes of traffic being carried in 
the General Classification, we do not know how much in total the railways were 
carrying. Traffic would be double counted if it was transported in a raw form and then 
processed. It was likely to be more, but how much so is unclear. What they can do 
is indicate the level of traffic the railways were carrying in this period and the effect 
of depression and road competition on overall levels. This places the use of business 
information within the context of the operating environment.
The decline in the heavy industries can be seen in the statistics relating to ship 
launches, coal output and steel production.
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Table 6: Heavy Industry Output, 1928-1938 
(all units in millions of tons)
SHIPPING COAL STEEL
1928 1.4 237.5 n.a.
1929 1.5 257.9 10.4
1930 1.5 243.8 9.1
1931 0.5 219.4 6.6
1932 0.2 208.7 3.6
1933 0.1 207.1 4.9
1934 0.5 220.7 7.2
1935 0.9 222.2 7.5
1936 0.9 228.4 9.1
1937 1.0 240.4 10.5
1938 0.9 227.0 n.a.
SOURCE: Shipping, Buxton and Aldcroft, British Industry Between the Wars; Coal: 
(1940) Mines Department Eighteenth Annual Report o f the Secretary for Mines, 
HMSO; Steel British Iron and Steel Federation Statistical Bulletin, December 1931 
Vol. XII, No. 12; December 1934, Vol. XV, No. 12; December 1935, Vol. XVI No. 
12; December 1937, Vol. XVIII, No. 12.
Coal and Iron show an upturn towards the end of this period, which is to be 
expected given that the former is required to make the latter. Shipbuilding however 
remained depressed. To see how this affected the railway companies we need to 
compare the total amounts of coal iron and steel carried by Britain's railways.15
Including the SR in this figure does not effect our interpretation as we are concerned with the 
overall market conditions. Indeed the SR carried much less of these commodities because they 
were located outside of SR territory.
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Table 7: Coal, Iron and Steel (millions of tons)
COAL IRON & STEEL
1928 181.1 8.33
1929 199.8 19.3
1930 186.0 15.4
1931 167.5 11.0
1932 161.3 10.6
1933 159.5 12.8
1934 167.8 15.9
1935 168.5 16.7
1936 170.8 19.3
1937 181.1 21.9
1938 166.0 16.4
SOURCE: Railway Returns, Coal includes coke and patent fuel. Iron and steel includes 
Pig Iron, Scrap, Class 6, and lists K,L and M under the General Classification of 
Merchandise.
Here we see one of the major problems in using railway commodity statistics. 
The tonnage carried in most cases was far greater than the imports and domestic 
production of the industry combined. This is because the railway figures were based 
upon items carried. That is to say that loads were carried from a steelworks to a 
stockyard to an engineering works. Each of these may have involved rail transport and 
would figure in the statistics. Steel would also be transformed into products that would 
then be transferred once more by rail. Similarly some coal traffic would go by sea. 
The degree to which this happened is impossible to calculate, but does not detract from 
their value here, as it is only to highlight the problems faced by the industry that they 
are used.
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Each company was affected in a different way and the old traffic has to be 
contrasted with the new emerging at that time. Motor fuel, cement and bricks are 
examples of these. Again we can see how much of this traffic was going by rail. 
However it is difficult to give any precise estimate of the proportions of the total 
available traffic as road competition would almost certainly be making inroads into this 
traffic.
Table 8: Tonnage of "New" Traffics (millions)
CEMENT BRICKS etc. REFINED LIQUIDS
1928 1.8 5.5 1.6
1929 1.8 5.5 1.7
1930 1.8 5.5 1.7
1931 1.7 5.1 1.7
1932 1.6 4.1 1.6
1933 1.4 4.9 1.1
1934 1.5 5.4 1.6
1935 1.5 5.4 1.7
1936 1.7 5.2 1.9
1937 1.7 4.8 1.9
1938 1.6 3.6 1.9
SOURCE: Railway Returns, 1928 - 1935.
From this both cement and bricks show an overall decline. This shows how the 
railways were losing traffic as there were increasing numbers of houses being built in 
this period, just over 166,000 in 1928, to 339,538 in 1936.16 Refined liquids, on the 
other hand, increased which is not surprising. This would be explained by the growth 
in motor traffic requiring petrol which would be transported to local distribution depots
The Building Industries Survey, Vol. II, No. 10 1936, p445, December 1936; Vol. IV, No. 9, 
December 1938, p373.
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from the refineries. This, using the oil companies’ own tank wagons would in most 
cases be more economical sent by rail in bulk than by motor vehicle.
The receipts received by the railways were also declining in some of these 
traffics. For cement it fell from an average receipt of 9s 8d per ton in 1928 to 8s 2d 
in 1938, in refined chemicals from 19s to 11s 2d. However in bricks and tiles the 
receipts went up from 7s 2d per ton to 8s 8d per ton.
Not all companies were affected equally by the decline in traffic. For example 
the LNER was carrying over 700,000 tons of cement in 1928 for which it received 
nearly £415,000. By 1938 this was down to 430,000 tons at £198,000. The GWR by 
contrast had increased its tonnage, but this was at the expense of revenue. From 
405,000 tons and receipts of £154,000 in 1928 to 412,000 tons and £147,592 in 1938.
As we shall see in Chapter Seven the reasons for such changes were many and 
complex. Conditions of conveyance differed from place to place, contract to contract 
so it is difficult to explain in detail the reasons for differing receipts between 
companies. However we do now have a general picture of how selected traffics were 
responding to the service railways were operating.
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Organisational structure and the Use of Business Information
The organisational charts for all of our companies covered many areas of 
activity, from accounts and estates to hotels and engineering.17 For our purposes, the 
organisational structure of the railway companies is of only marginal interest. We shall 
not look at the entire diagram of each, only those that relate to the commercial and 
operating aspects that concern the thesis. (See Charts 1, 2 and 3.)
The organisational chart can only provide a limited perspective on the utilisation 
of commercial and operating information. Our concern here will be to outline the 
internal organisation of the companies as a background to the specific issues of 
management control. We are concerned with the basic organisational structure 
involved in the operating and selling of transport. It is important that we place 
management control within some context and this requires a rudimentary understanding 
of how business was organised. Although the geographical areas of amalgamation were 
determined by government, the Directors and senior managers were able to structure 
companies according to their wishes.
Clear differences emerge in the three companies we discuss. The LMS and 
LNER each had to cope with amalgamating former competitors, with their own 
distinctive operating styles. In the LMS it was the L&Y, LNWR and MR; on the 
LNER the GCR, NER and GER. The magnitude of this task should not be understated: 
managers had to be found places in the new organisation and working practices agreed 
upon. No doubt the perception of the railways as a "profession" crossing company 
boundaries helped this process. However, there remained problems some of which we 
will identify in the following chapters. The GWR did not suffer from the amalgamation 
process as much as the LNER and LMS, as it was the only company to retain its 
identity after 1923. The few lines that were added were already known to the company 
who had relatively little trouble in assimilating them.
See Appendix after the index,(no reference) Sherrington The Economics o f Rail Transport, 
Volume Two, for organisational diagrams of the LMS and LNER. For the GWR the diagram 
is on p21.
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The LMS began under the former MR Chairman, Sir Guy Granet. It was he 
who invited Josiah Stamp to become Chairman, and later President of the company. 
Stamp's role in the railway sector was unique. He had experience of the chemical 
industry, government and was widely regarded as an influential figure in the industrial 
world.18 More importantly for our purposes he was aware of the debates in 
management practices in both Britain and America. The reforms initiated by Stamp 
require more explanation than on the LNER and GWR. These companies’ re­
organisation was, in terms of administrative structures straightforward. Under Stamp, 
the LMS would adopt Vice Presidents and an Executive Committee, with provision for 
employing many of the latest notions of management and administration.
This contrasted with the GWR, who retained the Departmental system. This 
involved the General Manager being responsible to the Chairman of the Board through 
the hierarchy of each department. The LNER operated on a Divisional system with a 
Southern, North Eastern and Scottish Area, under Divisional General Managers. 
Instead of detailing all of the organisational chart, we will concentrate just on those 
sections that apply directly to management practices and their role in control.
The LMS and Organisational Reform
The LMS embarked on a reorganisation of its Commercial Department in 1932 
which altered the organisational structure, depicted above. A Chief Operating 
Manager was appointed, responsible to the Vice President Operating and Commercial 
with Passenger and Freight Commercial policy combined under the post of Chief 
Commercial Manager. The purpose of reform was to ensure a means of 
decentralisation, giving district officers more power.19 As we can see from the 
organisational chart, District organisation dominated the operational aspects of freight
See Chapter 1, M.R.Bonavia (1981) Railway Policy Between the Wars, Manchester University 
Press. See also Dictionary o f Business Biography, Volume 5, (1986), M.Bywater “Josiah 
Joseph Stamp,” pp260-273.
A.Davies "The Application of Modem Commercial Practice to Railways" Journal o f the 
Institute o f Transport, April 1934.
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working. The Commercial Department interacted with the Goods terminal operations 
via the Development Agents under the Goods Terminal Superintendent.
The Executive Research Office reported directly to the Executive Committee. 
Whether the centralisation of detailed operational matters was desirable featured in 
many debates at the time. At the centre was the headquarters which was allocated the 
task of setting policy and surveying the network for traffic. District offices had local 
control, conveying the policy to outlying areas, but headquarters provided specialists 
who were able to advise District offices on aspects of policy, or any special problems 
that might arise. The stations, or "nerve-endings" as Ashton Davies called them, had 
the task of "interpreting the policy" under the guidance of the district office. The 
relationship with the customer was seen as being most important. The function of the 
Chief Commercial Manager was to act as a "Public Relations officer" as well, thus 
ensuring a high profile to his activities both within and outside the company.
The stated objectives for this reorganised structure seemed to relate to the need 
to be able to respond to changing circumstances. There was a need to "..revitalise and 
strengthen.." contact between the trading community, general public and the company. 
Its policy was to "..meet the transport requirements of the company's customers."20
This referred not just to rail transport but to a more widespread notion of 
haulage, related to a concept of transport as a commodity in itself. The objective of the 
LMS was to maximise revenue: "[transport] should be marketed at a price which would 
attract the greatest number of purchases, and be so related to costs as to enable the 
maximum amount of net revenue to accrue."21
This reorganisation was followed in October 1933 by the establishment of a 
Commercial Research Section designed to pursue revenue generating ideas. In 1935, 
the publicity and advertising side was reorganised. The most important rearrangement 
of local organisation came in 1933 as part of a wider assessment of the market.22 It
20 RAIL/418/209 Review of LMS Commercial Organisation, 1940, plO.
21 RAIL/418/209 Review of LMS Commercial Organisation, 1940, plO.
22 This was covered in RAIL/421/119 Statement of the Area, Population, Industries, Principle
Traders' Payments and Sales Organisation, September 1933. See below with reference to the
collection of commercial information.
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provided a "measure of competitive elements" within districts and "facilities for making 
commercial contacts," including details of the number of road hauliers within the 
area.23 District Canvassers were appointed to passenger and freight operations, with 
volume sometimes necessitating special canvassers for specific traffics. Such 
representatives could also be allocated to back up the permanent local teams.24 Each 
District kept records of the firms in their areas, their names, dates and time visited. 
Total monthly accounts were kept as part of a centralised system of reference.25
To ensure that these notions of service and policy were pursued at every level 
within the organisation, a scheme was introduced setting targets for each District and 
station. Introduced by Ashton Davies, the Chief Commercial Manager, this was known 
as the "Quota" system and its purpose was to measure and encourage effort. An initial 
survey provided a standard quota to be set "on a reasonable expectation of traffic, 
taking all things into consideration - state of trade, national conditions, local conditions 
and the prospects in their districts."26 It utilised a publication called "Quota News" to 
disseminate news and instill a competitive spirit amongst the staff. This included over 
60 "leagues" with positions being noted in each edition of "Quota News." The targets 
were set daily, weekly, monthly and quarterly, with prizes going to the best 
performers. It was a means of encouragement, designed to bring all parts of the 
network into the task of selling transportation. This was a response in part to the 
problems created by what was widely thought to be the "overcentralisation" of the 
LMS. Some mechanisms were needed to ensure that the intangible commercial, as 
opposed to operational/engineering, department functioned properly. The latter were 
more constrained by the nature of the technical work they were involved with. 
Commercial activity was more open to interpretation of fact with attendant effects on 
performance.
RAIL/418/209 Review of the LMS Commercial Organisation, pl4.
Bonavia Railway Policy, p55.
RAIL/421/119 Statement of the Area...Manchester District, p9.
Davies "Modem Commercial Methods” Journal o f the Institute o f Transport, April 1934.
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The GWR: Continuity without change
The District Goods Managers were responsible to the Chief Goods Manager, 
with some liaison between the road operations. Conspicuous by their absence were 
Train Control Offices at a District and Divisional level. Divisional control was not a 
priority on a system the size of the GWR. The Chief Goods Manager headed 14 
Districts within which the agents and station masters were expected to develop traffic.
The Goods managers were occasionally aided by "Local Traders Conferences" 
designed to bring together the company and traders. Their task was not only to 
increase the amount of business, but also to help monitor expenses. As with the LMS 
Quota Scheme there seemed to be an attempt to bring the outlying stations closer to the 
management’s objectives. It was noted that "Results which cannot readily be expected 
to accrue in tangible form should, however, be carefully watched."27
The most important commercial element of the GWR organisation was the 
existence of the Traffic Research Committees. We shall examine their role when 
discussing commercial research. However they were not the only sources of 
information within the goods organisation. The Rates Section collected information on 
the nature of and rates charged, by the competition.28 The operating and commercial 
elements came together within the offices of the Superintendent of the Line. We shall 
see exactly how when examining the role of the Goods Conferences.
Overall the organisation of the GWR was less complicated than that of the LMS. 
This was partly because the Directors seemed satisfied that the limited amalgamation 
could be contained under existing methods of organisation, but there was also a 
conservatism in relation to applying new management ideas when compared with the 
LMS. However this is not to say that this was necessarily inefficient per se, but it needs 
to be recognised.
RAIL/250/743 GWR Goods Conference Minutes, Minute 7346 12 April 1929, Appendix A 
"Local Railway and Traders Conference."
For a general overview of the GWR Goods Department see H.W.Payne (1934) "Keeping 
Abreast of the Times in the Goods Department" Great Western Railway (London) Lecture and 
Debating Society, meeting 11 January 1934.
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The LNER: Area and District
The LNER had the same problem of size and conflicting company loyalty as the 
LMS. However, like the GWR, it remained conservative in its approach to 
organisational structure. Its response was to divide operations into three: the Scottish, 
North Eastern and Southern Areas, each with a different Goods organisation.29 
According to the former Superintendent and General Manager of the North Eastern 
Area the advantages of area organisation overcame "..the otherwise inevitable 
remoteness of headquarters from many parts of the Area served. "30 District officers 
were readily able to communicate with their General Mangers and other departmental 
officers. This had to be balanced against the need to coordinate activity and 
communicate instructions throughout the network. This was achieved by the "inter area 
departmental committees" of which the LNER had several including the 
Superintendents, Goods Managers and Locomotive Running Superintendents.31
The North Eastern Area had the District Goods manager responsible to the 
Area Goods Manager, whilst the Southern Area had both specialised Goods Managers 
and combined Passenger and Goods Managers. The Southern Area thus had its local 
staff responsible to both the District Passenger and District Goods Managers.
The Wagon Control Office was separate from the Areas. Instead it acted to 
coordinate the various locations independent of the Area managers. According to 
Jenkin Jones this was an example of organisational adaptability as the Rolling Stock 
Controller was responsible not to the General Manager but to the three Area General 
Managers.32 The Wagon Control offices made reports on the usage of wagons and 
attempted to use such information to inform decisions as to the commercial viability of 
the investments in stock. These meetings were supplemented by special reports from 
districts and regions that monitored not just the company’s performance but the state
These were broadly in line with the pre 1921 boundaries of constituent companies.
C.M. Jenkin Jones "The Organisation of the London and North Eastern Railway," British
Transport Review, Vol. II, No. 6, December 1953, p484.
Jenkin Jones "The Organisation of the London North Eastern Railway," p485.
Jenkin Jones "The Organisation of the London North Eastern Railway," p487.
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of trade in each area. Differences existed between the detailed Area arrangements for 
Goods operations, but these reflected local conditions rather than any major difference 
in operating philosophy.
Relating Revenue to Expenditure: Operating and Commercial Decision Making
If the organisational structures of the companies differed, the basic structures 
by which the "indoor" and "outdoor" operations were conducted were remarkably 
similar. The Goods Conference task was to monitor traffic and liaise between the 
operating and commercial aspects of the company.33 For now we can note that its task 
involved monitoring traffic: the one off special consignment, such as an out of gauge 
load, or a seasonal traffic such as that in agricultural districts. Any differences between 
the amounts carried with that of previous years would have to be accounted for. Was 
it because the crop was smaller or was road haulage claiming a greater proportion? 
This was where the knowledge from Goods' Agents and those "on the ground" was of 
most use. Reviews of performance usually included a discussion of the improvements 
that could be offered to traders in the future. If road competition was the cause, then 
price reductions in the form of special rates were always possible provide they were 
approved by the Rates Tribunal. Equipment performance would come under scrutiny: 
was it possible to introduce special wagons or handling machinery? It may also have 
been the case that the service had not been adequate in some way. In all of this the 
interaction of operating and commercial aspects of railway working were often at the 
forefront of managers' minds.
The LMS Goods Conference
The Goods Conference was used as the main point at which policy could be 
discussed, at least in the beginning.34 The review of "Revenue and Expenditure" was
The terms indoor and outdoor refer to the commercial and operating aspects of the business 
respectively. For the respective companies the references are LNER RAIL/390/249; for the 
LMS RAIL/418/162 & 163; and the GWR RAIL/250/742 745, 767 & 768.
It is unclear how long the Conference lasted as the bulk of the records do not appear to have 
survived.
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used to monitor practice and performance so that instructions could be issued relating 
to operating and commercial decisions. For example in 1925, experiments in traffic 
concentration were noted at the Oldham goods depot, and District officers were 
instructed to investigate the traffics that could employ such methods.35 The efficiency 
of transhipment arrangements were closely followed as it seems that the proportion of 
tranship to general traffic was increasing at the same time as the cost of transhipment 
was increasing. The meeting recommended that the basis for analysis shift from the 
cost and hours per ton to wider considerations such as an analysis of traffic flows.36
New traffic was under review in the form of monthly commercial reports. The 
production of "artificial silk," as it was known, prompted an investigation into how rail 
transport could best serve the industry. It was not just the output and location that was 
recorded, but details of the production process and type of raw materials,(wood and 
cotton pulp in this case), giving a view of all activity that influenced the demand for 
transportation. From this a calculation of the total revenue which it was possible to 
achieve was made. The minute noted that "Our relationship with the manufacturers is 
extremely friendly and we are in constant touch with them with the object of 
anticipating their transport requirements."37 These reports also reveal the existence of 
liaison officers from companies at the LMS Headquarters, similar to the GWR's 
Development Officers.38 This shows how important it was for the railway to 
understand the business of the trader.
An important part of keeping expenditure and receipts in line was the 
monitoring of how capital stock was being used. Only then was it possible for 
managers to know whether they were making the right investments. From late 1923 to
RAIL/418/163 LMS Chief Goods Managers Conference, Minute 1414, April 21 1925 "Revenue 
and Expenditure."
RAIL/418/163 LMS Chief Goods Managers Conference, Minute 1414, Minute 1457 May 13 
1925 "Revenue and Expenditure."
RAIL/418/163 LMS Chief Goods Managers Conference, May 1925 "Monthly Report on 
Commercial Subjects for April 1925 - The Artificial Silk Industry." In this case a revenue of 
£175,000 was estimated.
RAIL/418/163 LMS Chief Goods Managers Conference, July 1925, Monthly Report on 
Commercial Subjects for June 1925 "LMS Relationship with Large Oil Companies."
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mid 1924 minutes appear which noted the performance of stock and its use across the 
network.39 In the case of fitted wagons, Divisional officers were asked to investigate 
whether supplies of such vehicles were adequate given increased running of fitted 
trains. The practices of other railway companies in this regard were also reviewed. 
Although the resulting reports noted that there was no need for further investment, the 
Chief Goods Manager overruled them and ordered further investigations. As a result 
the 1923/24 Wagon building programme included some more of these wagons.
The commercial needs were not always in accordance with operating practice, 
but given the complexity of working this is not surprising. By 1925 an Advisory 
Committee had been set up whose task it was to ascertain "ways and means of 
overcoming or removing obstacles which arise from time to time in carrying out Goods 
Department operations."40 This brought together members of the operating and 
commercial departments with a view to sorting out such problems that arose. Train 
services were investigated as to how best they could be suited to a region’s needs with 
the LMS canvasing various parts of the trading community. For example potato 
growers were asked to outline their requirements for the forthcoming harvest.41 The 
names and addresses of farmers, the amounts forwarded and the destinations were 
collected. Local road haulage and the potential size of the crop were noted as a means 
of establishing the size of the market. Some 52 growers were visited as a result and a 
"middleman" merchant was employed by the company to ease the selling process.
The GWR Goods Conference
Similarly the GWR had a Goods Conference which reported on road 
competition, special traffic, transhipment arrangements and aspects of train operation 
such as containerisation and high capacity wagons. As with the LMS there was also
RAIL/418/162 LMS Chief Goods Managers Conference, Minutes 757 10 December 1923, 813 
8/9 January 1924, 877 18/19 February 1924 and 1019 15/16 and 20 May 1924, "Pipe Fitted 
Stock."
RAIL/418/163 LMS Chief Goods Managers Conference, Minute 1623 November 17 1925 
"Appointment of Advisory Committee."
RAIL/418/162 LMS Chief Goods Managers Conference, Minute 1192 "Appendix G Canvassing 
Special Trades or Streams of Traffic Passing Between Competitive Points" 14 October 1924.
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a review of "Receipts and Expenditure," so comparison of traffic receipts were linked 
with any increases in operating costs. Details of the hours per ton, wages and cost per 
ton were noted together with details on the wider trade position. The use of containers, 
registered transhipment and railhead distribution were collected regularly.42 Similar 
questions of the interaction of operations and service were discussed, as on the LMS. 
In the early 'twenties complaints were received concerning the late arrival of 
consignments due to "bad working of the trains. "43 This was attributable to late starting 
and depot problems, and illustrates how complaints on service were transmitted to the 
relevant operating department. The distribution of rolling stock was part of the overall 
procedure and there appears to have been some problems with traders over the service 
being offered over and above the local complaints.
The introduction of high capacity wagons was discussed and representations 
made to the company from traders as to the advantages of these. Engineering 
considerations necessitated a more detailed examination of the issues involved.44 Once 
they were introduced it was the Conference that discussed rate reductions for their 
use.45 In 1925 a shortage of specially constructed wagons prompted a debate on wagon 
usage. This appeared to be causing a backlog of loads that was unacceptable if traffic 
was not to be moved to the roads.46 It seems that the receiving depots were often not 
told when loads were arriving, extending the delay further.
The bulk carriage of grain in specialised wagons featured in a calculation of cost 
analysis: potential gains ffom their introduction were set alongside the costs with close
RAIL/250/743 GWR Goods Conference Minutes, For example see Minute 7641 2 July 1931 
"Receipts and Expenditure."
RAIL/250/767 GWR Goods Conference Minutes, Minute 6476 January 11 1923 "Delays to 
Traffic in Transit."
RAIL/250/767 GWR Goods Conference Minutes, Minute 6616 and Appendix D, November 1 
1923 "High Capacity Wagons."
RAIL/250/767 GWR Goods Conference, Minute 6723 November 14 1924, "High Capacity 
Wagon." It was in bulk minerals such as Roadstone, Tar-Macadam and Limestone for blast 
furnaces that rates were reduced.
RAIL/250/767 GWR Goods Conference,46 Minute 6870 July 23 1925 "Shortage of Specially 
Constructed Wagons."
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attention paid to the impact on the operating aspects.47 Objections were noted as extra 
shunting was involved, coupled with its limited use as a special wagon. Specialist 
terminal facilities further limited their use to ports and other such locations such as 
large mills. This was not just a question of ascertaining the economies of scale 
available. Concern was expressed that the GWR might be accused of undue preference 
by smaller milling operations. However it was eventually agreed to experiment with 
such wagons and they were introduced throughout the network.
The LNER Goods and Mineral Managers Conference
On the LNER, operations were monitored via meetings of Goods Officers on 
a district by district basis. Given the organisational structure this made more sense than 
a company wide body. Here once again we see concern over road competition, 
although there was reference to other elements such as transhipment and the use of 
special wagons. The Goods and Mineral Managers Conference was a forum for 
examining traffic working much like the Goods Conference.
The concern over inroads by both road and sea competition led to close 
examination of the services offered by the company and subjects for analysis similar 
to the other two companies. For example in 1925 it was noted that the increase in 
water traffic from Newcastle to London should be countered by the running of extra 
"braked services," ie fitted trains. Of most interest here was the speed of transit and 
the minimum wagon loading permitted.48 These issues were interlinked as any decrease 
in minimum loading would free up terminal space and relieve bottlenecks. It would 
also help retain traffic which would otherwise go my road. After some discussion loads 
below 2 tons were accepted with special emphasis on perishable goods. Where 
possible, the "bulking" of orders was encouraged. Any implications for the loading
RAIL/250/767 GWR Goods Conference, Minute 6565 "Conveyance of Grain in Bulk" 
November 1, 1923.
RAIL/390/2035 LNER Minutes of Meetings of Goods Officers, Minute 2632 6 October 1925 
"Braked Services for Goods Traffic to London," RAIL/390/2035 LNER Rail Officers Meetings 
at York, Minute 2600 24 March 1925 "Minimum Wagon Load."
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procedure, cubic capacity and rate charged were calculated.49 For example the 
potential loss of revenue from running loads of 2 tons was offset against the cost of 
losing the traffic to road competition. Presumably this was based on the known loss 
of income from already calculated rates, including those on an exceptional basis.
By the late 'thirties the District officers were providing regular "tonnage 
estimates" of the wagon requirements if excess demand was expected.50 As with the 
GWR and LMS this information enabled commercial needs to be reflected in how the 
company was operated. Not only was wagon supply and demand equated, but the right 
equipment would be on hand for the job required and the use of specialist equipment 
could be maximised.
The construction of such equipment was discussed by the Conference, although 
it was not automatically entitled to at the beginning.51 It appears that the 
Superintendents thought it was a matter for them and the relevant engineering 
departments only. Goods managers were only to be bothered if the load was likely to 
be damaged. This alarmed the General Manager, who called a special meeting after 
which all those involved were included.
In general it is difficult to determine the "sense" of the meetings on the LNER. 
The records do not reveal the detail that they do for the GWR and LNER. The Goods 
Conference structure may not have been as useful in organisations arranged on an area 
by area basis. However the task of securing a coordinated approach to operating and 
commercial activity remained.
A Summary of Railway Performance
We will outline the micro foundations which helped the companies do their 
business. Whether any one specific management system was more efficient than the
RAIL/390/2035 LNER Minutes of Meetings of Goods Officers, Minute 2757 26 April, 1925. 
"Provision of Double Bolster Wagons for Hay Traffic."
RAIL/390/2035 LNER Meetings of Goods Officers at York, Minute 2930 21 January 1937 
"Supply of Wagons."
RAIL/390/249 Eastern Group Goods and Mineral Managers Conference, Minute A298 6 
February, "Design of Freight Rolling Stock."
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other can only be hinted at using measures of physical efficiency, and even here we 
have to be careful. The railways were amongst the largest companies and faced a 
dynamic commercial environment combined with complex operating processes. 
Through seeing how they responded to changes in this environment through such 
processes we will gain more knowledge concerning their performance. However we 
also learn a great deal as to how large organisations in general go about their business. 
We have seen how ideas on systematic management had developed in Chapter 2. The 
management practices of railways prior to 1923 have been discussed in Chapter 3. We 
now need to relate the approach, if not the specific ideas of the former to the latter. 
Did the railways develop a systematic approach to management problems or were they 
"unscientific?" Our main task is to examine the use of management practices and 
information in the development of management control.
A discussion of railway performance at this stage serves to highlight the 
narrative of management control and the development of management practices. This 
thesis is not about explaining the performance of the railways in the light of such 
indicators as the operating ratio or calculations of profitability. Nevertheless we can 
quote the historian of the nationalised industry as to the overall state of the railway 
sector in our period:
The net "standard revenue" envisaged for the "Big Four" companies under the 
1921 Act - £51,395,095 per annum - was never matched in practice; and in the 
years 1934-8 the average was some 35 per cent lower at £33,404,092. For 
Britain's railways as a whole (excluding London Transport) the operating ratio 
stood at 81 in the same period, 30 per cent higher than before the war.52 
What this thesis sets out to do is explain the background to this: what did managers 
know, and how did they know it?53
Gourvish British Railways, p2. The operating ratio was the proportion of working expenditure 
to gross revenue. See Irving The North Eastern Railway Company, Appendix I pp285-287, for 
details of the use and difficulty of this measure.
This is a shameless rephrasing of Walter Vincenti's (1990) What Engineers Know and How They 
Know It: Analytical Studies from Aeronautical History, The Johns Hopkins University Press.
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The Operational aspects will be examined in Chapters Five and Six, the 
Commercial aspects in Chapter Seven. Chapter Five looks at how the Conveyance 
function was monitored using system of Train and Traffic Control. Chapter Six views 
the operation of terminals through the use of Time and Motion Studies and studies of 
transhipment. Chapter Seven deals with commercial research, and pricing. It is 
limited to the consideration of merchandise, rather than mineral traffic. Much of the 
material in the archive, and indeed the debate surrounding railway management, 
focuses on this. Heavy mineral traffic was basically a captured market for the railways, 
so commercial policy was dominated by the need to prevent losing business to 
competition. Terminal operations were dominated by questions relating to general 
merchandising. This was generally high value, and its loading presented problems to 
the management of depots. In addition, coal was loaded and unloaded mostly at private 
sidings. It was not as demanding as general merchandising in its handling 
requirements.
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Chapter Five
The Conveyance of Traffic and Management Control
We begin our analysis of the railway companies by considering how freight was 
moved from location to location. This is dealt with because it was the core business 
in which the railways were engaged. Consideration will then be given to the terminal 
services in the next chapter. Once we understand the procedures by which operations 
were carried out, the use of commercial information can be considered. The setting of 
prices and determining of service will be left to the final Chapter.
The operating problems of conveyance may be dealt with in one of two ways. 
One is a process function, moving trains and coordinating traffic, the other one of 
routeing. By conveyance we mean the scheduling and routing of trains subject to the 
traffic needs of customers. This involved the bringing together of rolling stock, 
locomotive and freight to make up the train, our "unit" of conveyance. If uncertainty 
could be reduced and the process of movement eased, then day to day operations could 
be improved. Train and Traffic Control, to varying degrees, were seen as being a 
solution to this. As we shall see, Train Control dominated the debate on control 
systems during the period after amalgamation. When we discuss conveyance, the 
analysis is dominated by the Train Control systems in place on the different companies.
Using the model introduced in Chapter 1, Train Control can be seen as enabling 
the Plans to be Executed whilst at the same time providing the means with which to 
Evaluate performance. This would then feed back into the development and 
modification of services via the Programming of objectives. Through this process costs 
could be minimised, and by improving the service, revenue maximised. This chapter 
describes the use of Train and Traffic Control systems in the monitoring of 
conveyance. Using Rolling Stock Control as an example we see how management 
practices were developed to deal with the problems of Execution and Evaluation.
Historically, the means to the above ends were devised when concerns over 
congestion and crew relief grew in the pre 1914 period. As we have seen the MR 
initially developed this system with other companies facing the same constraints
109
developing similar control solutions.1 These were able to maximise track capacity and 
ensure punctual running. Locomotive use could also be monitored so as to minimise 
poor running and mileage, subject to maximum loading.2 Rolling stock distribution 
also became part of the general system of control on the LMS and LNER. Asae 
have seen in Chapter Three, there were by 1923 several systems of Train and Traffic 
Control in operation. Whilst the distinction between the two had not been immediately 
apparent, by 1923 clear differences were emerging. Train Control was involved with 
control of movement, Traffic Control just that of traffic. However there was some 
confusion as to where the boundaries should be drawn. According to Philip Burtt, the 
LNER distinguished between the two. A Traffic control office duties were described 
as "the obtaining and concentrating of information as to traffic to be moved..." This 
was slightly different to Train Control where the movement of traffic was planned. 
That is to say Train Control was proactive in moving the traffic, rather than just 
monitoring its progress. However, as Burtt pointed out, "If the control office, having 
obtained information as to traffic requiring conveyance, merely passes on such 
information to the separate superintendent's trains' office, the control office (so called) 
hardly seems to justify its name."3 If no control was being offered, then the "control 
office" was just a clearing house for information regarding the whereabouts of freight. 
Even rudimentary Train Control did more than this. In practice what it meant was that 
the signalman retained control over movement rather than acting in a controller role.4 
For example, instead of delaying trains because they were not sure of the situation 
further down the line they were now in a position to minimise clearance margins with 
no extra risk. This expanded the capacity of the line. The LNER maintained the 
distinction in some of its control areas, and this influenced the approach of that
See Chapter 3 for details.
A later BR document noted that the objectives of Train Control should be punctual working, 
minimal use of engines, maximum loading, minimal light running and reduction of crew hours.
See AN/94/173 Procedure to be Adopted and Standard Instructions in Connection with Train 
and Traffic Control, April 1950, p i.
Burtt Control on the Railways, pl08.
Burtt Control, p i 17.
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company to control. However, systematic Train Control became increasingly 
important, but it was not as systematic or widespread as on the LMS.
The LMS adopted the most centralised control system after 1923. Whilst the 
District Control Office remained at the heart of the Control System, there was an extra 
layer added to the hierarchy by the introduction of Divisional Control Offices. The use 
of Divisional control on the LMS will be highlighted as a key difference in the 
systematic application of Train Control as a management practice. By such systems 
Train Control was able to develop its full potential for coordinating all aspects of 
railway operation, including links with the Commercial and Mechanical Engineering 
Departments. Whilst adding a level of bureaucracy to the hierarchy it ensured that 
information relevant to coordinating activity was used by managers.
The GWR had systems of telephone communication and district control in place 
but did not systematise its Train Control to nearly the same extent, if at all. As we 
shall see, the GWR was criticised in the first year of the Second World War for not 
having sufficient control to avoid congestion.
Whatever means of control was adopted, it had to be accomplished while 
maintaining a sense of responsibility among the staff. Initiative was important and 
encouraged by trying to bring staff "on the ground" into making operating decisions: 
"..assistance must be given to the District Control Office by explaining clearly and 
frequently the current position and by making suggestions how to overcome any 
difficulties."5 However there had to be instructions laid down centrally governing the 
reporting procedures which enabled decisions to be made.
The problem was recognised after many years of using Train Control. It was 
noted in 1950 that "The danger in the past has been the tendency for the Control 
organisation to degenerate into a recording agency and insufficient time has been given 
to the study of the train service and its regulation both from the train and traffic 
viewpoint. "6 Nevertheless we may see such systematic management of information as
RAIL/421/85 Operating Control Organisation, 1939, p6.
AN/94/173 Procedure to be Adopted and Standard Instructions in Connection with Train and 
Traffic Control, April 1950, p i.
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being of some importance in operating the railway. The key problem for any network 
industry, is the co-ordination of operations.
Centralised Train Control: The LMS
As we have noted in Chapter 3, there were several control systems for the LMS 
to choose from. The MR system was adopted largely because of its success in 
improving punctuality and minimising congestion.7 Changes had to be made because 
of the size of the LMS: it covered over 6,000 miles of track, 10,000 plus steam 
locomotives and more than 200,000 wagons. The solution was to develop a system of 
Divisional Control Offices to coordinate the activity of the District Control Offices. 
This section will describe the general Train Control structure as it developed after 
1923. Then we shall look in more detail at the Divisional Control Office and examine 
its role in monitoring and planning operations.
The main features of MR Train Control remained: details of traffic, locations, 
and train movement within the control area were displayed on the Train Board. 
Information as to the amount of traffic being offered was noted on the "Traffic 
Position." This was collated into the "Traffic Position - Daily Summary" return which 
contained details on the previous 24 hours working. Each month "Traffic Position - 
Monthly Summary" was returned to the Divisional Control Office from which 
information could be used to plan traffic needs. Traffic on a regular or even semi­
regular basis, such as for seasonal vegetables, was checked for efficient working. So- 
called Special traffic was recorded in a Logbook, presumably including perishable and 
out of gauge loads. The movement of large loads was monitored by the Special Wagon 
cards.
As with the MR, movement was monitored by cards with details of traffic to be 
moved. These noted the details at the yards/sidings, and were updated at two hourly 
intervals. Departure and passing times were noted on the appropriate pegs with 
shunting engine details also placed at the relevant stations. At the Divisional level the 
Control Office utilised summary forms for the important (ie inter-district) freight trains
7 Bonavia The Four Great Railways, p26.
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rather than physical display.8 If for any reason the train left the running section then 
it was removed from the time section of the board and placed on the side. A train 
leaving the District would be communicated on to the next.9 Thus a complete record 
of running was maintained at the District Control Office so that actual and booked 
running could be compared.
At Division the key trains monitored were Up/Down Important Freight Trains 
and Up/Down Important Cross Country Freight Trains. Division was then in a 
position to note any problems and could take them up with the District Control office. 
This is an example of how the Chief General Superintendent received information: a 
daily summary of late running and such information could be used to adjust working. 
For example the time spent by a Pick-up Goods train at roadside stations was not 
uniform, so the flows of traffic were analysed with a view to ensuring loads would be 
picked up in one direction only. This meant that the number of trains traversing a given 
route could be minimised. Train control was able to deliver the information for this 
kind of study and ensure that the resulting working was carried out.10
The distribution of rolling stock is considered later as an example of control in 
action. However we need to briefly consider its use in the movement of trains and the 
implications for loading. Each morning "Traffic Advices to District Offices" collated 
reports on the number and location of wagons in an area and the number awaiting 
unloading by the consignee. This was updated on a two hourly basis so that the traffic 
and trip services could readily be coordinated. It was at this stage that any special 
clearances of traffic could be arranged or trains cancelled if loads were not available.11 
Divisional control compiled a General Position and Traffic Statement reviewing the 
area covering the state of marshalling yards and weather conditions. A summary of the 
traffic position was presented covering that which was on hand, due from foreign lines
RAIL/421/83 LMS Train Control, p29; RAIL/421/85 Operating Control Organisation, 1939, 
pl7.
RAIL/421/83 LMS Train Control, pp31-32.
Anon. "Traffic Control on the LMS," Railway Gazette, February 22, 1929.
RAIL/421/231 Appendix to Paper on Traffic Control, J.H.Follows Institute of Transport 
Congress, May 1927, Section Two.
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and a general traffic summary. Traffic flows to specific stations could therefore be 
monitored.12 From this the rolling stock organisation could then be informed as to the 
commercial needs and operating limitations for the day's work.
The mechanism by which congestion was prevented remained the same as it had 
under the MR: a series of forms and communications stopping trains arriving at 
terminals where capacity was reaching its maximum. The only difference was that the 
Divisional Control office coordinated those loads that were to be stopped out of district. 
The LMS encouraged traders to inform them if they were unable to take delivery of 
loads. Divisional Control had to be informed stating who requested the stop (ie the 
District), where it was and the time/date.13 Control was able to influence operations 
by regulating the flow of trains leaving, as opposed to between, terminals.
The LMS had retained and built upon the features developed by the MR. 
However it was the extension of control on a Divisional basis, that was the most 
important development in the inter-war period. The size of the LMS compared with 
the MR required that information was collated and decisions made at an intermediate 
level between District and Central Control at Derby.14 Each Division covered the area 
of a former company, although it is not clear why this should have been the case. 
There is no indication that this was somehow an optimal arrangement, although it may 
have been necessary to reconcile the other operating systems whose control methods 
were rejected. The Midland was at Derby (MR), the Western at Crewe (LNWR) and 
the Central at Manchester (L and YR). Each carried a Divisional Superintendent of 
Operation who oversaw the work of the District Controllers through the Divisional 
Control Office.
District Control was able to arrange operations between Districts only subject 
to the authority of the Division.15 However it appears that Division would not
12 RAIL/421/83 LMS Train Control, p43 and p55.
13 LMS Train Control, p44.
14 See RAIL/421/85 Operating Control Organisation - General Instruction, January 1939. The
terms Division and District will be used to denote the Divisional Control Office and District 
Control Office respectively.
15 Operating Control Organisation - General Information, January 1939, ppl-3.
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habitually "interfere" with District working. It was limited to particular tasks such as 
the use of additional diagram paths. The running of extra capacity affected other 
districts within the Division, so co-ordination was vital. Similarly departures from 
booked working were authorised divisionally.16 Notification was required of traffics 
requiring special facilities, such as perishable items or those running under special 
services such as the "Green Arrow" service.17
However, what makes Divisional Control interesting from our point of view is 
the role it played in planning and coordinating activity. It will be argued that the use 
of a Divisional Trains Office acted as the "Planning Department" for conveyance. The 
allocation of rolling stock, locomotives and the diagramming of trains were coordinated 
by this office in conjunction with the District and Divisional Control offices. This was 
an important difference compared to the other companies: as will become clear it meant 
that most elements of the service were coordinated at some stage in the process, from 
motive power allocation, the Commercial Department and the Control Offices.
In addition to the operational aspects of control, it was necessary in some cases 
for the Commercial Agent to be involved. An example of this was the carriage of "out 
of gauge loads." These were defined as those which "exceed the prescribed 
measurements of the standard loading gauge, or which present some other exceptional 
feature necessitating special arrangements being made for working. "18 The acceptance 
of such loads was not covered by "common carrier" legislation, but the railways often 
seemed keen to take on such loads. This reflected the perceived need to maximise 
revenue and attract custom. The Goods agent who secured the load communicated to 
the District Goods Manager giving the dimensions and weight of the load. This had 
to be approved by the Chief Mechanical Engineer who would determine the type of 
vehicle to be used, loading arrangements and any speed restrictions. Then the Chief
RAIL/421/83 London, Midland and Scottish Railway Train Control System, c.1930, p42.
Operating Control Organisation, p6. The "Green Arrow" service provided rapid goods transit 
for an extra fee.
LMS Train Control, pl21. The actual dimensions were Width 9 foot, Length not more than 60 
foot and Height 31.5 foot at loads centre. The axle weight could not exceed 14 tons with rail 
clearance of 6 foot.
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Civil Engineer would have to establish the route to be taken. Extra supervision was 
sometimes provided by inspectors riding with the load. Most loads under these 
circumstance had to travel on a Sunday so as not interfere with working.19 Close 
working between departments had to occur otherwise loads would be lost and damage 
done to the rail infrastructure, not to say the reputation of the company.
The Divisional Trains Office
The role of Train Control on the LMS and its relationship with systems in use 
on other companies can best be appreciated by examining the role of the Divisional 
Trains Office and the associated Divisional control. The task of the Divisional Trains 
Office was to ". .primarily plan in advance. ',20 In this it acted like any planning office 
under a regime of "scientific management." Planning, monitoring and co-ordination 
were brought together so that the aim of more "efficient and economical working" 
could be pursued. It was noted that "The object of "planning in advance" is to give due 
care and consideration to the requirements to ensure the most satisfactory and 
economical arrangements being laid down for the working of the line as regards both 
suitability for traffic offering, and economy from the point of view of Engines, 
Enginemen, Guards.. .having regard to conditions of service of train crews. "21 It was 
the existence of the Divisional Trains Office that separated the LMS from the other two 
companies under consideration.
The Divisional Trains Office acted as a conduit between the Chief Operating 
Manager at Euston and the rest of the network, to ensure that a "common policy " as 
regards operating was maintained. Links existed between District and Divisional 
control offices, as well as the Divisional Motive Power Office.22 The Commercial
LMS Train Control, pl22.
RAIL/421/81 Work of The Divisional Trains Office, p i.
Appendix to Paper on Traffic Control, pi.
The main source for this section is RAIL/421/81 Work of Divisional Trains Office, and Other 
Sections of Divisional Headquarters who are Concerned with the Preparation of Schedules, 
(1939). This seems to have been part of a greater work as the title is actually "Manual of 
Traffic Operating Chapter V - Planning."
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Department was seen as ". .the liaison between the public and the trains office. "23 So 
some contact was maintained between the District Goods Manager and the District 
Control Office as regards freight trains.24 Division was able to pass on to the 
Divisional Trains Office recommendations as to alterations. Decisions of "major 
importance" such as requests for accelerated services were dealt with by the Chief 
Commercial Manager liaising with the Chief Operating Manager.25 This meant that 
there was a link between the process of moving the freight and the service being offered 
to the customer. According to the operating instructions in force, it was commercial 
information from either the Divisional or District Freight Control Office that formed 
the basis for re-timing. Fluctuations in traffic and seasonal variation were particularly 
important. District Controllers were in daily contact with the Commercial Department. 
Any suggestions as to timetabling alterations were sent for approval to the Divisional 
Controller.
Train diagramming was part of the planning process within the Divisional 
Trains Office. Timetables were set and modified using these train diagrams, co­
ordinating what had been done previously on a District basis. There were four 
categories in diagramming trains, in descending order of importance: passenger, 
"important" freight trains, "ordinary" freight trains and "trip" services. Similar 
constraints as to working were considered here as on the MR system: the number of 
running lines, type of train being run, position of sidings and their capacity, gradients 
and even the signalling methods in use.26 The basic structure of the diagrams remained 
the same as they had developed under the MR. Special, relief and excursion trains 
(denoted as Q trains), were diagrammed in terms of geographical location and time. 
From this the Timing Clerks passed alterations to the "Notice Section." The "Engine
Work of the Divisional Trains Office, p2.
Work of Divisional Trains Office, p9.
Work of the Divisional Trains Office, p9.
RAIL/421/83 London Midland and Scottish Railway Train Control System, cl930, pl6. See 
Chapter 3 for details of the MR practice.
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Workings Section" was then consulted so that crewing could be arranged.27 This was 
important in aiming to maximise loading subject to the capacity of the engine over a 
given stretch of line. Complete sets of these diagrams resided at Divisional offices, 
whilst District offices held only those sections under its geographical control. As part 
of the diagramming process, publications were issued relating to standard operating 
procedures embodying these plans. Once routes were decided, the allocation of 
engines, crews and train guards could be finalised. These were brought together in 
working instructions as it had implications for the diagrams already established.
The Trains Office was a repository of information concerning timings, and acted 
to issue any changes. Each spring and winter the "Working Timetable of Freight 
Trains" , was produced. This was supplemented by the "Working Timetable of Freight 
Train Notice," issued three times a year in February, July and November. Short run 
alterations were announced in the "Fortnightly Notices." These included train 
alterations, "Miscellaneous Instructions" and details of engineering works. It was 
designed to "..regularise the working and avoid the cancellation of trains and the 
running of special trains brought about by the altered flows of traffic. "28 Even more 
up to date information was provided by the "Supplements to Fortnightly Notices." 
Further information was given in notices concerning the loading of trains, special 
working and even "Margins for Freight Trains in Advance of Express Passenger 
Trains". The "General Appendix to the Working Timetables and Selected 
Appendices", carried much general working information, dominated by issues 
regarding motive power.29 "The Classification on Marshalling of Freight Trains" 
outlined the long distance train arrangements for inter-control area working. 
Instructions were given to Yardmasters as to the position of vehicles within the trains 
as regards destination. These documents represent the operating instructions for the 
process of transportation. Whilst all companies had such documents, it was the degree
Work of Divisional Trains Office, p6.
Work of Divisional Trains Office, p49
Work of Divisional Trains Office, 16.
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to which the LMS had integrated these into the Control structure via the Trains Office 
that was important.
The key elements of the ability to preplan the routes and schedules lay in the 
monitoring of speed which in turn could be used to determine the capacity of various 
parts of the network. This was not just an extension of signalling but an important shift 
to being able to actively shape the transportation process. The role of the signalling 
staff was, of course, important to the smooth operation of Train Control in general.30 
Each signalman would have knowledge of the local conditions at the time of making a 
decision. Most would also have considerable experience of the line. Royle of the LMS 
stated that "Signalmen will receive instructions from the District Control Office as to 
the ultimate requirements, thus assisting them in carrying out detailed regulation."31 
This shows once more the difference between Train and Traffic Control.
The LMS standardised its output of trains within the framework of this 
diagramming process. To illustrate how this process worked, we shall examine how 
freight trains were categorised. The example of the fast "Fitted Train" services will 
demonstrate this. These were categorised according to engineering criteria. A "Fitted 
Freight Number One" with a Class 1 locomotive could run 20 wagons at 55 mph.32 
There were six categories in total, separated on the basis of speed.33 The load of each 
train was set on a per wagon basis calculated as an average tonnage of the various 
classes of traffic. So 3.5 loaded wagons or 5 empties were equated to 2 loaded mineral 
wagons.34 The loading of Mineral trains was thus expressed in terms of a standard and 
expressed per engine type, per line. These were published in a pamphlet entitled 
"Loading of All Passenger and Freight Trains," which contained details of "..the
30 See Burtt Control on the Railways, Chapter XIX "Responsibility."
31 RAIL/421/85 Operating Control Organisation, p7.
32 RAIL/418/196 Progress and Development in the Chief Operating Manager's Department in the
Years Prior to the War, p22. In addition what defined these trains was the proportion of
wagons fitted with brake pipes. In the case of a Fitted Freight Number 1 the train had to have 
one half fitted.
33 These were Fully Fitted Number 1 and 2; the Express Freight-Maltese Cross, Express Freight,
Through Freight and Mineral.
34 Work of Divisional Trains Office, p21.
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number of wagons authorised to be conveyed between various points.." per engine. 
This made allowances for differing gradients and line conditions in relationship to the 
particular load being carried, as calculated from the diagrams.35 To correlate loads 
with particular times meant that "point to point" running had to be ascertained. This 
was based on information from Control Offices being used to calculate average speeds. 
From this it was then possible to monitor the performance of engines and their crews.36
So not only could engines be allocated more efficiently, but the system of control 
would monitor performance as well.
An example of this in practice was the "Engine Co-ordination and Research 
Section," established to give further information as to locomotive capability. A graph 
of engine working was prepared, giving "..a visual picture for each department of the 
time each booked engine is occupied, and shows where opportunities exist for 
absorbing availability, and effecting savings."37 The number of engine failures was 
noted, especially when due to the use of an inappropriate locomotive. The "cycle of 
working" was monitored to assess any failure to complete the allocated roster. The 
daily analysis of the "Engines in Use" return enabled locomotive supply and demand 
to be monitored.38 Thus the LMS was able to bring together operating and commercial 
information into the decision making process.
However, information from Train Control did not replace the documents used 
by the crews. If the Divisional Trains Office was working effectively, how could this 
be the case? This might cast doubt on the ability of this Office to effect control. This 
was not the case: the point is not that the Divisional Control Office was replacing the 
Motive Power Depot as an institution, but that it was supplementing it. The forms and 
journals provided a means of providing crews with distinct, formal links to the Motive 
Power Depot and their foremen. Not only would there have been internal conflicts
Work of the Divisional Trains Office, p21.
Work of Divisional Trains Office, p32.
Work of Divisional Trains Office, p99. Thus departments would be in a position to "absorb"
engine time from, say, standing in yards awaiting revenue earning work.
38 Work of Divisional Trains Office, plOO.
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over any attempt to centralise the entire process, there were grounds to believe that it 
would not be effective. The information required by engineers was different to that 
wanted by Controllers. The Control system was able to supplement operating 
information on locomotive performance. The journals dealt more with the information 
required to maintain the locomotives.
Several statements and forms provided this: Engines were allocated on the basis 
of the Guards Journal and Drivers Report which provided details of "Train and Engine 
Hours - Daily Summary," sent from the Motive Power Depot to Central control every 
week. "Hours of Detention to Freight Trains" recorded the instances of bad timing, 
compiled once more from the Drivers journal. The use to which locomotives were put 
was monitored by "Analysis of Engines in Use" issued daily from the MPD. From this 
it was possible to tell which locomotives delivered the best results for given routes and 
loads.39 Even in the short term this was able to deliver information which could be 
used to improve operating conditions and feed back into wider issues of maintenance 
and design.
The task of the Divisional Trains Office was to act as a liaison between the 
various aspects of the Control organisation, the Motive Power Department and the 
Commercial Department. This concerned the classification and standardisation of 
trains, achieved by equating the locomotive with its load and route. The speed and 
class of train, mileage to be worked, fuel capacity and line restrictions were all 
important.40 It was also a case of equating the crew with route and type of engine on 
the weekly roster. Complicated sections of line often required specialised knowledge 
to work: the position of water supplies, particularly difficult stretches of line, complex 
junction layouts all made the task more difficult for inexperienced crews. Allocation 
was therefore not only a function of the depot's location but also of the skill of crews: 
thus physical capital was not the only element of operations to be covered by Control.41
Appendix to Paper on Traffic Control, p2.
Appendix to Paper on Traffic Control, 81.
Appendix to Paper on Traffic Control, p84
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District, Divisional and Central Control worked with these departments to ensure 
operations were effectively planned, coordinated and monitored.
The Divisional Trains Office seems to have extended the MR scheme far 
beyond the monitoring of relief and prevention of congestion. This was important in 
coordinating operations over great distances and also, as we shall see, enabled the 
marketing function to be extended into the field of control as traffic could be allocated 
to the train service and vice versa. The operating requirements could be combined with 
the needs of the commercial departments. This was in line with objectives of the re­
organisation of the LMS in 1932. The various constituent parts of the company had to 
be combined more effectively, and this involved analysing the methods employed 
throughout the company with regard to the different operating conditions. This task 
was made easier by having centralised control: "Comparative examinations of practices 
and methods must be made , so that standards may be laid down for the whole or for 
parts of the undertaking."42 Then "..having instituted standard practices, greater 
decentralisation of certain activities becomes possible."43 Because standards were 
known network wide, each area was aware of what the others meant. They could 
therefore be left on their own to operate. That is to say decisions could eventually be 
decentralised. It should be emphasised that the telephone combined with regularised 
information flows and reporting procedures, gave an ability to monitor in real time the 
interaction between traffic, trains and depots throughout the network. The extension 
of Train Control to a Divisional level gave management the ability to coordinate the 
operating and commercial aspects of the company.
Decentralised Train Control: The LNER
The LNER's attempt to introduce systematic analysis was hampered by several 
problems. It always seemed to be short of liquid funds which limited the ability to fully 
develop the communications infrastructure required for control. Perhaps of more 
importance was the problem of integrating the many different methods of operating
RAIL/1057/2804/5 Memo, no page numbers, Organisation, 21 June 1932.
Organisation, 21 June 1932.
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practice on the amalgamated companies.44 Like the LMS, the LNER was of 
considerable size, and sought to reconcile several operating traditions. How the LNER 
viewed the process of conveyance, and hence control, also differed across these distinct 
areas. The LNER's Superintendent of the Line, M.Barrington-Ward, served with 
Cecil Paget when the latter introduced the Train Control system on the MR. This 
provided the LNER with a figure of authority versed in the principles of a centralised 
control system. On the LNER, areas were split into Districts which in turn were 
divided into Sections. Rolling stock control was separated from the main Train and 
Traffic Control system with the Wagon Control Offices being developed especially for 
this task. District Control was provided by the District Superintendent acting as Chief 
Controller. Operational details were left to the Deputy Chief Controller. The control 
District was further broken down into Sections, each covered by a Sectional Controller. 
Thus the chain of command ran from these Sectional Controllers through to the District 
Control. Timetables were at first compiled by the District Superintendent's staff. This 
was followed by a centralised Timetables office whose task it was to produce the 
working timetable for the Operating Superintendent. There was need to improve the 
reliability of timings which separate passenger and freight sections were unable to 
deliver. Coordination was vital to this process if trains were to run unimpeded
Control does not appear to have been unified under a particular structure. For 
example, the office at Sheffield was part of the Manchester District, the Manchester 
Control being cut in half along the north and south. Leicester Control Office was part 
of the District Superintendent at Marylebone, 103 miles away even though it was the 
same line! This was eventually remedied in the re-organisation of 1929 when they were 
combined into one office under the District Superintendent at Manchester. For the rest 
of the Control Offices they were part of the District Superintendent's Office. The 
action under the re-organisation would suggest that these difficulties were recognised 
as a problem and remedies sought soon after. There were problems of amalgamating 
such a wide variety of operating practices given the physical and financial operating 
constraints the company found itself under.
See Bonavia The Four Great Railways, Chapter 4 for details of the problems faced by the 
LNER.
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As we have already indicated, there was a perceived difference in Train and 
Traffic control on the LNER. This can be illustrated by the development of control at 
Middlesborough. Whilst at Middlesborough the functions of Train Control were clear, 
the regulation of trainmen's hours, the movement of trains and traffic coordination, the 
organisation of the office differed. Train running was determined in the 
Superintendent's office, so the Control Office "marshals the information as to trains 
and traffic, and the superintendent's trains' office then manipulates the trains in 
conjunction with the controllers."45 So the Middlesborough Office was a combination 
of Train and Traffic Control, but as Burtt noted in effect the outcome was similar to the 
methods of Train Control on the LMS. That is to say the movement of traffic was 
monitored as well as its location.
By contrast, at Hull, the LNER had a District that was Traffic control only. 
The distinction was more clearly drawn here, as the traffic was monitored without the 
ability to "instruct the signalman on train working matters. ',46 This clearly differs from 
Train Control: the task was to coordinate "facts and information, and using such 
judiciously for traffic regulation. "47 In the main this involved regulating the coal traffic 
from collieries to the port of Hull. The function of such control was to inform the 
company as to when the ship was ready to receive coal. There could, however, be no 
direct influence on the train once it was underway.
What was lacking on the LNER was a network wide system of Train Control 
that covered in all cases the movement of trains and the location of traffic. In any event 
it did not prevent the adoption of Train and Traffic control over various parts of the 
network in our period. The Western District of the LNER developed the traffic density 
of the Midland Section of the LMS.48 District Control Offices were provided at 
Manchester, (1924) Sheffield, (1924) Kings Cross,(1927) Leicester, (1928) and
Burtt Control on the Railways, p i l l .
Burtt Control on the Railways, pi 16.
Burtt Control on the Railways, p i 18.
Anon "Reorganisation of Train Operating Arrangements, Western Section, Southern Area, 
LNER" Railway Gazette, May 13, 1932.
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Lincoln, (1928). Calculations were made to justify the expenditure on the introduction 
of Control schemes. These were calculated on the basis of an estimate of the number 
of hours lost through delay. As with the MR earlier, congestion was driving the search 
for improved control. A monetary value was then allocated to this, although on what 
basis is unclear.49 Such calculations revealed extensive savings: for example, the 
establishment of a Control Office at Lincoln would save an estimated £2,664 if only 10 
per cent of delays were prevented. This was put against a recommended £12,486 
expenditure. The installation of control at Leicester would give an estimated yield of 
130% return on investment.50
By 1932 there was more reorganisation of the control system, due to the 
problems of localised working. That is, the control systems had intensified local 
working with less regard to inter-district working. This meant that the areas with 
control systems pushed the problems of congestion etc into areas without such systems: 
this problem was soon recognised: "The full advantage arising from the establishment 
of Train Controls cannot be realised owing to the controls being violated.."51 Train 
Control had to be network wide to realise its true value. Headquarters could only be 
consulted by "clerical offices" by telephone and telegraph. Conferencing was 
impossible and it seems that the telephone lines were overtaxed by the work. "This 
often resulted in voluminous correspondence and the lapse of considerable time before 
new arrangements could be put into operation. "52 This was in clear contrast to the 
LMS where Centralised control and attendant Divisional structures were able to 
m inim ise correspondence by immediate telephonic communication. Nonetheless, 
the LNER did have the office infrastructure in place to facilitate the display and 
communication of information. Although not as developed as the LMS, they enabled 
a broad view of operations to be maintained.
49 RAIL/390/678 Extension of Train Control System, Southern Area, pi 2 June 1927.
50 Extension of Train Control, p i and p3.
51 RAIL/390/1680 LNER Sessional Papers relating to the Board: 1928-1929 Train and Traffic
Controls, p2.
52 Anon. "Reorganisation of Train Operating Arrangements, Western Section, Southern Area,
LNER," Railway Gazette, May 13, 1932.
125
Information and Display on the LNER
The means by which information as regards train movement was displayed 
differed considerably from that on the LMS. In some cases, the LNER used an endless 
belt moving train indicators along a "model of the line." 53 All signal boxes and 
additional reporting points were connected by telephone. Information was thus 
available on a real time basis with the carriers moving in direct relationship with the 
movement of the train automatically.54 Trains were divided into categories: No 1, No 
2, Class A, B, C and D, plus those form other companies. Colour coded pegs were 
used to depict the information, so that for example an Express Goods would be 
numbered and placed on a red peg. In most other cases a Train Board was used 
showing a schematic view of the line, but this time using pegs placed by hand. The 
details provided on these Boards was similar to that given on LMS Train Diagrams. 
It included sidings, their capacity and centres of traffic generation such as factories and 
wharfs.55
A "Working Book" of train schedules was used to note the running of expected 
trains. Telephone communication enabled emergency working and more general 
problems to be addressed by conferences when required. A Log was kept by the 
Deputy Chief Controller for the Superintendent which gave a picture of the previous 
24 hours working and provided the basis for the morning conference with the District 
Superintendents. Sections recorded the movement of trains and traffic ". .by a system 
of regular advices received from signalmen and station and yard staffs," with a weekly 
card kept to monitor inter-district movement.56 "More important" freight trains were 
also reviewed.
See Burtt (1926) Control On the Railways, Chapter 10 "Experiments on the LNER" for details.
The complexity of the machinery required would indicate that it was perhaps over engineered 
for the task in hand. See "Main Line Control, North Eastern Area, London and North Eastern 
Railway" Railway Gazette, March 2, 1923.
See "Reorganisation of Train Operating Arrangements, Western Section, Southern Area,
LNER" Railway Gazette, May 13, 1932.
Anon. "Reorganisation of Train Operating Arrangements" The Railway Gazette, May 13, 1932.
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Information regarding train movement was also entered on forms covering 
up/down passenger and up/down freight. Trains passing through sections of the 
Assistant Controllers were recorded on colour coded cards. The number of wagons, 
timing and tonnage were noted. Provision was made also for "Remarks" where details 
concerning, late running etc could be noted. From the "close watching" of train 
movement, the loading of wagons could be coordinated with those available for 
carriage. The information available from these cards was available to the General 
Superintendent's Office to check on performance. The hours of train crews were 
monitored enabling relief crews to be allocated more effectively.
Terminal working was aided by the reports as to traffic and rolling stock on 
hand. At 6am information was received as a Traffic Statement from the Districts 
regarding the freight on offer. Points of congestion could then be identified along with 
any points that were likely to become so, enabling loading points and marshalling yards 
to be kept clear. The stock of wagons and their loads was monitored every 6 to 8 hours 
and the supply of locomotives and crews allocated. This also had implications for the 
distribution of locomotives and crew around the network. The Railway Gazette noted 
that there were "Adequate arrangements..in force to provide for the best use of any 
additional locomotive power, while relief advices can be passed forward rapidly and 
efficiently."57 These reports came not just from the marshalling and goods yards but 
from factories, collieries and ironworks. Indeed anywhere a large quantity of traffic 
was likely to be offered. This also helped in equating the supply and demand for 
wagons. Information from goods yards and sidings was reported to sectional 
controllers. Reports to District as to traffic on hand, stopped and awaiting clearance 
were made at 6am, 12 noon, 6pm and midnight.
The LNER's Control mechanisms did have some features we might easily 
associate with a systematic approach to management. Standards were set for routes and 
speeds according to a categorisation of the variables affecting movement. Selected 
trains were singled out as being important and monitored separately, based upon their 
speed. Decisions could be made rapidly and transmitted to the relevant points by
57 Anon "Main Line Control," The Railway Gazette March 2, 1923.
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telephone. What may have prompted the differentiation between Traffic and Train 
Control was the doubts expressed on the value of centralising decision making. What 
the LNER might have been attempting was "control on the cheap." Given the very real 
limitations of finance, Traffic Control was not so all encompassing and would offer a 
less expensive solution to problems of congestion. According to one of its officers, the 
LNER "..had to try and skimp and save money where they could."58 It was not that 
they did not recognise an important management tool. The LNER was limited by 
financial considerations rather than a belief that Train Control was not useful. This is 
confirmed by the views of an LNER officer after reviewing the GWR approach to 
control during the Second World War. C.M.Jenkin Jones was Divisional General 
Manager of the North Eastern Area of the LNER and headed the investigation into 
GWR control practices. He favoured the LMS approach to Train Control as we shall
59see.
The GWR: Ad Hoc Control?
The planning of routes and arrangement of schedules does not appear to have 
been systematically integrated throughout the network. The main textbook on train 
control did not mention the GWR when it was published in 1926, nor did the trade 
press carry many articles about it.60 What control existed reflected more elements of 
Traffic Control, rather than those of Train Control. No mention is made in the 
histories of the GWR regarding the use of train control except as an aid to local 
working. Evidence on the existence and performance of Train Control is therefore 
sketchy. However we do learn something from the criticisms made of the GWR during 
World War Two.
M. A.Cameron in Bonavia Railway Polity Between the Wars, p85.
See Bonavia The Four Great Railways, p51.
Anon "The Bristol Division of the Great Western Railway" Railway Gazette, May 23, 1924; 
and more generally, Burtt Control On the Railways. This text, and indeed the article, was 
aimed at those engaged in degree level study of railway operations.
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A Committee of Enquiry on Traffic Congestion was established in 1940.61 It 
noted how centralised control of operations was rejected by the GWR and with what 
consequences. Severe delay had been experienced in dock areas that was put down to 
the "..failure in manipulation of the wagons rather than by a real shortage."62 By 
contrast the MR system of Train Control used on the LMS was singled out for praise, 
being described as "specially conspicuous." The reason was the degree to which 
control had been made part of a system: District and Inter-District co-ordination of 
trains linked by telephone lines with a Central Control office.63 From the report the 
GWR was seen as having a different strategy toward train control. It is worth quoting 
in full the Committee's view of this approach:
The Great Western divisional or district controls are connected by telephone 
with the signal boxes on the line controlled and thus provide the facilities for 
exchange of information between the controls and the signal boxes. In some 
controls the running of important trains is recorded on daily sheets, but in 
others the record is confined to a train card which is placed in different slots to 
indicate the geographical position of the train. To a certain extent the relief of 
trainmen is indicated by the controls, but the system still continues by which 
trainmen ask for their own relief. Our investigations led us to the conclusion that 
too much reliance is placed on clearing yards by special trains. There is no 
specific Headquarters Control except insofar as the Superintendent's Freight 
Trains Section performs this function. The Locomotive Running Department 
is under the supervision of the Chief Mechanical Engineer and is not 
represented in the divisional or headquarters controls, although there is at
RAIL/267/346 Report of the Committee of Enquiry on Traffic Congestion, November 1940. 
This was set up by the Railway Executive to investigate charges from the Ministry of Transport 
that there had been delays in the turn around of shipping at ports due to the supply of wagons. 
Two documents exist under this classmark, one the actual report the other the response by the 
GWR'S General Manager.
Report of the Committee of Enquiry on Traffic Congestion, p29.
Report of the Committee of Enquiry on Traffic Congestion, p72.
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Swindon a Headquarters Running Superintendent who is jointly responsible to 
the Chief Mechanical Engineer and the Superintendent of the Line.,f64 
Several points of interest emerge from this. The GWR did have a policy which 
concentrated on the running of special trains, and the use of diagramming was seen as 
a solution to this problem. The GWR had problems with Wagon distribution from an 
early date, which necessitated the running of specially designated "Empty Trains."65 
It appears that these were part of the problem being described in 1940. The lack of 
Divisional control, such as that developed on the LMS, prevented network wide 
supervision of all aspects of train movement.
The response of the GWR to these criticisms shows just how different their view 
of control was. First they commented that". .it is quite incorrect to say that the system 
on the Great Western Railway has been less highly developed than those of the 
Northern companies when regard is had to the requirements."66 What is less clear is 
what the differences in requirements were. The GWR had set up control areas around 
congested valley and port areas similar to those on the LMS and LNER. Why had they 
not seen the value of integrating a network wide control system? One clue is that the 
senior managers, at least, did not appreciate what was meant by having an integrated 
control system. In their defence they stated that £200,000 had been spent on installing 
telephone/telegraph equipment. This included the fact that 90% of Passenger Stations 
were equipped with Post Office Telephones.67
Thus they associated investment in telephones with Train Control. So although 
telephones were used to help control movement via signalboxes, there was no 
appreciation at the top of the organisation of what was going on. This implied that 
systematic collection, collation and analysis of information were not being carried out. 
The Committee's recommendation that the GWR should have officials from the
Report of the Committee of Enquiry on Traffic Congestion, p74.
This will be examined in more detail when we come to consider Rolling Stock Distribution on 
the GWR.
RAIL/267/346 Report of the Committee of Enquiry on Traffic Congestion, 19 December 1940, 
P17.
Report of the Committee of Enquiry on Traffic Congestion, pl7.
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LMS/LNER to instruct these companies in Train Control. This was seen as the best 
way to co-ordinate operations. "Strong Headquarters Control" between divisions 
"..giving them knowledge of the position in neighbouring divisions and preventing 
them from working in watertight compartments."68 In addition statistical information 
was seen as being used best in the environment of control. Standard practices were 
codified more easily by using Centralised Control which could relate statistical 
measures with the work being measured. The GWR was clearly indignant at having 
its operating methods questioned, but does not seemed to have produced convincing 
evidence that it was maximising rolling stock utilisation.
Indeed evidence on the collection of statistical information suggests support for 
the Committee's views. It took about six weeks to obtain reliable information on train 
running from the Guards' Journal with a four weekly summary prepared on a regular 
basis. The timetable acted as an implicit standard around which performance could be 
assessed. Divisional officers received details as to the time keeping of trains weighted 
for the conditions of carriage and loading.
Information display was provided in the District Control Offices but not as part 
of a "planning office" approach. Train movement was indicated by a small carrier 
which sat in front of the Controller. In each carrier a slip gave details of the train 
working, recording the train destinations and times of arrival. A cardboard clock 
indicted when information was last received. Occupation of any stretch of line, the 
location of trains and time of last report were clearly displayed. On moving out of the 
control area the slip was removed and filed away. In addition geographical train boards 
were provided to monitor trains. What control the GWR had, was used to monitor 
train movements, enginemen hours and traffic.69 Any departures from running had to 
be cleared by Control, and loading checked by this central control. This approach was 
more akin to signalling than Train Control.
Report of the Committee of Enquiry on Traffic Co-ordination, p75.
For details see Anon. "Train Control Developments on the Great Western Railway" Railway
Gazette, July 2, 1915.
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The monitoring of punctuality was of great importance because the GWR 
offered high speed vacuum fitted train services.70 These trains usually ran at night so 
as to maximise available line capacity. Fast General Merchandise trains were booked 
to run at speeds of 30 mph, whereas most normal freight trains ran at 25mph. Figures 
on the timing of these trains were included in the General Managers' Reports and 
regularly reported to the Superintendent of the Line at Paddington: the number of trains 
run and the train miles per train hour were noted. Such trains were classified according 
to the number of wagons and the speed of running expected.71 Starting, intermediate 
and arrival times were charted so that the working could be discussed at a 9.0am 
meeting. In addition entries from the Guards' Journals were used to calculate figures 
for the average timing.
Information flows within the hierarchy reflected the older departmental 
structures rather than the divisional organisation of the LMS. Thus the company 
remained conservative in its approach to monitoring and planning its operations. It had 
kept its corporate identity after amalgamation and so lacked the need to integrate other 
operating practices within its organisation. Areas of South Wales had coal traffic 
intended for export that produced congestion and required much movement of empty 
wagon stock, but action was limited. As with the LNER, there were "knock-on 
effects" of having just limited control. Localised control would in most cases just serve 
to push the problem outside of the area where congestion was initially located. It was 
the lack of a co-ordinating organisation that produced the problems outlined in the 
report of 1940. That and the failure of the GWR to control its rolling stock 
distribution.
Control in Action: Rolling Stock Distribution
See Anon. "The Freight Train Services of the Great Western Railway" Railway Gazette, 
September 1, 1922 for details of these services. The use of vacuum pipes on a proportion of 
wagons increased the braking power available. This was the main constraint to running fast 
services.
See RAIL/250/450 General Managers Reports. The categories changed in these figures from 
"fast freight" and "vacuum" to categories such as "fitted D" and "fitted C."
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We have seen so far how Train and Traffic Control was used to monitor 
movement and traffic on each of our companies. An important aspect of these 
operations was the distribution of rolling stock. The movement of rolling stock and its 
coordination with the flow of freight was a key component to the Execution and 
Evaluation of the management control process. Ultimately it was how the company 
was able to offer a service: by bringing wagons of the specified type to the location 
required, at the right time.
The LNER separated this function from the overall Control process and the 
GWR lacked any centralised Rolling stock control. These represented different 
solutions to similar operating problems and as such offer us a glimpse into the differing 
organisational structures. Rolling stock distribution extends our analysis of Train 
Control as it provides an example of how control was able to help minimise the costs 
of working whilst maximising the use of capital. Ensuring that rolling stock was in the 
right place at the right time also improved the service the companies were able to offer 
the customers. It helped execute the routine instructions regarding Train operating, and 
evaluated the performance of terminals in the service they were offering. The not 
inconsiderable numbers of privately owned wagons were not under the purview of 
Rolling Stock Distribution systems and so will not be addressed here. In any event, 
this particular problem would not be solved until the nationalisation of the railways.72
Centralised Rolling Stock Distribution on the LMS
For the LMS, movement of rolling stock was centralised at Derby and utilised 
the same infrastructure as Train Control. Procedures were outlined in the company 
publication, "Instructions Relating to the Control and Distribution of Freight Rolling 
Stock." A Daily Freight Rolling Stock Return was telephoned from each station or 
reporting point indicating the number of empties on hand and the number required for 
loading. The District Control office then telephoned the "Daily Freight Rolling Stock
The problem of demurrage, the payments made to railways by traders for the use of wagons, 
ropes etc, was long considered a problem. The Royal Commission on Transport addressed the 
problem without reaching any firm conclusion as to how to deal with it.
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Position" to the Divisional Office. A summary was prepared at Divisional Control and 
then sent on to Central Control. "Movement Orders" were issued by telephone each 
morning and again in the afternoon, giving stations, yards etc their instructions. 
District Office contacted the Division at 4.0pm as a check on developments since the 
12 noon report. As a check on the efficiency of this process, selected stations were 
monitored by the "Daily Freight Rolling Stock Return" which was balanced against 
previous working.73 A key problem for any such system of distribution lay in the 
honesty with which managers reported the actual figures. Clearly there was an 
incentive to either over-order stock or alternatively under-report the number of empties 
available.
Control increased the utilisation of assets, as many wagons could not be filled 
with just any load. Some required special arrangements ranging from wagons devoted 
to specific loads to regulations governing the loading of given commodities. Chemicals 
had to be transported under specified safety conditions, and care had to be taken not to 
damage the wagon for future use. In some cases this necessitated the use of separate 
control arrangements. For example, the number of Fitted or partially Fitted trains in 
each District over the previous 24 hours were checked against those that should have 
been their from the information regarding traffic on offer. The District Control 
Office was able to impose "van levies" on stations where there was a "regular 
deficiency."74 How effective these were is unclear.
Special wagons were extracted and summarised separately under "Special 
Wagons Requirements and Supply." Movement of such specialised equipment was 
monitored through the use of "Special Vehicle Cabinets." These were colour coded 
according to the status of each wagon with details of date, movement, destination, 
whether loaded or empty were noted. The cards were arranged as per the type and
RAIL/421/83 LMS Train Control, pl9.
RAIL/421/231 Appendix to Paper on Train Control, p21. The degree to which these levies 
were actually used and how effective they were is debatable. No clear records of this exist in 
the LMS archive but the LNER experience suggests that they were not that successful. See 
R.T.Munn Milk Chums to Merry-go Round Newton Abbot: David and Charles, p92.
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location of wagon. As they progressed around the network they would be moved 
accordingly.75
The LMS developed a clear hierarchical reporting procedure for the distribution 
of rolling stock which acted to maximise the use of assets whilst attempting to minimise 
movement. Again we see the advantages of having a Divisional Office to co-ordinate 
working on an inter-district basis. The Central Control Office was able to allocate, 
network wide, stock between divisions as well as those special wagons.
Departmental Wagon Control on the LNER
The LNER was faced with more serious problems of co-ordination. Not only 
did it have a surfeit of systems to choose from but it had to deal with the differing 
perspectives on operations inherent in all of them. Under pre-grouping arrangements 
there were several systems covering different aspects of distribution. For example the 
Great Central Railway had refrigerated vans worked by the District Traffic Manager 
whilst fish vans were under the control of the Superintendent of the Line. A Rolling 
Stock Controller dealt with all other stock.76 Similarly the GER had the 
"Superintendent of Operation,(B)", and the Commercial Superintendent in charge of 
"fitted covered vans during the fruit season" and all other stock respectively! This 
suggests that early developments were piecemeal rather than planned.
Amalgamation highlighted the need for a new wagon control system. It was 
imperative that each of the separate systems were brought under one set of rules. 
Perfection may not have been achieved but it was important to make a start to the 
process.77 In October 1921 initial contacts were made and by April 1923 a new system 
was decided upon. A representative from the North Eastern and the Great Central 
investigated the possibilities as it was anticipated that there would be problems, perhaps 
even old rivalries, in allocating wagons between districts. Centralised control offered 
several advantages which would help minimise such problems. Old company loyalties
RAIL/421/83 LMS Train Control, pp97-98.
Anon. "Increasing the Mobility of Freight Rolling Stock" Railway Gazette, March 14, 1924. 
RAIL/390/35 LNER Organisation Committee Minutes, Minute 92, 11 April 1923,.
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had to be replaced by a new "corporate culture" where co-operation should be carried 
out "unselfishly." For the LNER, the problems of amalgamation gave rise to problems 
that were not just related to designing and investing in an information system. 
Attitudes within the workforce to the re-organisation were addressed as well. To 
encourage proper working, a circular was issued stressing the need to maximise the 
use of wagon stock. Staff were encouraged personally to watch wagon movements and 
compile accurate reports. If they could not speed up the process, to "..tell someone 
who can. "78 All members of the organisation were being encouraged to become part 
of the control system. Strictures about avoiding delay, increasing wagon loading and 
wagon miles were also given. Under central control special traffics could be catered 
for, with more flexible wagon supply and minimal shunting. It was also envisaged that 
capital spending could be saved if existing wagon stocks were used more extensively. 
A centralised structure was duly agreed and put under the charge of the Operating 
Department.
These were the Wagon Control offices, extended to 120 stations where greater 
account could be kept of the stock. They were responsible for "correlating and 
synchronising" information from the local stations. The unit of control was seen as the 
"loading point," from which a standardised scheme of returns was developed. Working 
instructions were issued to stations, rolling stock control offices and District 
Superintendent's offices. The system adopted was based upon 24 districts under the 
control of the Superintendent's office. Wagon Control Offices were established to deal 
with specific stations per Superintendents district. Reports were made direct to the 
Central Control Office located at York. Traders were asked to bring their goods to the 
station before 12 noon. The station then completed a "Wagon Report" which was made 
out and sent to the relevant wagon control. This showed inward loaded wagons on 
hand, empty wagons available for loading the next day "available and wanted, 
additional or spare." A similar report was submitted by 2.30pm from the Wagon 
Control to the District Superintendent. This then became the "District Superintendent's 
Wagon Report," sent to the Central Control Office by 3.30pm Analysis of this
78 Anon. "Increasing the Mobility of Freight Rolling Stock" The Railway Gazette, March 14,
1932.
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information then resulted in instructions as to movement, normally issued by 6pm. 
This flow of information through the hierarchy enabled local commercial and operating 
conditions to be factored into the decisions on stock distribution and use. Future 
requirements could be noted via the "Stock Report" recording the inward loading at 
noon, the number of wagons required next day, empties available for loading 
tomorrow, and spare. A "Weekly Summary Card" noted the previous day's wagons 
on hand, received and forwarded, those on hand at 9.0am that day and the number of 
requisitioned wagons. The time spent in the terminals was monitored with 
separate summaries created for private sidings and works. This further extended 
control to the operations of the Company's customers. Demurrage time and any 
inefficiencies in customer behaviour could be made clear. Communications were 
passed on by the Urgent Train Message, a variant of the Telegram. These included 
Special Wagon requirements and Railway Owned Containers. Mineral wagons also had 
their own forms distributed to the District Superintendent and the Mineral Manager. 
Distribution whilst carried out from York, relied on staff brought in from the local 
areas with detailed knowledge of local operating conditions. The District 
Superintendents Office used information received to assess the overall stock on the 
system. By 6pm, instructions were sent by telephone to the District Superintendent's, 
to be confirmed later by telegram. Between 3.30pm and 5pm the Freight Rolling Stock 
Controller was in a position to set up the supply of wagons. Once the Wagon Control 
Offices had analysed the data and issued instructions to the stations, a message was sent 
to the station from which authority was passed to the Guard.
For Special wagons an "Urgent Train Message" was used to communicate 
information as to each stations requirements as to Special wagons. Details of received, 
on hand and forwarded wagons was then entered from these reports onto "Special 
Vehicle Cards." These recorded the movement and loading details. These were 
displayed in trays which enabled the information to be seen at a glance. Other wagon 
records were kept in a cabinet: wagons on hand - spare,on hand - required, on hand - 
inward loaded, to arrive - loaded, and to arrive - spare.
The LNER also utilised the services of a Traffic Statistics Office. Daily records 
were kept of wagon movements, and these were combined into a monthly "Record of
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the Average Terminal User."79 The control offices had access to these statistics on an 
informal basis as required. For example, the Central Wagon Control received a 
monthly statement for each terminal point on a district by district, section by section 
basis. Through this system the "Terminal Wagon Time" was monitored with a view 
to minimising how long wagons spent at terminals. This was undoubtedly a legacy of 
the NER management reforms which stressed the use of statistical measures. 
Information was collected and used by all control systems. However, the collection of 
statistics as a separate function from the monitoring of Train and Traffic control 
reflects a different approach to management.80
The LNER also used the wagon control system to check the value of wagons 
within the Wagon Building Program. The reports of the Wagon Control Organisation 
stressed different variables to the LMS. The reports of the former related the 
movement of wagons to the commercial environment, rather than the operating aspects. 
The Rolling Stock distribution system delivered information which could help the 
problems of the LNER in assessing just what their wagon needs were.
Decentralised Rolling Stock Control: the GWR
On the GWR, Rolling stock control was not integrated within either a train 
control system or a special wagon control office, as the 1940 report on congestion 
noted.81 Rolling stock was distributed according to the Office of the Superintendent 
of the Line. It seems that the problem with distribution was not new. Just after the 
amalgamation, the GWR Goods Conference Minutes reported that there were 
complaints concerning a shortage of wagons, when in fact there should have been 
sufficient. It noted that whilst there was co-operation between the Divisional
4,000 stations returned these cards which were sent by the first available passenger train after 
9.0am.
The records of this office do not appear to have survived. See Chapter 3 for details of the NER 
and statistical analysis.
See "Wagons and Their Ways" GWR Lecture and Debating Society Meeting of 16 December 
1926, Number 200.
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Superintendent and the District Goods managers ". .for some reasons that were not quite 
clear, the wishes of the latter were not always being carried out." It was also noted that 
there was a "lack of knowledge" as to the areas "producing" wagons and those 
requiring them.82 Train or Traffic Control systems should have been able to deal with 
these problems if introduced widely enough. Telephone reports and centralised 
instructions would enable wagons to be located and their movement monitored.
A report was commissioned from the Goods Conference to investigate the 
causes of these delays. This identified specific organisational problems, as this report 
noted that there were a series of "misunderstandings" which had now been cleared up. 
To prevent problems arising in the future it was suggested that the shortages were 
spread around the network. The supply of wagons was to be based on the "average 
number of wagons loaded out by each district during a given period." This was the 
origin of the special empty trains which were criticised by the 1940 Committee on 
Congestion. A follow-up minute noted that "Consideration is being given to a proposal 
to run empty stock trains between certain parts of the line, picking up empty wagons 
and converging on places where wagons are required for loading.83 Tests were carried 
out from time to time to monitor the efficiency of the turn around of stock. The 
problem with the system as it was established was the split in responsibility. Traders’ 
needs were met by the Chief Goods Manager. However it was the operating 
departments that controlled day to day distribution. This made it less certain that the 
needs of commercial and operating aspects of operations would be met. The District 
Goods Managers coordinated the supply of wagons with the Divisional Superintendents.
The Superintendent of the Line received a stock taking report from all stations 
and depots at 2pm every day. This was summarised by the Divisional Office who sent 
it on to Paddington to arrive first thing the next day. Thus the Divisional Office was 
in a position to co-ordinate the supply and demand of wagons per district. Urgent
RAIL/250/767 GWR Goods Conference Minutes, November1, 1923 Minute 6579 "Distribution 
of Goods Rolling Stock,".
February 16, 1924, Minute 6617 "Distribution of Goods Rolling Stock" Appendix, and June 12 
1924 Minute 6656 "Distribution of Goods Rolling Stock," RAIL/250/767 GWR Goods 
Managers Conference.
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requests for wagons were made by telephone and telegram, as on the LNER. The 
Goods Department also collected over the same area, the same information except for 
that on ’’purely traffic yards and sidings."84 This Summary form reached Paddington 
the next day and gave details of any other requisitioning of empty stock, retention of 
stock from the previous day and the number of wagons "under load" from the previous 
day. Thus both departments had their own sources of information, from which in 
theory they could co-ordinate working. There was of course some doubt as to whether 
honest reporting was taking place and it was the Chief Goods Manager's job to monitor 
this. It is not clear what, if any sanctions were used in the event that reporting was 
dishonest. A check was made on the number of empties on hand at 8.0am and the 
number awaiting unloading. Presumably these need not strictly be included as being 
on hand but they might become available during the day. This could be checked with 
the previous days (unloading figures as an indication of the true worth of the figures. 
As it was this information was used to reconcile the needs of the two departments, 
Commercial and the Operating. The overall position regarding freight was graphed 
according to the daily averages over all districts. The categories of analysis were: 
loaded and empty wagons on hand at 8.0am, and the number of wagons unloaded and 
loaded out per day. Wagons made empty by unloading were more important to smooth 
running than those created in general by yards. This was a measure of each individual 
terminal's ability, or not, to generate the wagons required for the traffic on hand.
The Divisional Superintendents each had a Rolling Stock Inspector in charge of 
wagon allocation. Empties were brought back "on line" by Inspectors based within the 
District Goods Managers Office. It was by actually visiting the yards, depots and 
sidings that a check was kept. A report was then sent to the Chief Goods Managers 
Office, to be considered with the Summary.
It is not clear that the GWR's overall control of rolling stock was able to deal 
with the requirements of traffic. The Committee on Traffic Congestion from 1940 was 
critical of this aspect of operations in particular. Extracting information for special 
studies would be not be as easy and might mean special information gathering
84 Payne, "Wagons and their Ways" Number 200, GWR Lecture and Debating Society, p8.
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mechanisms being set up. The details as regards the position and status of stock do not 
appear to have been as integrated as on either the LMS or LNER. Whilst the Goods 
Department was involved details seemed to have been sent, at least in part, by train 
rather than communication by telephone. As such there would have been a lack of 
"real time control." It appears that the company relied on personal supervision with 
the difficulty in coordinating individual observations which was the problem. Without 
a systematic means of processing information, the planning and execution of services 
could not be optimised. The GWR had no clear idea of where their stock was at any 
one time, and could not easily bring it to where traffic was located. This caused the 
problems that the Committee identified in 1940.
Conclusion
Network coordination was vital for the successful running of a railway. Trains 
were able to flow smoothly between points and traffic could be brought to the required 
depot for collection. Train Control was better able to deliver this as it could control 
the movement of trains in "real time." Traffic Control, whilst useful, could only bring 
traffic and trains together.
For the LMS the Divisional Trains Office had extended the mechanisms of 
Train Control into the Commercial and Operating departments as never before. The 
size of the newly amalgamated company had provided the initial impetus for this but 
it was soon apparent that much more could be achieved at all levels of operations. The 
planning function of the Trains Office at a divisional level enabled the Control Office 
to implement such regulations and commercial schemes as were devised. The costs of 
over-centralisation were deemed to be outweighed by the benefits. Managers and 
workers alike had access to the decision making process through the telephone, 
conferences and reporting mechanisms. The evidence of the Committee on Traffic 
Congestion suggests that the LMS was the most effective in controlling movement.
The LNER utilised control somewhat less effectively but nonetheless was able 
to coordinate activity more effectively that the GWR. The distinction between Train 
and Traffic control need not necessarily have made a difference if decisions regarding 
train movement were somehow incorporated. Bringing trains to traffic was a major
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problem for congested areas, and train movement could be implicitly monitored in the 
process. It was borne out of a need to monitor and plan traffic movements without the 
infrastructure of Train Control. This was a reasonable response to the financial 
constraints faced by the company.
By contrast the GWR did not have adequate train control for clearing its 
network. This may have been reasonable given that it took the traffic levels of the war 
to create a problem. This is unlikely however: the capacity of track can still remain a 
problem even in a declining market for rail transport. The LMS found that even with 
a slump in freight traffic, increased passenger mileage and speed would create a 
shortage.85 In addition there was always the need to use the assets more effectively. 
This was also recognised by the LNER, who had more reason than most to watch their 
assets closely. Unfortunately for them there was not enough money to completely 
introduce such schemes as quickly as they would have liked.
Train Control was a means of interacting with the process of conveyance. The 
process of Execution and Evaluation, as outlined in Chapter One, were part of a unified 
system only on the LMS. The willingness of the LNER to adopt such practices and the 
problems caused by their absence on the GWR, indicate that such a system did confer 
benefits. The improved utilisation of rolling stock and the maximisation of route 
capacity could be achieved using these methods. Only a systematic approach to 
management could deliver these benefits, requiring as it did the standardisation of 
trains, schedules and routes. For successful operation, it was important that any gains 
in efficiency of conveyance were not cancelled out by delays in the Terminal 
operations. It is to this that we now turn.
85 RAIL/418/196 Progress and Development in the Chief Operating Managers Department, p23.
142
Chapter Six
The Control of Throughput: Managing Terminal Operations
By the time of amalgamation, several problems were combining to make the 
topic of terminal design important. The facilities afforded to traders were in many 
cases both insufficient and outdated for the post World War One market. Sites once 
surrounded by open spaces were now built up, and space at a premium. Any 
alterations had to be made within the old 19th century structures, with a few notable 
exceptions. Increasing road competition made it more important than ever that loads 
should not be lost or damaged in transit. Decreased handling reduced the number of 
damaged loads, which although a small proportion of traffic would not encourage 
Traders to use the railway.1 If the turn around time could be increased better earlier 
deliveries to customers were possible. Better use could also be made of rolling stock. 
This was particularly important for more specialised wagons such as those involved in 
the container traffic. If shunting could be reduced with improved yard layout not only 
would cost be reduced in terms of locomotive power but work would be speeded up.
These problems were approached on the LMS by the use of Time and Motion 
studies, whilst the GWR restructured its transhipment operations. These two 
approaches should not be seen as perfect substitutes, as the former certainly examined 
the problem as part of a more specific examination of terminal operations. They were 
more complements to each other stressing different aspects of the operation. The 
LNER borrowed from both these approaches as it co-operated with the GWR on 
reforming transhipment practices and eventually would adopt Time and Motion studies. 
There were also reports regarding the use of mechanical handling equipment that fell 
short of a systematic analysis of the Terminal function.
Both Time and Motion analysis and studies of Transhipment were a response 
to the widely differing operating conditions and standards which since amalgamation
1 RAIL/418/209 Review o f the IM S Commercial Organisation and its Achievements 1932-1939,
February 1940, p69. For example, in 1929 £318,510 was paid in compensation on Traffic 
receipts of £29.6 million, or 1.08%. By 1938 this figure was down to 0.93%, £214,309 on just 
over £23 million.
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had been seen as presenting problems. The new technology of road transport came to 
require a different terminal infrastructure for efficient operation.
When we examined Train and Traffic Control the Execution and Evaluation 
components of our model are important. In this chapter the emphasis will be different. 
The analysis here was of how to Plan, Execute and Evaluate. As the nature of the 
product was determined in the Planning process of our model, the re-organisation of 
terminal working involved linking the service with its execution. By improved terminal 
operations, movement could be expedited and new services, such as Containers and 
Railhead Distribution, introduced. We see here how information was used to shape 
decisions regarding the best approach to conducting business. Management control 
needed to be articulated toward cost minimisation, whilst maximising the gains from 
investment.
It was by sampling and experimentation that the companies hoped to be able to 
establish the foundations for better performance. Monitoring and Evaluation would fall 
to statistical summaries rather than real time information and telephone conferences. 
The task was to examine what terminals did, what they should do, and how they might 
achieve it. This chapter places the emphasis on how two different aspects of terminal 
operation were chosen for analysis. Each seems to have reflected the operational 
concerns of each company: for the LMS it was the throughput of large Goods 
Terminals, for the GWR the Transhipment of products.
Time and Motion studies were seen as an attempt to codify standards and "best 
practice" across the network for merchandise traffic. Such traffic was relatively 
expensive to handle, and came usually in relatively heterogenous loads. This was the 
main problem for the railways in minimising costs. The solution involved remodelling 
old termini and placing new designs on a foundation of systematic analysis. In this 
respect railway companies were no different from any other, as materials handling was 
undergoing change throughout industry.2
Several changes occurred on the railways: Containerisation was a response to 
the need to improve handling times and minimise damage to goods. The growth of
2 For example see Anon. (1931) Morris Conveyors, Book 187, Herbert Morris Limited for details
of equipment and customers for materials handling equipment.
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road competition facilitated its growth as collection and delivery was made easier via 
the railway companies’ own vehicles. This will be considered in Chapter Seven.
Several different aspects had to be addressed: how to charge for the service, to 
maximise use and to what extent should specialised handling equipment be provided? 
All companies extended their collection and delivery services and set up railhead 
distribution from selected stations. Efficiency in the terminal was achieved by 
minimising the amount of work done by men, both in terms of physical effort and the 
amount of time spent. This implied decreased handling, with attendant benefits in 
decreased claims for damaged goods. Increased clearance speed and wagon turn round 
times utilised equipment more effectively. Finally shunting could be reduced by 
adopting mechanical substitutes. This was easier said than done because of the 
constraints on working of station design. The choice of yard design in the early years 
of railway development re-enforced such constraints: "The governing point would seem 
to have been to get some place at a low capital cost and the question of annual working 
charges seems to have been treated as of a secondary character. "3 The monitoring of 
performance seems to have consisted of assessing the current cost of working with 
reference to monthly Returns on a year by year basis supplemented by daily and weekly 
data when required. This was no longer considered efficient. We begin with an outline 
of how terminals functioned in general. Then we will be in a position to examine the 
role of Time and Motion studies. LMS practice in developing such schemes will be 
contrasted with the experience of the GWR in rearranging their transhipment services.
Terminal Work
This section begins with a review of how the terminal functioned in general, 
beginning with the arrival of goods at the railway terminal.4 To do this we need to
E.Falconer "Goods Shed Operations" Journal of the Institute o f Transport, Volume 16, No. 5, 
May 1935.
For what follows see Sherrington The Economics o f Rail Transport, Edward Arnold and 
D.R.Lamb (1941) Modem Railway Operation,(2nd. edition) London:Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons. 
We shall not consider private siding management as this was in most cases entirely outside of 
railway control.
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address the task of the terminal as regards the loading of wagons. Then we can 
describe the tasks within terminals.
The process of securing the load within the wagon could not be left to chance 
and this had important consequences for loading procedures. Wagon loading was one 
of the most important variables watched by managers. However the problem of 
aggregation is once more apparent. Analysis was most useful in train by train 
monitoring of specified commodities over specific routes. Much effort was put into 
determining the gains to be made from mechanised loading and ensuring that the cubic 
capacity of wagons was utilised to the full. Any improvement in transhipment was an 
important factor in increasing wagon loading for this reason. Costs were also increased 
because of the wide variety of wagons travelling around the network. Many had been 
inherited from the amalgamated companies, whilst others were dedicated to specific 
traffics. Specialist wagons existed for the conveyance of bulk liquids, powders, meat, 
fruit and vegetables, fish, coal, steel and many other products. Many of these also 
required special terminal arrangements. Indeed they were often associated with 
specialist terminals that would be located on private sidings and only sometimes appear 
at company administered terminals. We have already seen how Train Control 
monitored the use of such equipment. In terminals, rapid preparation and despatch 
took the form of specialist handling equipment such as overhead "goliath" cranes and 
conveyor systems.5
Railway company control over the stock of wagons was limited: Lamb estimated 
that out of 1.4 million wagons, 650,000 were owned privately.6 Most were used to 
convey minerals and they served in many areas as storage areas for coal, and although 
demurrage was levied, these occupied valuable track space. Another problem was the 
empty running when return loads were lacking. Private stock had to be returned to the 
owners whether a load was available or not. For our purpose the issue was an
See F.C.Warren "The Load Gauge and Some Exceptional Loads" Meeting Feb. 27th 1913 GWR 
Debating Society Proceedings, for details of such wagons and their place in operations from the
point of view of GWR practice.
Lamb Modem Railway, pl47.
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exogenous variable, one which management really had to accept, whilst all the time 
attempting to maximise use.
Of more importance to managers was the question of wagon carrying capacity. 
This was most keenly felt in the coal and mineral carrying trade because of the 
possibilities for economies. To give an illustration, for a train of 600 tons "paying 
load" the figures in Table 1 apply:
Table 1
Wagon Capacity Number
Required
Train Length Tare Gross
10 tons 60 1,080 ft 369 969
12 tons 50 975 ft. 350 950
20 tons 30 735 ft. 288 888
SOURCE: D.R.Lamb Modem Railway Operations, page 151.
The tare weight was that of the wagon empty, and hence for the train was the "dead 
weight." Increasing the size of the wagon increased the net wagon load such that 
economies of bulk carriage were possible. The reduced length of train was also 
important in minimising the amount invested in sidings and increased the carrying 
capacity of the line. Wagons were designed with the needs not only of movement, but 
of loading: bulk, batch and customised loads gave rise to the design of specialist 
equipment both in terminals and wagons.
In many depots there was a distinction between shed and yard working, 
reflecting whether the railway service included Collection and Delivery. If it was not 
included then it was the duty of the receiver to unload in the yard. Whichever 
category of traffic was involved, there was usually a split between incoming and 
outgoing traffic. The act of loading and unloading wagons varied from site to site, and 
from traffic to traffic.
The underlying economics of the transport terminal were defined by the nature 
of the product. An item was packaged ready for handling, and then transportation. 
The distinction between the two is important: handling was required so that an item
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could be transported. How products were packaged was a function of handling and 
vice versa. The elements that determined these were fragility, weight, bulk condition - 
liquid, solid, gas, hot or cold - and whether they were dangerous or not. The manner 
in which goods were sent was also influenced by the means of handling used. Care had 
to be taken with dangerous goods, combined with the techniques that were available to 
handle them. So, for example, acids could be carried in bulk tankers or carboys, 
subject to the terminal and size of consignment.
The size of the consignment was important in determining the economics of a 
terminal. Merchandise carried in bulk with uniform package size was easier to handle 
than in small lots. Large consignments would perhaps enable the purchase of special 
equipment. Some loads were almost customised by comparison and this was true of 
out-of-gauge loads and some dangerous products. Those loads carried in bulk were 
often despatched to dedicated terminals or private sidings and so do not concern us 
here. However the general principle still applies: bulk loads were more economical 
than batch or customised loading, and as such were encouraged by the railway 
companies.7
With each load there would be a consignment note which acted as the contract 
between the customer and the railway. Several checks were made on the load whilst 
it was in the terminal. Once the load had been weighed by the yard weighbridge it 
proceeded to the platform where it was to be loaded. There, it was weighed once 
more, this time by the checker who would indicate at the same time where the goods 
had to be taken and check what was arriving with the consignment note. This was then 
passed on to the office for the preparation of invoices. Each of these would have the 
weight, number and destination of the wagon into which goods are being loaded. Any 
discrepancies between the quoted rate and the condition of the merchandise was then 
noted. Lamb observed that if at all possible it should be the practice to make up the 
delivery sheets at the same time as the invoices, ready for the unloading at the receiving
For details of how a load was related to wagon design, see R.Tourret (1980) Petroleum Rail 
Tank Wagons o f Britain, Tourret Publications: Abingdon, and D.Rowland (1985) British 
Railways Wagons - The First Half Million, Leopard Press: London. Whilst the latter deals only 
with post nationalisation types, the principles were the same.
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terminal.8 The invoices might then be dispatched, either with the goods or by post, to 
the receiving depot.
Another important duty of the checker was to examine the condition of the 
packaging and labelling. This was to prevent loss or damage in transit for which the 
company could be held liable. Also there was a relationship between how a load was 
packaged and the mechanical handling procedures that could be used. Very often a 
load had to be made part of the wagon. For example, carboys containing acid had to 
be made fast within the wagon and packed with straw. This involved extra cost and 
was reflected in the initial placing of the merchandise within the General 
Classification.9
The goods were then harrowed and loaded into the wagon. This was no mean 
task as the consignments were often not all destined for the same point. Transhipment 
was a major problem for all railways as it was time consuming and costly. Some 
consignments would have to be off-loaded first and this required the correct 
arrangement of the load within the wagon If the wagon was covered ie enclosed, then 
it was ready for dispatch, but if open then it was sheeted by tarpaulins. Once loaded 
and ready it was moved from the yard or shed by the use of a capstan or otherwise 
shunted to the dispatch sidings where it could be made up into a train. The number of 
wagons was noted by the number takers for the purposes of the settlements from the 
Railway Clearing House and the train then dispatched.
Care had to be taken in ascertaining the proper loading, and in some cases, 
correct positioning of the train.10 This involved liaising between the Superintendent and 
the Goods Manager. Loading tables were a ready means to deciding the train load by 
the number of vehicles but this was not altogether satisfactory. The calculation of 
reasonably precise tonnage figures was to be preferred rather than the equating of 
loaded and empty wagons into equivalent units.
Lamb Modem Railway Operation, p68.
Details of how packaging effects loads and materials handling, albeit at a later date can be found 
in W.F.Friedman and J.J.Kipnees (1960) Industrial Packaging, New York: Wiley and Sons.
For example gun powder would be located as far as possible away from the crew. Sometimes 
for particularly dangerous loads, special inspectors would travel with the trains.
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The arrival of the train at its destination saw a similar process in reverse. The 
trains arrived in the reception yard and their numbers were "taken" by the staff of the 
Clearing House. A member of the yard staff might indicate, sometimes with just a 
chalk mark, which siding the wagon(s) should take. It was important that the yard 
remained clear at its entrance, no mean feat in some of the larger depots. To ensure 
this the yardmaster took regular "tours" to ensure that smooth running was maintained. 
Whole sections of the train were removed and placed either in the shed or yard to await 
unloading. When unloaded the invoices were checked with what arrived, and removed 
to the vehicle, loading point or warehouse as the case may be. The loading of the 
company road vehicles mirrored that of the rail vehicles with the loads placed per 
district or street within each truck or dray. Finally the whole load was weighed once 
more on leaving the yard by the weighbridge. The invoices would be received by 
the delivery office where they would be entered into a book and numbered. The rates 
levied would be checked and sorted according to whether they are to be delivered by 
the railway or await picking up by the customer. From the invoices it was usually the 
case that the delivery sheets still had to be made up. These were used by the company 
in the process of delivering merchandise. The invoices would be marked according to 
the delivery point and these would guide the checkers during unloading. Each sheet 
covered a single unit of freight with different coloured sheets indicating whether there 
was payment to be collected or not.
The performance of the Goods Yard was based on several factors. Burtt noted 
the daily reports of number of wagons forwarded and dispatched along with the total 
tonnage handled. Alongside this the number and cost of staff were seen as the key 
variables. The key problem was how to account for differing conditions and for this 
Burtt suggested cross sectional analysis be undertaken with Yards of similar 
condition.11 The Time and Motion studies domininate our approach to terminal 
performance because they attempted to do just this.
Time and Motion Studies
n P.Burtt (1926), The Principal Factors in Freight Train Operating, George Allen, pl62.
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It was the LMS who were the first to apply the techniques of Time and Motion 
study, or job analysis, to the problem of terminal organisation.12 The LNER and GWR 
were followers in this regard. During 1944, the LNER sent officers to the LMS Goods 
Depot at Derby (St Mary's) to examine how the LMS was utilising Job Analysis to 
restructure Depots.13 The work of the LMS in this field therefore dominates our 
discussion of Terminal redesign.
It was the amalgamation that prompted the LMS to review its operations. In 
1923 the management conducted a survey of Goods facilities that revealed ''..great 
variations in their design and operation."14 It was not just the organisation and 
location, but the lack of suitable measures of performance, especially over time. 
Comparing costs over time, apart from neglecting differing operating conditions, 
"accepted as a standard of performance a comparison founded on the results obtained 
in the circumstances as they then existed. "15 The possible solutions to these problems 
were described in a series of special studies and reports. The most influential of these 
were the Time and Motion studies instigated by E.H.Lemon, one of the LMS Vice 
Presidents. It was early in 1930 that a committee was established to investigate the 
"mechanisation and modernisation" of goods terminals.16 An outside consultant, Lewis
During the war a number of reports were produced by the Railway Companies Association 
dealing with technical and operating matters. That on Goods Shed design strongly favoured 
both the approach and conclusions of the LMS. Whilst it is true that Ashton Davies of the LMS 
held the chair of this Committee, many other commentators also held this view. See 
RAIL/1098/38 Railway Companies Association Commission Report on the Best Layout for 
Goods Terminals, 1944. For other commentators views see Lamb Modem Railway Operation, 
especially Chapter VII "Modem Methods in Goods Handling." Further details of LMS 
experience by one of its officers appears in E.Falconer "Goods Shed Operations" Journal o f the 
Institute o f Transport, Vol. 16, No 5 May 1935.
This produced the following report: Brochure Prepared in Connection With the Visit of LNE 
(Southern Area) Officers to the LMS Modernised Goods Depot at Derby (St. Mary's), 
RAIL/421/153, 18 May 1944.
RAIL/1098/38 Railway Companies Association Commission Report on the Best Layout for 
Goods Terminals, Chaired by Ashton Davies, Dated february 1944, p i 1. This report was 
recommending future operational policy for after the war.
RAIL/421/153 Visit of LNE (Southern Area) Officers to the LMS Modernised Goods Depot 
at Derby (St. Marys) 18 May 1944, p i.
RAIL/1007/217 E.H.Lemon Mechanisation of Goods Depots Memo dated March 23rd, 1933. 
The Committee consisted of the Electrical Engineer, the Chief Civil and Mechanical Engineers,
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C. Ord, was then appointed to investigate in more detail the layout and operation of 
terminals.17 Issues of warehouse design, mechanical appliances and labour efficiency 
were discussed in the light of information gathered by these studies.
Time and Motion: Ord's Report
The nature of the problem was grounded in movement, in extending to the 
terminal the ability to keep the process of transportation moving. Road transport would 
deliver the goods for unloading to sheds, loading banks and yard sidings. Direct 
loading from dray to wagon minimised handling, but was constrained by the need for 
good wagon loading. Thus some packages would have to be kept awaiting suitable 
wagons, and their proper positioning within them. In already congested yards, this was 
a source of excessive harrowing as porters had to make their way around these loads. 
The function of the job analysis was to examine the handling of consignments 
(including cartage operations), reduce labour costs, improve conditions for the staff and 
"expedite the handling of goods" so that the standard of our service must compare with 
that of the Post Office ie a next day's delivery."18
The setting of standards and measurement of work was not easy because of the 
variety of different tasks to be integrated into the analysis. There were fluctuations in 
"size, shape and weight" of load as well as associated fluctuations in the reception of 
traffic from traders.
The stated objectives of Ord's study were to:
1) Eliminate trucking.
2) Reduce the amount of handling.
3) Expedite the clearance of traffic each morning so as to improve the
percentage delivered each day and to assist a speeding up of transit.
and the Operating Manager.
See Lemon Mechanisation. Ord was then engaged in a study of Crewe Transhipment Shed. 
His fees, including expenses , were £550 per month.
RAIL/421/153 Visit of LNE (Southern Area) Officers to LMS, p i.
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4) Speeding up container transit.
5) Substitute locomotive shunting by mechanical tractors.
6) Quicker release of wagons under load.
7) Increase concentration of working to reduce walking and harrowing time of 
staff.
8) Minimise cartage costs.19
To encourage the co-operation of the workforce, no attempt was to be made to separate 
the gains of mechanisation and/or organisation from those that might have occurred 
otherwise. So long as workers applied themselves in the future there would be no 
repercussions about the past.20 Previous comparisons were not based on any 
"yardstick" for the purpose of measuring the efficiency of the work. Ord's task was 
to provide information as to how existing yards could be improved and to prepare the 
framework for constructing new ones. Ord reported to Lemon's Committee in March 
1934.
Three types of traffic were classified, Forwarded, Received and Transhipment. 
Most loads were found to be relatively homogeneous with little variance in handling 
needs. Ord quantified the type of savings that should be possible in terms of ". .present 
average handling costs of the larger stations in England. "21 Any variation in efficiency 
was tested against the performance of "more efficient stations," defined as those with 
the lowest average costs. Several stations were taken as suitable candidates for 
analysis.22
To take Blackburn as an example of this analysis, three figures were used as 
"standards." One was the hours per ton, (hereafter referred to as hpt), after changes 
in organisation had been made, followed by what it was thought could be achieved 
compared with similar stations. In this particular case, Kettering for received and
19 RAIL/1007/217 Report from L.C.Ord 3 March 1934 Mechanisation of Goods Sheds, p i.
20 Ord Mechanisation, p i . This implied some concern over union response, but no details on the
response from the workers appear in the reports.
21 Ord Mechanisation, p2.
22 Ord Mechanisation, p2. The others recommended but not, it seems chosen, were Lancaster and
Chesterfield.
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Lancaster for Forwarded and Yard were used. This was combined with an estimate of 
what was achievable under existing conditions.
Table 2, Yard Analysis at Blackburn Depot.
Before After Estimate Forecast
Received 1.85 1.45 1.35 0.8
Forwarded 2.0 1.1 0.65 0.35
Yard 0.95 0.95 0.75 0.4
SOURCE: PRO RAIL/1007/217 p4 and pl4 Mechanisation of Goods Sheds. All 
figures are hours per ton.
There are several problems interpreting these figures, so their value is somewhat 
limited. It seems that the objective of the analysis, to improve terminal working, had 
somehow become lost. It is not clear how the forecast figure was arrived at. Measures 
of doubtful provenance could not change management practices. Similarly, how were 
the component parts of the terminal weighted? For instance, if the facilities were 
poorer elsewhere how would this impact upon performance? Nor is it altogether clear 
why Ord used two estimates in the first place given that they differed. The forecast 
seems to be a long run objective which would eventually be achieved once 
mechanisation was in place and the workforce used to new working practices. The 
estimate seems therefore to have been an interim measure of performance. In short it 
is not clear from this example that the LMS had moved away from "unscientific" 
comparisons. Terminals with differing conditions of work were still being used as 
indicators of efficiency.
There were also problems with the implementation of the plans from within the 
ranks of the railwaymen which became apparent at Blackburn. The received traffic 
figures "..did not drop until about a week ago when a discrepancy checker was 
dropped at our request.." This brought the figure down to 1.65 hpt (hours per ton); 
two more were replaced and the figure fell to 1.45 hpt. This suggests that Time and 
Motion studies could indicate those workers who were somehow failing to perform in 
line with expectations.
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As well as new working practices, job analysis attempted to assess the effect of 
introducing new technology in the form of mechanised handling. A relatively 
unmechanised yard at Oldbury was chosen as a test. There was a ",,deep rooted 
objection.." to machinery here, for what reason was unclear.23 By introducing 
equipment on a step by step basis it was hoped to prove and quantify the gains from 
mechanical handling. Road motors were introduced and an overhead crane installed 
to provide a best practice standard for future reference. No details of the exact results 
were mentioned in Ord’s report as it appears to have been an on-going project.
By far the greatest problem for Ord was that the working arrangements did not 
deliver any financial economies. He stated that: "The results the Company obtained 
after two and a half months were working costs nearly double those obtained at other 
stations with older and poorer layouts." However he went on "This in no way implies 
that the layout was not successful or the facilities good...in fact they have been 
generally very much admired."24 This must have been of great comfort to the 
shareholders! Mitigating circumstances were offered as an explanation. The study was 
rushed so that the cost structure of the facilities could not be adequately measured as 
a prelude to more widespread examination. Hence there was a "..lack of necessary 
knowledge and experience to know the figure at which the shed should work and the 
ability to plan and educate, and if necessary to enforce results.."25
Given that the study was rushed and failed to deliver economies, we must ask 
why it was pursued thereafter? The answer lies in the value of Ord’s work in revealing 
the difficulties involved in obtaining the necessary information and in implementing the 
results of analysis. There was not wholesale support for Job Analysis: "The District 
Goods Managers, Agents and Foremen either did the best they knew, their failure being 
due to lack of knowledge, or on the other hand they knew what was wrong and how to 
put it right, but were too lazy or indifferent to do so. The former assumption is the
Ord Mechanisation of Goods Sheds, p7.
Ord Mechanisation of Goods Sheds, pl2.
Ord Mechanisation of Goods Sheds, pl2.
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only possible one for many obvious reasons."26 This is not at all obvious given that 
Ord had seen fit to draw attention to this fact, suggesting hostility to his study. Support 
for this view also comes from Ord's comments on the terminal at Blackburn. There the 
District General Manger and Goods Agent informed him that they had received official 
thanks from the company for their "good work," implying that they were doing well.27 
There were other occasions, cited by Ord, where remarks on past performance had 
made the introduction of new working practices more difficult. His frustration was 
clear when he commented that "[T]here are very many more economies possible than 
the District Officers or Agents can see or understand. "28 Ord concluded that the task 
of job analysis was challenging to someone, such as himself, without the technical 
background. This was compounded by non-co-operation, and Ord found some 
difficulty where "..both seniors and men were putting up the worst performance we 
could find."29 This suggests that as an outsider he was not seen as being aware of 
railway working practices and so did not command the respect of the terminal 
management and workforce. So whilst the senior management may have been keen on 
the modernisation of terminals, it is clear that not everyone in the company was so 
inclined.
Despite these problems, by November 1935, Lemon had issued a memo 
outlining the principles agreed under the guidance of Ord's report. Wagon and dray 
loading, along with harrowing were singled out for attention. Analysis, either already 
completed or about to be done, it is not clear which, would fix standards for each. 
Labour output was taken as being of equal quality throughout the network seemingly 
so that any gains could be ascribed to the new organisation. Whether this was an 
attempt to push further the perceived effectiveness of such studies is unclear. Either 
way, the assumption was not altogether valid: Ord had noted the poor physical
Ord Mechanisation of Goods Sheds, pl3.
Ord Mechanisation of Goods Sheds, pl3.
Ord Mechanisation of Goods Sheds, pl3.
Ord Mechanisation of Goods Sheds, p!4.
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condition of the workforce at Blackburn and intimated that this had detrimental effects 
on performance.30
The approach to be adopted was summed up as "..the work should be brought 
to the men rather than the men go to the work. "31 This involved both the introduction 
of mechanised handling and the redesign of the shed. Movement was aided by using 
conveyors and unloading machines. Wagons were to be unloaded directly onto electric 
trucks and thence to the waiting dray. To minimise shunting, electric capstans were 
recommended. These also gave foremen more control on the placing of wagons 
without having to call on locomotives and this had implications for minimising shunting 
costs. Direct loading from wagon to road, under covered accommodation, was 
recommended. Cartage was analysed to minimise movement within the yard and on 
delivery/pick-up rounds. The duties of cartage staff were extended to including helping 
shed and yard staff with their duties.32
Time and Motion: The Results
As a result of Ord's initial studies, a special office at Euston was established to 
examine shed design and mechanical equipment to conduct Time Studies. A District 
Committee was set up to take advice from the specialists at headquarters.33 It is 
probable that these were members of the Executive Research Committee, introduced 
by the President of the LMS to coordinate Commercial and Operational Research.
RAIL/1007/217 E.H.Lemon Mechanisation of Goods Depots, 1933, p i. So bad were some
that reducing physical effort and walking became increasingly necessary just for this reason. 
RAIL/1007/217 Ord Mechanisation of Goods Depots, pi 1.
Lemon Mechanisation of Goods Depots, p i.
Lemon Mechanisation of Goods Depots, p i.
33 RAIL/418/196 Progress and Developments in the Chief Operating Managers Department, 1940, 
p72.
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FIGURE ONE: LMS Goods Shed Design 
Source: Lamb Railway Operations. p82.
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An example of the type of analysis undertaken may be seen in the categories on 
Form ERO 29882 "Analysis of Goods Station Operation." This was used as a basis for 
the collection of information and embodied an implicit model of Terminal operations. 
It was divided into the following sections: Staff, Received Shed Traffic, Forwarded 
Shed Traffic, Yard, Warehouse and various summaries.34 The Received/Forwarded 
tasks were split into Shed Wagon (Un)Loading and Shed Dray (Un)Loading 
respectively. Table Two shows how four medium sized stations performed:
Table 3
Date H.P.T.
Before
H.P.T.
After
%
Decrease
Cost of 
Introduction 
in pounds
Lancaster 1934 0.71 0.45 36.6 4,400
Blackpool 1935 1.25 0.85 32.0 16,000
Burton 1935 1.33 0.73 45.0 3,600
Burnley 1936 1.45 1.07 26.0 6,300
SOURCE: Taken from RAIL/421/153 Visit o f LNE (Southern Area) Officers, 1944.
Physical handling was reduced, per ton, which was the objective: what is less clear is 
the degree to which other factors had changed. What we can examine is the means by 
which modernisation can be seen to have influenced the outcome. Given that the speed 
of movement between wagons and drays was an important aspect of terminal working. 
We might usefully start there. The major changes appear in the movement of 
merchandise from the wagon. This is clear if we examine Figure One. These plans 
show the layout of modernised depots.35 In each we can see how important the direct 
loading of drays has become, although how they were loaded varied: at Lancaster there 
was a single unloading point served by a capstan. This delivered wagons to a
Section XIII "Goods Terminal Modernisation" RAIL/418/196 Progress and Developments in 
the Chief Operating Managers Department, 1940.
Unfortunately there is no similar illustration of the previous layout. However from Lamb’s text 
it is clear that major changes had been made, as we shall see. See p82 facing Lamb Modem 
Railway Operating.
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"Sectional Conveyor" where Electric "Mules" delivered slates of goods to the waiting 
drays. These were arranged in order, so facilitating delivery.36 The only problem with 
this lay in the fact that the gang had to be limited to a single worker - any more and 
they were in each other’s way. The solution to this was the Wagon Unloading 
Machine, that enabled both to work at once.37 At Blackpool and Burton, the stations 
dealt with forwarded traffic by unloading straight to the wagon. For received sundries, 
electric trucks were loaded from the wagons and then proceeded to "butting" strips for 
transfer to the required dray. Once the wagon was empty it could remain in place 
awaiting a load. Direct unloading as the inward wagons acted as an "..ample 
reservoir.." of work and hence spread work over shifts.38
Differences in performance reflected these alternative appliances: Burton was 
of the "Through" type and Blackpool designed as a "Grid." The Burton terminal used 
capstans to move wagons to a fixed unloading point. Blackpool had no fixed points, 
with the electric trucks able to move around the sidings. Whilst Blackpool had 
performed a little better than before the modifications, afterwards the position was 
reversed, but still economies had been made.
All these alterations were modifications of existing small to medium sheds 
rather than completely new sites. The true value of Job Analysis lay in building new 
sheds on a large scale. The sheds at Derby St Mary's and Birmingham Lawley Street 
were the first to embody fully the "fundamental ideas" on shed design gleaned from Job 
Analysis.39
The shed at Derby was begun in 1936 with an authorised expenditure of 
£164,OOO.40 It was designed to discharge 790 tons and load 765 tons at any one time,
"Lancaster (Castle)," RAIL/421/153 Visit of LNE(Southem Area) Officers to the LMS, 1944, 
p i.
Lamb Modem Railway Operation, p88-90. This was a development of the Sectional Conveyor,
this time operated from within the wagon.
"Blackpool (Talbot Road)" RAIL/421/153 Visit of LNE (Southern) Area to the LMS 1944, p i.
RAIL/421/153 Visit of LNE(Southem Area) Officers to the LMS, "Derby St Mary's," 1944, 
p i.
"Derby St Mary's" Visit of LNE(Southem Area) Officers to the LMS, pp2-4.
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with wagon standage space of 256 and provision for 100 empties.41 Unloading was 
carried out in two stages. There was an initial sorting made as the wagons were 
unloaded, into three sections for town deliveries and five for transhipment. Heavy 
crane and "wait order" traffic was also separated. A second "Sort" took place at the 
dray loading point, to individual delivery vehicles. Transhipment traffic was allocated 
to the appropriate wagons. Forwarded traffic was loaded straight from the road vehicle 
to the wagon. Such direct loading eliminated the need to barrow goods, an activity that 
had been identified as wasteful at the outset of the job analysis. The task of loading and 
checking was spread throughout the shed staff. This utilised cartage staff for the 
former and eliminated the need for porters to have to report to the checkers.42 That this 
was achieved without having to build decks within the shed lead to savings of 
£14,000.43 Operations around the depot were coordinated by a telephone network. 
This linked agents, chief foremen, delivery office, dray loaders and the "indoor" 
commercial offices.44
Birmingham (Lawley Street), was designed differently as the proportions of 
Forwarded and Received goods were greater than Transhipment. Mechanical 
equipment was fully integrated into shed design.45 In this design, hand trucking was 
much reduced with the employment of cart roads for direct transfer of loads. Mobile, 
instead of static, cranes were provided which increased flexibility of working. 
Conveyors and traverser helped move material along the axis of the shed so that loads 
for road delivery could easily be made up. This was combined with more general 
analysis of working conditions so that in at least one case, that of the Sheffield Yard, 
traffic was regulated ". .to the daily capacity which the firm can except. "46 That is to
41 Visit of LNE(Southem Area) Officers to the LMS, p6.
42 Visit of LNE(Southem Area) Officers, p4.
43 Visit of LNE (Southern Area) Officers to the LMS, p3.
44 Visit of LNE(Southem Area) Officers to the LMS, Appendix D Telephone Arrangements.
45 For details on the technical working of this shed see ppl74-180 T.W. Royle "Modem Methods
of Handling Goods at Railway Stations" Journal o f the Institute o f Transport, November- 
December 1945.
46 RAIL/418/196 Progress and Developments in the Chief Operating Manager's Department, p29.
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say that the working of traffic from traders to the Yard was being regulated prevent 
congestion. This formed part of the Train Control system we have described in 
Chapter Five.
From 1931, the analysis of Sheds was applied to the task of shunting and traffic 
movement in general within Yards.47 The "Analysis of Freight Shunting" noted the 
number of staff on duty and their cost. The task of shunting was broken down into 
"primary sorting," "sub-sectionalising," "pushing roads down" and "shunting out 
wrong wagons." The Chief Operating Manager's Head Quarters coordinated the 
shunting analysis with proposals for terminal redesign. The task was "To study 
problems in all forms and create and disseminate new ideas for reducing costs and 
increasing efficiency." A small unit of the Divisional Superintendent's staff started in 
1931 to carry out regular analysis of shunting methods and performance. Its remit was 
extended in 1937 to include modernisation proposals and additional monitoring.48 The 
Divisional Superintendent of Operations was able to analysis traffic to provide 
information on flows of traffic so that train working could be adjusted accordingly.
By the beginning of the War in 1939, District Committees had been established, 
under the guidance of HQ specialists. Over 230 stations had been examined and of 
these 141 benefited from such review without making any structural alterations, that 
is to say solely by reorganisation. The estimated savings were estimated at amounting 
to a total of £50,973. Of those schemes already carried out, 44 stations had realised 
economies totalling £28,964.49
As we have noted above, the Time and Motion studies were conducted by 
specialist teams able to utilise the experience of senior officers at the Euston 
Headquarters. Although there was likely to be many different departments providing 
advice, the most important would have been the Executive Research Office. Whilst the 
detailed papers of this office do not appear to survive, some of their reports do. Of 
particular interest are those describing the system of "back checking" on investment.
Progress and Development in the Chief Operating Manager’s Department, p32.
Progress and Developments in the Chief Operating Manager’s Department, p35.
Progress and Developments in the Chief Operating Manager's Department, pp72-73.
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In the context of terminal operations this provided more information on the 
modernisation programme. The next section chronicles the use of this method in 
evaluating the mechanisation of movement within the terminals.
The Executive Research Office and Terminal Mechanisation
So far we have seen how mechanisation impacted upon physical measures of 
performance. The process of "back-checking" involved calculating the gains, financial 
as well as physical, that had been made from investments. As an example of how this 
worked, a report from their Executive Research Committee will be considered.50
This report examined the performance of 25 light tractors and the conversion 
of horse trailers, amounting to an investment of £6,260. The objective of the back- 
checking was "..to produce conclusive evidence of the economy, or otherwise.." in a 
given investment.51 Such tractors were seen as a means of reducing costs which had 
been increased by changing work patterns.
The estimated outlay was first compared with that which was actually spent. 
The conclusions of the experimental use of the equipment were given, with detailed 
evidence in an Appendix.52 The results of working under old and new conditions were 
presented under the headings of variable and non variable cost. Figures relating to 
interest, wages,provender, fuel etc were noted so that the overall increase, or not, 
could be discerned.
Given this information it was then possible to make decisions as to the future 
course of the programme. In this case it was noted that one area of experimentation, 
at Nottingham, was particularly suited to motor working, implying that due allowance 
would have to be made for this. More general conclusions were drawn by expressing 
in terms of "equivalent horses" the displacement required. For example in terminals
RAIL/418/107 "Back Checking of New Works Report. Light tractors authorised for 
experimental purposes," 1934 Further information can also be found in E.Falconer "The 
Mechanisation of Goods Depots," Journal o f the Institute o f Transport, Feb 1936; 
H.W.Faircloth Address read to the Commercial Motor Transport Exhibition "Railway Cartage 
and Mechanical Transport" published in Railway Gazette, November 19, 1937.
RAIL/418/107 "Back-checking of New Works," pi
See RAIL/418/107 Statement No 4 to Appendix A, "Back-checking of New Works Report."
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where there was mixed horse and motor vehicle working, 1 and 3/5 horses equivalent 
per tractor were needed before economies resulted. If a complete change was made 
then the figure was 1 and 1/4. Total variable costs differed from an increase of £42 to 
a decrease of £138, per year.53
The process of back-checking ideally required creating as far as possible 
standardised conditions of work, but without losing the essence of the task.54 Efforts 
were made to present before and after figures in a format which made comparison easy. 
Cost comparisons of the various types of vehicle were made under the old and new 
conditions. Details were then given explaining the reasons for this.
Appendix C of the Report related the experiment to future practice.55 Further 
cost comparisons were made and calculations as to the ratio of horses to mechanical 
vehicles required for equivalent tasks. This related the experiment to the wider 
considerations of the company, extrapolating what had been learnt to the rest of the 
network. In this case it involved noting the implications for the companies motor 
building programme and a comparison of how the LMS stood in relation to the other 
railway companies. It was noted that Railhead Distribution schemes had over-extended 
existing facilities.
Such analysis was important in revealing aspects of LMS organisation as it was 
being changed. By the 1940's the analysis of Goods operations and consequent back 
checking would be regarded as forcing "a complete reorientation of all past ideas in 
regard to the working of Goods stations."56 The LMS was widely credited with the 
first use of systematic analysis of freight handing in terms of Time and Motion 
studies.57 The approach adopted was eventually adopted by the GWR and LNER, but
Appendix C, "Back-Checking of New Works," p6.
For details see Appendix A of Back-checking of New Works Report.
See Back-Checking of New Works Report, Appendix C, Results of Experiments in Relation to 
Future Policy.
RAIL/421 /153 Visit o f LNE (Southern Area) Officers to the LMS Modernised Goods Depot at 
Derby (St. Marys), May 1944, p i.
See Lamb Railway Operating, Chapter VII "Modem Methods in Goods Handling."
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only after the Second World War could it be fully implemented. It is to these two 
companies that we now turn, staring with the LNER.
Terminal Working: The LNER
If the other companies were not yet using Job Analysis, they were aware of the 
need to innovate in the handling of traffic. Most of the time this was seen as an issue 
involving the use of aids to mechanical handling. Early on, the LNER considered the 
use of electric trucks within depots.58 These early experiments were not altogether 
successful as the narrowness and congestion within terminals limited their usefulness. 
This suggests that the LNER was not at this stage considering terminal operation in its 
entirety. It was not analysing the wider picture and relating the design of shed to the 
introduction of new techniques of handling. The report did recognise that design 
entered into the equation as it recommended the use of such trucks in warehouse 
accommodation, as opposed to terminals, used by the Company. A considerable saving 
was expressed in terms of 1 electric truck, with "lad", being equal to 6 men with 
handbarrows. A total daily reduction in the wages bill was calculated at £22-8-0.59 
Given that this was some considerable saving it would have been logical for the LNER 
to begin a review of Goods Shed operations. There is not much evidence that they did. 
The next mention of Goods Shed operation comes once more from the perspective of 
mechanical handling.
In 1929, a Lieutenant Colonel Carey reported on a scheme to improve 
mechanical transhipment.60 This was another scheme to homogenise the carriage of 
freight, in this case by the use of wheeled containers on flat topped wagons.61 This 
would result in the scrapping of all Goods Yards and no marshalling would be required. 
In the first place, containers were sorted at the terminal by destination. Although this
58 RAIL/390/233 LNER Superintendents Committee, Minute sl70 1 October 1923 "Goods 
Handling by Electric Trucks" Appendix B.
59 RAIL/390/233 Superintendents Committee, Minute S170.
60 RAIL/390/234 LNER Superintendents Committee, Minute 1594 22 October 1929. "Lt. Col.
Carey's Scheme for Mechanical Transhipment."
61 The other was the abortive Gattie scheme, for which see Chapter 3.
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did not find favour with the LNER management, they did appear to be considering such 
schemes seriously. The reason for rejection lay in the cost of writing off old plant and 
of introducing new. An estimated £10,000 was thought to be needed just to test the 
system, so it was shelved.62
Methods of mechanical handling as found on other companies were also 
considered. The early LMS use of conveyors and movable platforms at Huddersfield 
was noted in 1932, with a visit to the site.63 Other references were made to the 
alterations at Burnley, but the introduction of conveyors was rejected as the LMS had 
not yet tried them at their large stations! The LNER was awaiting the results of the 
LMS studies before committing itself. The fact that large stations had not yet been 
altered was explained by the experimental nature of the LMS's analysis. Thus the 
LNER lost an early chance to re-organise working by failing to recognise the 
significance of reforming the organisation of shed working. Given that information 
was shared in the post amalgamation industry, this was a rational approach.
A review of LMS Time and Motion studies prompted a letter from the General 
Manager of the LNER in 1935 that prompted a further review of LMS Time and 
Motion Studies.64 A follow up report on progress was requested, as well as a 
Superintendent's report on LNER working in relation to "LNER technology.1,65 In due 
course the LNER would fully embrace such analysis, including several shed visits.66 
The eventual form of analysis was undertaken late in World War Two by the District 
Operating Superintendent's office. In addition to the Superintendent there were the
It is interesting to note, however, that the Port of London Authority was approached as to the 
value of this system and was reported to be "strongly in favour." Clearly the transport industry 
as a whole recognised the value of Containerisation long before it was carried out.
RAIL/390/234 LNER Superintendents Committee, Minute S2136 15 June 1932 "Movable 
Platforms in Goods Warehouses."
RAIL/390/234 LNER Superintendents Committee, Minute s2727 April 9 1935 "Methods of 
Working in Goods Warehouses."
RAIL/390/234 LNER Superintendents Committee. Minute s2826 5 October 1935 "Methods of 
Working Goods Warehouses," Unfortunately no record of the report remains but it was 
suggested that comparisons with one LMS site, Lancaster (Castle), were favourable.
See RAIL/421/153 Visit of LNE (Southern Area) Officers to the LMS Modernised Goods Depot, 
18th. May, 1944.
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District Goods Manager and Cartage Manager along with representatives of the 
Superintendent and Goods Manager. The layout, staff organisation and facilities would 
form the basis of such analysis with the amount and type of traffic used to balance 
actual performance against expectation. Then the District Committee would visit the 
site. From the account given by Lamb, significant similarities in objectives of both the 
LMS and LNER existed. That is the amount of hand cartage was to be reduced and 
direct loading from wagon to road increased.67 The fact that the LNER took some 
time to realise that a more systematic approach to depot design might be useful did not 
mean that no reorganisations were carried out. Meanwhile the trade press reported on 
some of the more extensive changes made to LNER depots, but detailed reports were 
sketchy..
In 1934 Farrington Goods station was mechanised as the old infrastructure was 
limiting the work that could be done.68 How this was accomplished confirms the view 
that shed modernisation was seen largely in terms of mechanisation. Here the 
"biological” horse was replaced by the mechanical one: the latter could work in the 
narrow confines of the depot. This is not to say that such projects were ineffective: 60 
of these mechanical tractors with 92 "carrying units" could do the work of 87 horse 
teams and 147 vehicles.
The reorganisation of Kings Cross in 1938 reflected the changing nature of both 
the service offered and the equipment used.69 Rapid unloading was essential if the 
gains made by fast fitted freight trains were not to be lost in time spent unloading. 
Increasing use of containers also prompted changes in handing equipment. The new 
scheme changed cartage, receiving and forwarding activity. The result was increased 
wagon capacity and the provision of mobile crane equipment, including those for the 
unloading of containers.
See Lamb Modem Railway Operating, p91 and 94. It seems that these studies only became of
importance after the World War Two and that most were reorganisations before this time were 
unaffected by such studies.
See Anon. "A Mechanised City Goods Station" Railway Gazette, March 16, 1934.
See Anon. "King's Cross Goods Station Remodelling, LNER" Railway Gazette, July 22, 1938.
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To summarise the LNER work, we can identify two periods in the approach to 
analysis of depot working. Firstly the identification of mechanisation with 
modernisation, seemingly without the systematic analysis of the LMS. Then we see a 
recognition of the value of such studies as carried out by the LMS. This does not mean 
to say that the remodelled depots were somehow ineffective. But it does suggest that 
best use was not perhaps being made of assets. Whilst the LNER invested in 
mechanical handling equipment such as cranes and mechanical horses, the LMS was 
apparently better able to see the advantages of such items as wagon unloading machines 
and conveyors. By understanding how such machinery had an impact on the working 
arrangements in the depots, a clearer picture of the costs and benefits could be 
obtained.
Terminal Working: The GWR
In many respects the GWR followed the LNER in its equation of depot 
modernisation with mechanisation. It was not until 1937 that Time and Motion studies 
were introduced. However the GWR had commissioned a Report into the use of 
mechanised appliances in 1918.70 This explored some of the issues that had been raised 
by the earlier Gattie investigations conducted by both Government and railway 
companies.71 The report noted that modern mechanical appliances were being 
introduced, but only at the largest stations. At large stations more use could be made 
of the machines, presumably ensuring that there was a reasonable return on the 
investment. However the main limiting factor was the wide variety of loads being 
handled, in particular with regard to the station to station traffic. This was the opposite 
conclusion to that reached by the initial enquiries by Ord on the LMS. There it was 
stated that variance in loads was not a major problem. The difference in findings could 
reflect the state of handling technology in 1918 to that in the early thirties, but it also 
depended on how homogeneity was defined.
RAIL/267/375 Final Report o f Committee on Mechanical Appliances for Dealing with Goods
Traffic, 1920.
See Chapter Three.
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Several schemes for the redesign of Paddington were shown in the report but 
there was no detailed analysis of the flow of material through the terminal. The 
conclusion of the report was that mechanical appliances could only be used "in a very 
limited way."72 This was a reasonable conclusion if modernisation was to be 
introduced into existing depot structures. What was ignored was the ability to change 
such structures. A more rigorous approach to the problem might have identified where 
real savings could be made and improved the understanding of operations. For 
example, even at South Lambeth where a four road shed was built from new, the 
appliances within it only included two 20 cwt capacity travelling cranes. This despite 
the fact that direct loading from wagons to road had been recommended as early as 
1918. At the remodelled Paddington and Bristol (Temple Meads) interior platforms 
remained.73 This contrasts with the modified sheds on the LMS which utilised 
technology such as conveyors and unloading machines. Only by 1947 was the Chief 
Goods Manager of the GWR discussing introducing these within their sheds.74
The GWR only made the first steps toward Time and Motion studies in 1937. 
The Goods Conference noted that". .certain advantages had already emerged. "75 Small 
groups of experts had been sent by Headquarters throughout the network to examine 
the possibilities for such studies. Initial experimentation was to take place on medium 
sized stations nominated by District Managers. Three conditions were laid down as a 
basis for choosing these stations: Inwards shed traffic to be about 30 truck loads, 
handling costs of about 6s per ton and the number of delivery rounds "relatively" few.76
pl9, RAIL/267/375 Committee on Mechanical Appliances, Final Report.
See Lamb Modem Railway Operation, Chapter V "Freight Terminals."
D.Blee "The Transhipment of Goods Train Traffic: Its Development and its Future" Journal 
o f the Institute o f Transport, May-June 1947.
RAIL/250/745 Great Western Railway Goods Conference, 12 November 1937, Minute 8358 
"Design, Equipment and Working of Goods Sheds and Improved Handling Methods."
The stations eventually chosen as suitable were Oxford, High Wycombe, Slough, and 
Shrewsbury. Unfortunately there does not appear to be a record of the progress made. 
RAIL/250/768 GWR Goods Conference, See Minute 8384 "Design, Equipment and Working 
of Goods Sheds and Improved Handling Methods" 25 February 1938.
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The minute noted that "necessarily" there was limited scope for such studies on 
the GWR, but for what reason was not made clear. An important indicator of why 
policy differed lay in the perception of the problem as revealed in an article by the 
Chief Goods Manager of the GWR in 1947.77 Whilst giving praise to the LMS for its 
research he stated that "studies have concurrently been conducted independently by the 
Great Western Company" and that although there were basic underlying principles the 
GWR studies did not "lead us to the same conclusions as to method."78
Quite clearly the work of the LMS broke new ground in attempting to improve 
service. Although both the LNER and GWR introduced mechanical handling 
equipment they did not systematically consider its effects. For the LMS, modernisation 
and mechanisation seemed synonymous, involving the organisation and operation of the 
scheme.79 For the LNER, it was a question of learning from the LMS, whilst the GWR 
did not perceive immediately that Time and Motion studies were a solution to the 
problem of cost minimisation.
There were key differences in the circumstances surrounding how companies 
managed. The GWR was the least affected of all by the amalgamation. Thus it did not 
have to deal with the wide varieties of operating practices that both the LMS and LNER 
had to. On the LNER what modernisation of depots there was, was constrained by the 
uncertainty surrounding operations that seemed to permeate the entire organisation. 
The LMS, as we have noted, was more dominated by managers from one company, the 
MR, and had Josiah Stamp as a President who was willing to experiment with new 
ideas. But we must not forget that terminal performance could be improved in other 
ways as well. The GWR perceived the terminal problem in a different way: it was 
particularly active in developing a streamlined Transhipment organisation, at which the 
LNER would eventually look. Given the increasing competition from Road transport 
this was of no little importance.
D.Blee "The Transhipment of Goods Train Traffic: Its Development and Future" Journal of the 
Institute o f Transport, May-June 1947.
Blee "Transhipment" Journal o f the Institute o f Transport.
RAIL/418/196 Progress and Development in the Chief Operating Managers Department, p73.
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Transhipment
In some sense then the GWR's attempts at reforming transhipment can be seen 
as a partial substitute for the LMS's job analysis. The GWR saw the movement of 
transhipment loads as a key part of improving service and cutting costs. All companies 
recognised that there were problems in such loads and had done for many years. The 
LNER set up a Committee to monitor these, but unfortunately no record of this seems 
to have survived.80 LMS operations were covered to a large part by its work on Time 
and Motion studies. Indeed, Lewis Ord was initially engaged in a study of Crewe 
transhipment shed when he was appointed to the initial Time and Motion studies.81
The GWR in its reorganisation of transhipment targeted an area of operations 
which was increasingly important: that of the small consignment. By its very nature 
these loads were susceptible to road competition. The working of small loads 
comprised two problems: firstly there were many possible sources and destinations of 
traffic, secondly the size of each load restricted the full use of wagons. The criteria 
for what constituted a small load was one of weight. When analysis began this was 
anything under 1 ton. Part loads would be combined into full loads at points along the 
line: in short tranships were "goods sent to one place but intended for another, the one 
place being part-way towards the other."82 The problem, then, was to minimise the 
number of times a load had to be transferred. This was not as all encompassing as the 
LMS Time and Motion Studies, but was sufficient for the task in hand. It involved a 
systematic approach to the analysis of conveyance, loading and terminal service.
The LNER Superintendents Conferences mention these meetings and their Minutes were read, 
but no record remains. See RAIL/390/233 LNER Goods Superintendent Committee, Minute 
S264 "Goods Transhipping Committee" 17 December 1923.
RAIL/1007/217 Mechanisation o f Goods Sheds, 1933.
H.W.Payne (District Goods Manager, Newport GWR) "A Re-organisation of Goods Tranship 
Operations - Great Western Railway" Railway Students Association, Meeting of December 10 
1931.
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C har t  B .— Loading  of Direc t  W a g o n s ,  S ta t ion  Trucks  a n d  P i c k - U p  T r u c k s  to  and  
from  Newbury ,  show n  D i a g r a n m a t i c a l lv .
FIGURE TWO: GWR Transhipment Diagram
Source: Anon "Tranship Traffic" Railway Gazette. January 3 1930.
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Transhipment up until the early thirties consisted of three types of wagon 
working.83 The "Station Truck" was worked over a given route with forwarded and 
received goods placed in along the way. These were all listed in a station Truck Book, 
and ran to some 553 in all.84 The "Pick-Up" wagon was used to relieve Station Truck 
working. Several loads were picked up and conveyed direct to their destination, and 
these numbered about 205. Finally the "Composite" wagon combined two loads less 
than one ton. To take an example: two loads, for destination A and B were combined 
and sent to A. When the wagon reached A, the load was removed creating space for 
loading from A to B. Thus one load had direct loading whilst the second was 
Transhipped.
The aim of the study was to minimise the number of transhipments and increase 
the speed of carriage. "Tranship Maps" were produced giving details of the "spheres 
of influence" of each station within its region (See Figure 2).85 These were produced 
so that the destination of transhipment wagons could be readily associated with 
individual stations. Our example states that Newbury had connections with the 
specified stations shown, and indicates the direction of the flow of each category of 
truck. Traffic could be readily directed to the relevant transfer point for a particular 
station. Hopefully a number of loads would arrive for inclusion in a full load, subject 
to a limit on the number of miles to be run. The problem with this lay in the fact that 
there were too many junction points, 52 in all. The working principle behind 
transhipment had always been that it was not mileage that dominated but the direction 
of travel. For example putting a load onto a fast train which passes the ultimate 
destination without stopping may in the long run be quicker. It would negate handling 
and speed up the overall process of shifting the good from one area to another. A 
wagon may then be sent back when full to that station.
H.W.Payne (Chief Goods Manager, Paddington) "Wagons and Their Ways" Great Western 
Railway Lecture and Debating Society, Meeting 16 December 1926.
Although by 1935 this figure had risen to over 600. Anon "Station Truck Working on the 
GWR" Railway Gazette, July 19 1935.
For what follows regarding the early analysis of transhipment working see Payne "A Re­
organisation of Goods Tranship Operations" Railway Students Association.
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As a first step in re-organisation, a record of traffic passing through the station 
was taken over the period of a week. This included the truck number, sending station, 
number of previous transhipment, and final destination (ie further transhipment or 
straight to destination). The study seems to have relied heavily on the graphing of 
information both as a means of seeing where changes could be made, and to 
communicating them within the organisation.86 Loading charts were produced which 
depicted tranship working, so that the range of services could be graphed and the 
locations noted. Details as to the tonnage received were collated into charts. By 
measuring traffic density, transfer points could be correlated with the maximum flows. 
The key factors were originating traffic, geographical location and position on the 
network. Probably the most important part of this review was the development of road 
services as a substitute to rail working. Given the attachment of railwaymen, in certain 
quarters, to keeping traffic "on the rails" this was remarkable. It was, of course only 
recognising what would soon become inevitable. Road transport was better at the tasks 
of delivering small loads from a variety of different, but close by, locations: "The new 
principle of transport to be inferred is the direct loading to the largest possible extent 
with a final dispersal of small lots by road.." The Station truck could be eliminated and 
transit improved by a day. At the same time it was possible to see if less than one ton 
loads could be excepted; ie would traffic be lost to road competition? Long distance 
station trucks were not yet replaced but were kept under review. What emerged was 
a policy of concentrating traffic which required co-operation with the other companies 
to be successful. This is an important point, as systematic analysis could reveal the 
limits of transportation modes.
In deciding what stations to focus transhipment on, the GWR was fully aware 
of the commercial environment within which they were operating. This included 
maximising facilities left idle by the changes such analysis wrought. It was noted that 
sheds that were closed for transhipment traffic could be used as warehouses for the 
growing railhead traffic.87 Once the decision to extend transhipment work to a given
86 See H.W.Payne "Tranship Traffic" Railway Gazette, January 3, and February 7 1930.
87 See Payne "Tranship Traffic" Railway Gazette, February 7 1930. The development of railhead
services will be described in Chapter Seven.
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station was made, on the basis of traffic flow data, enquiries as to facilities were made. 
Road services, siding accommodation, town traffic and accountancy operations were 
all considered.
The result of the analysis led in 1932 to the 52 transhipment points being 
reduced to just 9. Savings of £32,370 were identified, including additional outlay of 
£11,010 for road vehicles.88 From 1934 the times of transhipment were monitored by 
a series of "time tests." These showed that through wagons were achieving a next day 
delivery rate between 86 and 88 percent. Small consignments were consistently being 
delivered over 90 percent by the second day.89
Finally we need to account for the Statistical Returns published by the Ministry 
of Transport which provided figures for hpt, transfers, average weight and tonnage.90 
These were published as a result of the 1921 Railway Act, with a view to opening up 
the operating of railways to more public scrutiny. However there is no evidence that 
such information was used explicitly, even by the RRT where we would most likely 
find. Given that any detailed requests for operating information could be obtained 
directly from the company at the annual reviews of operation it would seem 
unnecessary for government to collect such statistics. Indeed it would seem to be the 
case that, not for the first time, that the government was responding to the pre 1914 
concerns regarding the conduct of railway management.
There were also reasons to suspect the validity of the figures themselves. We 
do not know enough about the conditions of operation to be able to use these figures: 
depots varied enormously in their traffic and design. Across the sample the proportion 
of transfers, amount of labour and capital employed differed. Also, the number of 
stations sampled varied between companies: the GWR had 20, the LNER 32, the LMS 
51. The figures were aggregated across several categories including private siding 
traffic merchandise and minerals. We lack information as to the type of traffic being
RAIL/250/744 GWR Goods Conference, "Re-organisation of Tranships" Minute 7814 14 
October 1932.
RAIL/250/745 GWR Goods Conference, "Transit Time Tests" Minute 8268 6 November 1936.
These are found in the Monthly Railway Returns HMSO published by the Ministry of Transport 
from 1923 to 1939.
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handled: what was the proportion of bulk, batch and customised consignments, and 
were there specialist facilities employed? Without such information it is impossible to 
interpret the statistics provided. The terminals listed were very different and over time 
traffic flows were changing.
Similarly with the LMS Time and Motion studies. Only two of the sheds that 
were at the beginning being redesigned by Time and Motion studies appear in the LMS 
sample: Coventry in 1937 and Manchester (Ancoats) in 1935. In Coventry's case we 
see a decrease in hpt from 1.25, in 1937, to 0.97 in 1938. This was despite an increase 
in tonnage handled from 15,904 to 17,316 tons. In the case of Manchester in 1935 the 
hpt went from 1.43 to 1.27 in 1936 and 1937. It then increased to 1.28 in 1938. Over 
this period, the tonnage handled went from 24,468 to 23,947. The problem is whether 
this can be clearly attributed to the Time and Motion studies. Many sheds on the LMS 
saw increasing hpt over the period 1928 to 1938. However the large sites, such as 
Birmingham and London were gradually decreasing. This was where the Time and 
Motion studies were yet to be applied so that they can hardly be credited for improving 
performance. Clearer evidence exists on the GWR that there was a decline in the 
number of transhipment in some depots and an increase at others which possibly 
reflected the new system of transhipment. The most spectacular decline was that of 
Neath, where the 1928 figure of nearly 68 percent fell to just under 4 percent.
Conclusion
We have seen two different approaches to the improvement of terminal service 
working. The LMS utilised Time and Motion studies to review completely the 
workings of freight operations. The GWR chose those loads which were most 
troublesome and likely to be lost to road transport. Both demonstrated a willingness 
to apply systematic analysis to these problems. The LMS seems to have adopted a 
technique for redesigning its terminals because it had problems securing operating 
efficiency. That the LNER and GWR would eventually follow the LMS approach 
indicates that the method was seen to offer some promise. In addition it won the 
Railway Companies Association recommendation as "best practice." The LNER 
was a follower in all this. We know that they were monitoring transhipment, but quite
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how is not clear, although we do know they followed GWR practice explicitly.91 The 
LNER visits to the LMS modernised terminals is backed by the comments of 
T.F.Cameron, then acting Divisional General Manager of the Scottish Area, in 1946. 
He stated in the context of the LMS analysis, that, in terminal design, progress was "..a 
matter of attention to detail and of unceasing striving for improved methods. ',92 A more 
measured approach to the design and operation of terminals and their facilities was 
eventually to be justified by the gains made. The LNER was able to capitalise on the 
LMS developments and may well have benefited from their experience as first movers 
in applying these management practices. The GWR reduced operating costs and the 
number of transhipment points to its advantage; the LMS saved money by reorganising 
work more effectively. In tandem with the more specialist Time and Motion studies 
it is clear that the LMS must have had a reasonable grasp on how costs behaved within 
terminals. The information so gathered would also inform the construction of new 
terminals. More precise measures of the effectiveness of each approach are difficult 
to come by.
However, there is enough specific evidence from the companies that these 
studies were useful. Given the climate of the time such systematic analysis of 
operations was vital if the railways were to pursue cost minimisation within the context 
of "efficient and economical working." Even if they were not at first successful, it was 
important to understand how operations were carried out.
RAIL/390/233 LNER Superintendents Committee "Goods Transhipping Committee" Minutes 
si 191 20 March 1928 and sl895 24 March 1931.
Cameron An Outline o f Railway Traffic Operation, p i 35.
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Chapter Seven 
Managing Commercial Policy
The objective of all three companies, in the period from 1923 to 1939, was to 
attract traffic onto the railways, subject to the maximising of net revenue. This had to 
be done in the face of increasing competition from the roads and a continuing 
depression in the heavy industry that provided so much of the rail revenue. To combat 
this, the companies needed to know what traffic was available and what type of service 
was required. Once this was known the company had then to decide on the price to be 
quoted. The latter was especially important as, by law, rates had to be published, 
enabling road hauliers to undercut the railway rate. This chapter concerns the 
collection and analysis of commercial information and its use in the setting of prices 
and developing of services. That is, how information was used to determine the market 
and sell successfully in that market will be discussed.1
Commercial information was used to determine under what conditions the firm 
would be operating. As such it relied on financial measures far more than the operating 
sections, whose analysis was mainly undertaken using physical indicators. Using the 
model of management control developed in Chapter One, we can identify Planning as 
being used to implement the Programme. It was then left to the operating departments 
to Execute and Evaluate these services. How the service was developed and the 
response of the trading community was of some importance if traffic was to be retained. 
We have already seen in Chapter Five how information from traders was used by the 
LMS to halt traffic in the event of congestion. Here we will be concerned with how, 
once the operating parameters were clearly identified, the task of doing business could 
proceed.
The means by which management obtained information relied on tests and 
samples obtained from traffic flows. This involved the examination of specific services 
and commodities with a view to answering predetermined questions. Depending on the 
questions being asked, this may or may not have been a means of monitoring
1 For a discussion of railroad information gathering and marketing see R.V.Scott (1985) Railroad
Development Programs in the Twentieth Century, Ames: Iowa State University Press.
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operations. As we shall see, a request for a new rate could prompt such studies, but 
only then would the performance of that traffic be noted. Thereafter monitoring might 
take place, but this was not automatic.
We begin with how prices were determined and then examine the means by 
which information was collected. This provided the basis for an approach to approach 
traders with price quotations. The setting of rates was an iterative process: because 
of the nature of the regulatory framework, the RCH was used as a forum for liaising 
between companies and negotiating with traders. In addition, the nature of the rates 
process, with its Exceptional rates required that all railways keep track of what others 
were charging. The coordination facilitated by the RCH, will be demonstrated by the 
consideration of two examples: the use of containers and the development of road 
services.
Setting Railway Rates: Traffic Costing
The setting of railway rates had long been bedeviled by disputes over how 
charges should be fixed. In the following sections we will see how the basis for pricing 
developed after 1923. We will also examine attempts at costing devised to determine 
at what point road transport became more economical than rail. Whilst such analysis 
was not aimed directly at using cost data to set rates, it was an attempt to discover the 
limits to rates in the face of road competition. As such, it had implications for railway 
pricing.
This development of government regulation of price and service in the 19th. and 
early 20th. century has been analysed by P.Cain.2 To understand the post 
amalgamation legislation relating to pricing, it is helpful to review what had preceeded 
the Railway Rates Tribunal deliberations on the new Classification and associated rates 
structure.
See the following "Railway Combination and Government, 1900-1914" Economic History 
Review, XXV (1972); "Traders versus Railways: The Genesis of the Railway and Canal Traffic 
Act of 1894" The Journal o f Transport History, New Series Vol. II No. 2 (1973); "Railways 
and Price Discrimination: The Case of Agriculture, 1880-1914" Business History Vol. XVIII 
No. 2, (1976) and "The British Railway Rates Problem 1894-1913" Business History Vol XX 
No. 1 (1978).
179
The fear was that the resulting monopoly power would drive up the costs of the 
wider business community to the detriment of the economy as a whole. As Cain points 
out this worry was exaggerated: coastal shipping helped to drive down rates for many 
parts of the country and some inter-company rivalry was still apparent.3
One of the main problems facing businesses was the fact that so many 
classifications of goods existed. Action to bring these under one classification was 
begun with the passing of the 1884 Railways Act. Because of the difficulties in 
physically changing the administration of the system, along with suspicion on both 
sides of the other's intent, problems arose. These led to the 1894 Act which curtailed 
the ability of the railway companies to charge the maximum rates which had been 
agreed. They had put all of their rates up to the maximum permissable on January 1 
1893 causing uproar among the traders.
The body responsible for regulating facilities and rates was the Railway and 
Canal Commission. The decisions reached here further weakened the railways’ 
autonomy in management. According to the regulations regarding "undue preference," 
the granting of preferential treatment to individual companies for "similar services" was 
prohibited. This meant that the railway had to show that the services were indeed 
different to avoid charges of undue preference.
As we have seen in Chapter 3, since the late 19th century the railways had been 
accused of not relating their charges more explicitly to the costs incurred. In the 
Chapters on Conveyance and Terminal operations we have seen how physical measures 
of performance were used for management control, which could on occasion be 
calculated in monetary terms. In addition, at the instigation of an outside body, the 
railway companies began costing studies under the auspices of the RCH in 1935.4
These began after the Chairman of the Transport Advisory Council suggested 
that the railways ascertain at what point does rail become more economical than road? 
We will see in the following sections how important a problem road competition was 
for the railways. Ascertaining the relative cost of each mode would be most useful.
3 Cain "Railways and Price Discrimination," pl41.
4 RAIL/1080/672 General Managers' Representatives Meeting, "Transport Advisory Council -
Coordination of Rail and Road Goods Transport" June 7, 1935.
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The accountants of the companies were approached with the question in mind of 
whether high class traffic really did bear more of the cost than the low. This had been 
the assumption underlying the concept of charging "what the traffic will bear." The 
overall objective seemed to be one of planning which traffic should go by road and 
which by rail. That is it was information for regulating the mode of transport rather 
than rate setting.
An initial study was conducted which revealed differences in company approach 
as to how events should proceed. The LMS wanted "..an examination of 
comprehensive costs in relation to receipts."5 Each was separated into variable and 
non-variable, conveyance and terminal operations, resulting in figures for all aspects 
of the transportation process. This would reflect the different commodities being 
carried and enable full consideration to be given to the differing conditions under which 
they were transported. The LNER and GWR thought this was too expensive and 
suggested that 24 trains carrying a variety of commodities be analysed.
Some means had also to be found of splitting passenger from freight cost. This 
was done according to the so-called "Beharrell Formula. "6 Whilst not a formula in a 
mathematical sense, it tried to identify what measures could be used to monitor which 
activity. So, for example, Locomotive running expenses were allocated to engine hours 
and maintenance to engine miles. However it did not provide for the separation of 
passenger and freight. Be that as it may, the suggestion was for cost comparison to be 
made from data on road vehicles, obtained from the railways’ own road operations and 
from the specifications published in Commercial Motor. The task was then allocated 
to a "Special Committee on Freight Train Costs."
The data collected for rail transport was per freight train mile, per loaded wagon 
mile, per 100 net ton miles and per 100 gross ton miles. The traffic sample was coal, 
class 1 to 6 mineral and merchandise and merchandise 1 to 6. These were to be 
sampled over "short, medium and long distances." Over 160 trains were to be
RAIL/1080/672 Goods Managers Representatives Meeting, "Report of Committee of General 
Managers Representatives" 9th. October 1935, p2.
For details of this see Chapter XIV of C.H.Newton (1930) Railway Accounts, London: Sir Isaac 
Pitman.
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monitored in this fashion.7 The Beharrell formula had to be modified as it did not make 
the distinction between variable and non variable cost. These were allocated as per 
abstract of official accounts so under Abstract b we have Locomotive and Wagons 
repairs and renewal categorised as variable.
Particular emphasis was to be placed on wagon turn round time, empty haulage 
and "additional shunting and transhipment." The latter category presumably meant 
unnecessary. Inspectors were to accompany the selected trains noting the following 
information:
i) Owner, number and tare of wagon.
ii) Weight of wagon and brake
iii) Destination of wagon
iv) Point at which wagon was detached
Commodity details were to be obtained from the invoices, Drivers Reports and Guards 
Journals. It was suggested that "hypothetical loads" be calculated by commercial 
officers for comparison between points, although it is unclear whether this was actually 
done or on what basis if it was.8
In further meetings it was noted precisely what sort of constraints had to be 
placed on interpreting the data. This reflects what we have seen in the design of Train 
Control systems and the debate on the validity of the ton-mile. For example, under 
conveyance several points were made regarding train load, speed, length of haul, empty 
haulage, wagon load, marshalling and special working.9 So under train load seasonal 
fluctuations, the nature of the route and type of engine used were to be noted. Similar 
caveats were applied to terminals - layout of goods depots, mechanical equipment 
employed, traffic flows etc.10
7 RAIL. 1080/672 General Managers Representatives Meeting, "Preliminary Report, Appendix 
A"
8 RAIL/1080/672 General Managers Representatives Meeting, "Special Committee on Traffic 
Costs," p3.
9 "Preliminary Report of Committee of General Managers Representatives" (Minute 2617) no 
date, RAIL/1080/672 General Managers Representatives, pp 6-7.
10 This illustrates again the limitations of the Ministry of Transport statistics relating to Goods 
Stations. See Chapter Six, pp34-35.
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Information concerning receipts was collected on the basis of average wagon 
load and receipts per ton. There was a problem perceived that it was not at all clear 
that the figures would be representative of each company’s average receipts. There was 
a clearly defined cost/benefit calculation concerning the cost of acquiring this 
information.11 The procedures adopted to collect the information seem to have been 
based on LMS designs and adopted by the others.12 That they chose to do this was 
probably to do with the LMS experience in such matters, via its Executive Research 
Office.
Unfortunately, the records of what the experiment found do not appear to have 
survived. This does not detract from the fact that railways were beginning to engage 
in costing. Problems were noted in the interpretation of data and the basis for 
comparison with the motor industry seems tenuous at best: for example data published 
in the trade press was probably not representative of market conditions. The use to 
which such information was put is unclear but it does indicate that the railways were 
willing to engage in costing, provided the ratio between costs and benefits was 
favourable. That such practices were not more widespread, sooner reflects more on 
the regulatory environment and the competition from roads, than a failure to 
comprehend the value of costing as a technique. Under the RRT, there was little 
incentive to provide detailed costs, especially if cross subsidisation was required. If 
firm evidence was found for this it would have been another stick with which traders 
could beat the railways.
Railway Pricing: The General Railway Classification
The basis of railway pricing was the General Railway Classification of Goods. 
This was finally agreed after much discussion amongst legislators, traders and the 
railway companies, when the Rates Advisory Council submitted the proposal based on 
the older Classification. This was expanded from the piecemeal classification that had 
developed since the middle of the 19th century. It came into effect from "The
11 RAIL/1080/672 General Managers Representatives Meetings, Preliminary Report plO.
12 RAIL/1080/672 General Managers Representatives Meeting, "Goods and Superintendents
(Operating) Representatives Memorandum of Special Meeting," 12 June 1936.
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Appointed Day" in 1928. There were several sections, the most important of which 
were: transit by Merchandise train, Livestock by Merchandise train, Perishable goods 
by Passenger train, goods other than Perishable, and Livestock. Dangerous goods and, 
later, Containers had their own classification. Part of the purpose for the re­
classification was to remove the exceptional rate as a means of charging. It was viewed 
as an unwieldy means of charging as there were so many in operation. It was thought 
that a simplification was long overdue. This was unsuccessful as we shall see below. 
This revised classification shared similar features with the original: Class 1 was the 
lowest and Class 21 the highest, providing a "price list" for commodities based upon 
several criteria:
i) Value. This was the most important element, reflecting "What the traffic will 
bear" or what value was added by transporting a commodity to its destination.13
ii) How fragile the goods were and the amount of packaging required. This was 
used as an indicator of how much handling was needed and the likelihood of 
claims for damage being made. Additional insurance could be bought by 
charging extra for the service, so-called Owners Risk (OR) rates.
iii) Bulk to weight ratio. That is, a measure of cubic capacity. This again affected 
the amount of handling and whether there could be good loading of wagons.
iv) The degree to which shipments in bulk could afford economies. To give an 
example, wire rope that travelled in 5, 2 and less than 2 ton quantities would 
be allocated Classes 12, 14 and 16 respectively, without showing special favour 
to any one trader for the same service: that is, subject to the law regarding 
Undue Preference.
vi) The cost of handling. This depended on all the above criteria, in addition to the 
methods of handling employed.
According to the condition of an article of freight, be it packed, in bulk etc, a standard 
rate would be allocated based upon the General Classification. There were several 
standards applicable depending on the combination of services required. Charges could 
be made for returning empties, wagon hire, private owner wagons and insurance
For details of the economic thinking behind this, see W.Acworth (1904) The Elements o f 
Railway Economics, Oxford: Clarenden Press.
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premiums, amongst other things.14 However it was the General Merchandise scale that 
was the most important.
The complexity of the Classification can be seen from the following examples. 
The carriage of "Grease, for lubricating purposes" had five main categories, with the 
following Classes:15
Casks or iron drums 11
Tins or lead tubes in cans 12
In cases 13
In pales 15
In tins protected by boards - 15
In addition there was a category for Grease "Impregnated with disinfectant in casks" 
carried in Class 15. There were also separate classes for E.O.H.P categories. This 
stood for "except otherwise herein provided," a catchall phrase covering the remaining 
circumstances that might apply.
A clearer example of the value basis of rates was given by the classification of 
Vegetables. "Beetroot in bulk for sugar making" and "carrots, mangol wurzel or 
turnips in bulk for feeding livestock, 4 tons." being charged at different rates for a 
similar service. The E.O.H.P. category even distinguished new from old potatoes as 
"potatoes of the current seasons growth handed to the railway companies between 1st 
December and 15th of June inclusive."16 Vegetables grown under hothouse conditions 
were accorded classification in high classes, given their higher value.
The Classification was also a source of information to traders as regards 
packaging requirements for goods. For dangerous goods this was clearly important. 
To prevent misunderstanding, details were given of the tests to be applied, thereby 
ensuring that consignees would be aware of the packaging requirements of their 
products. Petrol products had to be subjected to careful handling, which required
The full list included rolling stock, railway vehicles, carriages, caravans, live stock, small
parcels, surcharges for heavy articles and deductions as regards owners risk carriage.
See RAIL/1092/54 Classification of Merchandise, p52 submitted July 1927.
RAIL/1092/54 Classification of Merchandise, pl07.
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specialised equipment. Therefore the Classification laid down the tests that would have 
to be carried out by the trader as a basis for packaging. Then the railways would know 
in theory that the trader fully understood the nature of the product being sent from a 
loading point of view.
The Basis for Pricing: the Standard Rate
The Rates Classification was used to allocate a standard rate for the service 
required. It was split into 20, 30, 50 and 50 miles and over for conveyance, with 
station terminal, loading, unloading, covering and uncovering charged according to 
the class of commodity. Not every class within the classification was afforded the 
same service. Classes 1 to 6 did not include service terminals, for example.
The calculation was thus based on the services offered for a given classification. 
From this a per ton mile figure was obtained and the relevant services added to the 
distance. For this system to function properly it required an immense amount of 
clerical work and predetermined information. Each station had its own distance book 
for destinations it was dispatching to, calculated over the "shortest working route." 
This need not have been the physical distance but one which provided the cheapest 
route, subject to operational constraints such as transhipment and marshalling points. 
The calculation of chargeable distances was standardised across the rail network by the 
RCH and published by them.
As far as C&D was concerned, the 1928 Classification quoted only Station to 
Station Rates. However during the inter-war period it became exceedingly important 
with the advent of door to door road services. From 1928 the companies had road 
powers and delivery services were considerably extended. As with the charging for rail 
transport there was enormous variation in rates. Minimum loads varied from station 
to station in some cases, with some items such as dangerous goods and loads exceeding 
30 foot could be refused. The scales A to H for cartage were used to delineate the 
extent of areas within which the company would pick up loads.
The Basis for Pricing: Deviations from the Standard Rate
186
Most traffic had been, and continued to be, dealt with by Exceptional rates 
despite the fact that the 1928 Rates classification was designed explicitly to remove 
them. It was estimated that by 1939 there were 7 million exceptional rates covering 80 
per cent of the traffic.17 These provided the railways with a flexibility denied them by 
government in most areas of operation. Even so, care was necessary when quoting 
such rates, as we shall see when discussing the collection and analysis of commercial 
information.
The breakdown of charges that comprised the Exceptional rate were defined by 
the 1921 Act as Conveyance, Station Terminals and Accommodation (including 
services in connection with a private siding). These were calculated on the basis of a 
proportion of the standard rate. Application for rates not more than 40 per cent below 
standard and less than 5 per cent, were referred to the Rates Tribunal where any 
objections could be lodged.
The calculation of these rates in practice required much in the way of 
information regarding the commercial conditions of both the individual trader and their 
industry. Commercial information was required to successfully quote for the 
exceptional rate. It was not only that it could be used to offer new services: the very 
nature of the rating process dictated the need for information. This was especially true 
in testing the validity of the rates, which included:
i) The existence of competition, by road or sea, within commodity classification 
or location.
ii) Existing rates for similar commodities forwarding from other locations. These 
may or may not be being carried under similar circumstances, which would 
possibly lead to charges of "undue preference." This referred to the position 
in law that the railways could not discriminate between traders. Any 
commodities carried under identical conditions were required to be charged the 
same rate. This led to many court actions through the years, and we shall 
examine some examples of these later.
iii) The size of the consignment.
17 Carey Modem Railway Practice, p49.
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iv) Frequency of shipment.
v) The total traffic flow, both in magnitude and direction.
The above, combined with the underlying classification regarding bulk, loading etc 
mentioned above, formed the basis of the rate. Exceptional rates came to be grouped 
under several broad headings. Some were granted as a function of location, a rate 
covering a given area with a standard rate per mile for all within. For example import 
and export companies could be granted special rates for consignments to and from 
ports. These would usually fulfil all the main criteria of regularity and bulk loading 
associated with Exceptional rates. In such cases specialist rates for bulk loading were 
available. These offered operating economies to the railway company which could in 
turn be passed on to the trader. If the consignment comprised of more than one items 
that varied between categories, then composite rates would be calculated. The method 
usually assumed the rate being from the highest category item within the bundle.
If the basis for setting the rate was reasonably clear, there could be some debate 
over the specifics. It was this that the Hearings before the RRT were meant to clear 
up. For example the LMS was involved in the conveyance of Chocolate from 
Mangotsfield, near Bristol, to London.18 The railway’s position here was that the 
Exceptional charge should be one third of the Standard. Such a drastic decrease had 
to be justified to the RRT, and it was noted by counsel for the LMS that "Undoubtedly 
if these hundreds of tons of this traffic were going from Bristol to London by road, the 
lorries would not be coming back empty."19 This would have meant opening up other 
areas of the market to road hauliers, as "backloads" would have been available. Thus 
the reduction was granted: not only was there evidence of competition but also the 
danger that the overall revenue position would suffer. That is, the damage would not 
be limited to just the chocolate traffic but to a wider erosion of the railway’s position 
in the market for transport from the Bristol area to London.
Application 1936, Number 304 by the Railway Companies Re. Exceptional Rates in Railways
Act 1921 Proceedings o f the Railway Rates Tribunal, Year 1936, Number 34, Exceptional Rates 
held on Tuesday 14th. July, 1936.
19 Application 1936, Number 304 Proceedings of the Railway Rates Tribunal, p506.
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There also developed a system of Agreed Charges. These began as variants of 
the Exceptional rate until they were ruled illegal within the meaning of the 1921 
Railways Act. It was not until the Road and Rail Traffic Act of 1933 that they were 
made legitimate. These enabled the cost of administering transportation to be 
minimised, both for the trader and the railway. They were a flat rate based on the 
Trader’s traffic flow over a given period. An average rate per ton, per unit of 
consignment was used to negotiate a price. This involved sampling given periods of 
traffic with all the attendant difficulties. The question was, could the information 
provided by the firm be relied upon, and was the time period a reliable indicator of 
traffic flow? After a period of time the railway companies’ own data would reveal 
whether they were being duped. A case involving the LNER and LMS illustrates the 
process.20 Tests of traffic were taken in May and September 1935 which gave an 
average of 61 shillings, 11.23 pence per consignment. This was then used as a basis 
for the Agreed Charge, subject to regular flows of traffic. Bulk loading in this case 
was considered particularly important in maintaining economies. Even so it was noted 
that road rates were being quoted at 40 shillings per ton. The rationale for a company 
to use rail transport under such conditions depended on the additional facilities on offer. 
In addition there might have been more direct loading between points due to the 
existence of Private sidings.
We shall see later how road services came to be developed as a response to 
private road haulage. Within our period the railways also began to make use of other 
modes of transport in carriage. Competition from water borne transport had always 
figured in the calculation of rates. In the pricing process this was being reflected in the 
applications being made. The GWR and LMS negotiated a rate with one company that 
included sending some traffic by water.21 In this example 8 per cent of the total traffic 
was to be sent by water at a rate of 21 shillings per ton. The reason for this was the 
existence of facilities and loading arrangements apparently dedicated to water transport.
Application 1936, Number 29 Road and Rail Traffic 1933, Proceedings o f the Railway Rates 
Tribunal, Year 1936, Number 9, Agreed Charges Wednesday 19th February 1936, p i 10.
Application 1936, Number 32, Road and Rail Traffic Act Proceedings o f the Railway Rates 
Tribunal Year 1936, Number 9, Agreed Charges Wednesday 19th February 1936.
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The final rate was again based upon samples and tests of movement taken over a two 
month period. The rate was agreed to by the RRT because it was estimated that 40 per 
cent more traffic would be carried, with a 25 per cent increase in revenue.
Once a figure had been agreed internally, it was put to the RCH to be ratified 
by all the companies. Then it was down to the Rates Tribunal to determine its legality. 
The hearings before the RRT concerning Exceptional rates would focus on any 
objections raised by Traders and the effect on the railways net revenue position the said 
rate would have to be assessed. Evidence to the RRT was obtained by sampling the 
traffic flows and then relating them to the competitive environment. Example of this 
appear in the published evidence of proceedings from the RRT.
Thus far we have defined the main categories of pricing: if the railways were 
to succeed in their aim of maximising revenue then they had to monitor the economy 
of the area in which they were operating so as to quote the best prices possible for this 
objective. Information was required concerning new business and changes in existing 
patterns of traffic. The Exceptional and Agreed charges needed information to 
determine their levels. To develop road services such as Railhead Distribution also 
needed considerable commercial research and information gathering. The rest of this 
chapter is devoted to how the companies achieved this. It will include an analysis of 
how business information was used to develop services as a response to increasing 
competition, and how a new transport technology, the motor vehicle was integrated into 
the rail network.
Commercial Research
Although the organisational structures dealing with freight operations were 
different, we can see that all of the companies discussed questions in broadly similar 
fashion. It was the bringing together of commercial needs with operational capability 
that was of the utmost importance to all these companies. Meetings and conferences 
often based their decisions on information provided by quite extensive surveys of both 
the economic environment and the traders within it. For the LMS, Ashton Davies 
noted that "Research is an excellent aid to business forecasting, but intuition is the
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prime mover."22 The information gained still relied on interpretation by skilled 
managers to be of use, and it was the function of such meetings to provide this. 
Information was seen as the foundation upon which decisions had to be made, although 
analysis was more systematic than Davies comments might suggest.
There were two main categories of information: that regarding the state of 
business within the area, and that dealing with the type of service and level of rate 
required to attract traffic to the railway. There was also research designed to test the 
viability of new concepts of operating. In this section we will examine all of these 
elements. It will include the role of the RCH in coordinating activity, and the Railway 
Research Service in providing general information on railway operations. These will 
be discussed within the specific context of the development of container traffic.
The GWR Traffic Research Committees
The GWR established "Traffic Research Committees" whose express purpose 
was to be used in the fight against road competition.23 Attended by Development 
Officers and representatives of the Goods Manager’s office, these were established on 
the basis of 30,000 census forms sent out by the company to businesses soliciting 
information on a district by district basis.24 Throughout 1936, 70 meetings were held 
with each district visited at least four times. By early 1937, it was calculated that 
through this action an extra 124,590 tons worth £57,494 had been brought into the 
company, increasing to £165,927 by 1938.25 To what extent this could be attributed 
to the Research Committees is not clear but there can be little doubt that without this 
road competition would have made further inroads into rail traffic. Such research at 
least helped the GWR to focus on their market and the needs of the customer.
Davies "Modem Commercial Practice" Journal o f the Institute Transport, April 1934.
RAIL/250/745 GWR Goods Conference Minutes, Minute 8233 12 June 1936 "District Traffic 
Research Committee."
RAIL/250/745 GWR Goods Conference Minutes, Minute 8199 28 February 1936 "District 
Traffic Research Committee."
RAIL/250/745 GWR Goods Conference Minutes, "District Traffic Research Committee," 
Minutes 8295 26 February 1937, 8319 21 May 1937 and 8478 5 May 1939.
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In essence what these Research Committees were doing was coordinating 
information on the type of traffic being offered and under what conditions. Given the 
vagaries of the pricing system it was important that rates agreed as closely as possible 
with each other under the same conditions. The reaction of firms to rates quoted could 
be discussed and any further reductions considered. How much of the traffic was there 
travelling by rail at present and could it be increased? This information was gained 
both by local agents and the census forms.26
To illustrate how these Committees worked we can consider an example from 
the London District Traffic Committee concerning furniture.27 Firstly, the number of 
manufacturers was determined at about 200. This helped to establish where the traffic 
was distributed. Then the extent of road competition was noted and in this case 59 
hauliers were identified. However this was likely to include only those actively 
involved in the carriage of furniture, as obtained by the census.28 The amount 
forwarded each day was estimated at 105 tons broken down into 31 private hauliers and 
39 "owners vehicles" with 35 going by rail. This was compared with previous 
carryings by rail under the headings of collected, delivered and the two combined. It 
was revealed that the 13,880 tons carried in 1929 had fallen to 9,727 in 1935. The next 
step was to analyse what could be done about the situation. In this case the rates 
charged were already high, with charges calculated from class 20 of the Classification. 
Exceptional rates were quoted in some cases but these did not appear to be making 
much impact. The problem was that road hauliers had several means of charging, all 
of which were likely to render the railway in a poor light for much of the traffic. 
Prices per ton at or below the rail rate were common, as the road hauliers could always 
consult the local rail rates published by law. As a response, the railway quoted per
26 RAIL/250/768 GWR Goods Conference Minutes, Minute 8370 25 February 1938 "District 
Traffic Research Committee,". The census forms were sorted into "trade groups" where they 
could be investigated by staff from the District offices. This also enabled input from 
Headquarters if any areas of general commercial policy were involved.
27 RAIL/250/717 GWR Traffic Research Committee - London District, Minutes 42 13 July 1936, 
42 20 November 1936 and 144 4 March 1937 "Furniture: Ex. High Wycombe.
28 This was likely to include only those actively involved in the carriage of furniture as obtained 
by the census. Although it is likely that the local agents would be well aware of other hauliers 
who were potential carriers.
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package or per load rates. From this analysis the GWR was able to formulate its plan 
of action. Door to door transit was an important advantage of road haulage. This 
could be offered through the use of the railway’s own fleet of vehicles or through the 
use of containers. The problem here was the increased handling on the former, and the 
latter was subject to an extra charge.
In addition, the general level of costs were increasing. Other remedies 
suggested included the lowering of the minimum load and modifying the claims process 
in event of damage. In addition it was thought that "unpacking" facilities might be 
provided, extending the services offered by the company. Finally there was the setting 
of an Agreed charge which would simplify the clerical procedures involved, thereby 
decreasing costs. This option was pursued with two sample firms based on the cubic 
capacity of the container. However this was not altogether successful as one firm 
returned to road haulage and the GWR rejected using cubic capacity as a basis for 
charging. The reason for this is not made clear but it is likely that the general principle 
for this type of traffic at least would not lead to appreciable gains in traffic. Furniture 
was not the most compact of items, hence its high rate (class 20).
This example gives some indication of how traffic research was intended to 
work. Analysis of the furniture industry revealed the nature of the problem the GWR 
faced: road was simply better at the task. Door to door delivery was quicker by road, 
with most railway companies taking over a day to deliver their consignments.29 The 
cost of bringing loads to and from the station had to be borne by the GWR and was 
especially a problem given the dispersed nature of the furniture factories. These 
problems were not unique: even a bulk commodity such as grain and oil cake, was 
similarly affected.30
Grain was a bulk commodity imported via London docks, and so on the face of 
it was suited to rail transit. It was the task of the GWR to distribute this across its
RAIL/250/717, GWR Traffic Research Committee - London District, Minute 42 13 July 1936.
RAIL/250/717 GWR Traffic Research Division - London District. In addition see Minute 186 
23 June 1937 "Review of Operations of the Committee During 1936," Minutes 13, 14 February 
1936; 39, 20 March 1936; 69, 13 July 1936; 90, 2 October 1936 and 140, 30 November 1936 
"Grain and Oil Cake Ex. London Dock, Wharfs and Mills."
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system. However even here it was the case that road transport was making inroads: 
from £82,470 in 1931 the business had declined in value to £58,468 in 1936, with an 
estimated 100,000 tons was travelling by road. Rail traffic reached the GWR through 
rail transfer from the docks or through barges, many of which came to the company 
wharves at Brentford. The company decided to bulk loads in 5 to 10 ton lots from here 
to the destination as a response to the competition, hoping to achieve economies, and 
thereby decrease rates. This was the first step in reformulating the basis of the rate 
being charged. The GWR entered into negotiations with mill owners and began a test 
of the effect on revenue of quoting a "barged and delivered" rate to the GWR depot at 
South Lambeth. The expectation was that 50 per cent of the road traffic would revert 
to rail with a profit on this traffic to the company of 2/6d per ton. However, a later 
minute noted that overall a decrease of £300 in revenue would occur per annum on the 
given rate. The RRT would in all likelihood reject any applications presented on such 
as basis. As part of the negotiations, the GWR was in contact with the industry trade 
association, the National Association of Corn and Agricultural Merchants. In 1936 
they were told by the GWR that unless a "substantial" increase in net revenue could be 
achieved, then no new rates would be forthcoming.
This was not the only problem facing the management: it was not at all clear 
that the savings could be quantified, rendering such analysis problematic at best. The 
reason for this was stated to be the existence of tolls, terminal charges and 
arrangements under pooling. This suggests that the charges could not be allocated to 
any particular activity and hence no standardised comparison could be made. Related 
to this was the variety of selling methods from "Ex ship via rail" and "Ex ship via 
Private wharf" to "Ex Mill" and "Ex Silo." According to the Research Committee, "in 
every instance the selling price differs according to the various handling costs 
incurred. "31 The Committee was able to report that from their investigations that road 
hauliers used the grain shipments as "forward" loads. That is to say that they enabled 
the lorries to go to the docks with a full load and hence earn revenue. Their real 
interest was the "back" loads of cement, paper, bricks etc from the docks. This would
31 RAIL/250/717 GWR Traffic Research Committee - London District, Minute 69 13 July 1936
"Grain and Oil Cake."
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make it very difficult for the railways to compete against: road hauliers could certainly 
charge well below the cost of the outbound trip because they had to go to the docks 
anyway.
Total receipts from grain and oil cake traffic fell from £42,817 in 1932 to 
£29,593 in 1936. The effect of the Committee’s work was to stem at least part of the 
flow from rail to road. Comparing the first four months of 1936 with 1937 revenue 
increased from £7,253 to £8,132, on an increase of 25 per cent in tonnage. However 
the railways were fighting a losing battle which the information collected by Traffic 
Research could but confirm. About 81 per cent of home grain production was 
purchased by merchants in their own vehicles. Only 3 per cent was forwarded by rail, 
the remainder was hauled by private road hauliers.
Some success was achieved in monitoring new sources of traffic. This was not 
just the construction of new plants in "traditional industry,” but the development of new 
industry. The Birmingham district Traffic Research Committee reported on the growth 
of the engineering industry associated with the production of cars.32 The first task was 
for the Railway Rates Tribunal to agree on the classification to be used as a basis upon 
which to charge the rate. This case saw the use of containers for at least some of the 
traffic. Once this was established, then the Research Committee would proceed as per 
any usual application.
We can see how it was that the GWR attempted to negotiate decisions on price 
and service. The information so provided could be used beyond the confines of the 
GWR. It may have been needed in the negotiations at the RCH, of which more will be 
said later. Much of the information about local trade conditions was implicit in this 
analysis. As we shall see other companies made more explicit use of such research.
Commercial Development and Area Research on the LMS
The re-organisation in the early thirties provided an infrastructure for much 
needed information on the obtaining of traffic and the economic environment. Ashton
RAIL/250/712 GWR Traffic Research Committee - Birmingham District, Minutes 93 31 April 
1936; 124 19 May 1936; 239 22 February 1937 and 351 4 November 1937. "Steel Pressings 
for Motor Bodies: Birmingham to Oxford, Leamington and Coventry."
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Davies noted that "..trained staffs are continually subjecting the traffic fields to detailed 
investigation and statistical analysis."33 Evidence for the LMS activity in research 
comes from various sources. Memoranda were presented by the Chief Goods Manager 
dealing with the effects of road competition, summarising the ongoing activity in 
attempting to get traffic and the rates that should be charged. Details of commercial 
and operating matters appeared, as we have seen, in the Goods Conference Minutes. 
There does not appear to have been a dedicated Traffic Research Committee as with the 
GWR. However there was a Commercial Development Section, but these records do 
not appear to have survived. However, some of the reports issued are available.
In 1926, the Commercial Development Section presented a report in which 
Containers were discussed as a response to road competition.34 Their task was to 
facilitate door to door delivery and reduce the need for package loads. It was also 
stated that the "relative ratio between the cost of labour and of substituting mechanical 
appliances for labour.. .has altered in favour mechanical appliances. "35 However it was 
also noted that only about 8 per cent of rail traffic could "with advantage" be carried 
by Container.36 The criteria for this calculation was not made explicit so we have no 
way of knowing whether this was a reasonable assumption or not. However, detailed 
comparisons were made of the capacity and revenue per ton mile. It was estimated that 
for meat the "average station cost per ton" with a Container was 3.35d per ton as 
opposed to 19.52d using the "assumed ordinary method."37 The number of journeys, 
mileage and average length of haul placed the Container within the context of train 
activity in general. One part of the Development Section Report dealt with 
"Displacement of Packing - Effect Upon Railway Revenue and Expenditure." It was
Davies "Modem Commercial Practice" Journal o f the Institute o f Transport, April 1934.
RAIL/421/146 Freight Transportation in Container Trucks, December 31 1926, Development
Section Euston.
Freight Transportation in Container Trucks, Paragraph 70.
Freight Transportation in Container Tmcks, Paragraph 177.
Freight Transportation in Container Tmcks, Paragraph 233.
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stated that in tests about 15 per cent of the gross weight was of packaging.38 Because 
of this the company wished to offer the use of Containers only to those traffics already 
going by road. However this would have led to charges of undue preference, with 
some 15 per cent of LMS traffic being affected by this.39
The gains to be made, should Containers be introduced, were contingent on the 
rates that could be charged. This raised several issues including the position of such 
consignments within the General Rates Classification. The report was concerned that 
a simpler classification be used based on the weight rather than value. The tests carried 
out were weighted according to the classification of the goods so that an accurate 
picture of the potential revenue was presented.
Also raised were problems associated with the limited use of Containers: it was 
difficult to obtain a return load and this necessitated empty working. The attempted 
solution to this was to place the Container within the Rolling Stock Distribution. 
Indeed it was recommended by the report that a specialised central control be 
established for just such a purpose. Further investment was also required in the form 
of cranes and special wagons. However the provision of such equipment was "held in 
abeyance" because there was no perceived benefit to such expenditure, at least until a 
more general re-modelling of terminals might take place. Of more immediate concern 
was the standardisation of already being used, equipment and operating procedures, 
which were eventually pursued through the offices of the RCH.40
While the Development section was devoted to specific issues, a broader 
description of LMS operations was presented in a "Statement of the Area, Population, 
Industries, Principal Traders' Payments, and Sales Organisation."41 This gave details 
of the main areas of population and business activity within each region. It was used 
to place the company’s operations within the context of the commercial environment.
Freight Transportation in Container Trucks, Chapter V.
Freight Transportation in Container Trucks, Paragraph 93.
Freight Transportation in Container Trucks, Paragraph 132.
RAIL/421/119 “Statement of the Area, Population, Industries, Principal Traders, 1933' 
Payments and Sales Organisation. We will use the example of the Manchester area.
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This involved noting the number of stations, depots and private sidings with listings of 
the accounts above £3,000. For the Manchester area this was 244 out of a total 23,000. 
Out of this total number of firms it was estimated that over 10,000 would need to be 
canvassed on a regular basis. What exactly was meant by a regular basis is not clear. 
Figures were provided on the number of calls made by canvassers, inspectors and C&D 
drivers.42 Whilst this snapshot of operations was used by the agents to develop traffic, 
it could also have been used as the basis for the standards calculated for the "Quota" 
system.
These reports also reveal that a close watch was kept on "prospective traffic" 
via monitoring the local press and trade journals. This involved liaising with the local 
Chambers of Commerce concerning the needs of the local business community.43 The 
extent to which agents had been successful was measured through comparing the 
previous two years work. The canvasser concerned was then required to explain if 
deceases in traffic were occurring. Monthly reports were similarly discussed with the 
District Canvassing officers.44
The LNER: Statement of Trade in Area
The LNER produced a report similar to that of the LMS, but which continued 
from 1933 on a regular basis. These were the "Reports on the State of Trade," 
produced for each area of the company.45 When first produced in 1933, the emphasis 
was on information collected regarding the "micro" environment of company 
transactions. By 1939, there had been a shift: although business conditions were still 
monitored there was much more emphasis on macro-economic indicators such as the 
retail price index, and aggregate measures of output.46 The explanation for this is
RAIL/421/119 Statement of the Area, pp2-7.
RAIL/421/119 Statement of the Area, pi 1.
Statement of the Area, plO.
LNER (Southern Area) Report on the State of Trade, are the particular examples that have 
survived.
See RAIL/398/23 and RAIL/398/37 for the reports from 1933 and 1939 respectively.
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unclear: certainly all companies were aware of the macro-economic environment, but 
most did not include official statistics in their research. Perhaps the explanations that 
they were relatively cheap to collate, being easily available from published sources. 
The detailed profile of districts provided by the other two companies did not feature in 
the LNER.
The basis of these reports were the estimates of traffic receipts and originating 
traffic, their early format a mix of area survey, such as the LMS did in 1933, and the 
traffic census of the GWR. Note was made of the local trading environment, especially 
the conditions of collieries and blast furnaces. For example, the Robin Hood coke 
ovens were to be reopened with the implication that up to 2,000 tons per week of 
minerals (it is not clear whether it was coal or coke) would be carried by the end of 
June 1933. Any reasons for variation in traffic were noted. In one case, banana 
imports fell off due to a hurricane in the West Indies. Canvassers then had an excuse 
as to why traffic in their area was down. But more importantly this information 
allowed the use of resources to be planned.47 A General Trade Report enabled the 
stocks of selected materials - pig iron building materials, scrap etc - to be monitored 
throughout the network. Past and future contracts placed with companies within area 
were mentioned, as part of the regional monitoring. A special section of the report 
detailed the work of ports such as Immingham. Information by type of commodity and 
facilities required for handling was collected. Both operating and commercial managers 
were in a position to see what traffic emanated from where and the facilities required.
Within this example there was, in addition to the main report, a "Supplementary 
Report" that dealt with the Nottingham District. This again reviewed trading 
conditions, but in more depth, with details concerning local road and water 
competition, with estimates of traffic passing by road from specific companies. 
Intelligence concerning new industry in the area was also noted.
Our foray into commercial research has revealed some variance in procedures. 
From the specialised traffic research of the GWR, to the detailed surveys of the LMS, 
it is clear that the companies were heavily involved in trying to understand their
47 RAIL/398/23 Report on State of Trade (Southern Area), 1933, pl6.
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environment. The LNER seems to have been less active in this field but this may 
reflect once more the constraints faced by the company from a financial point of view. 
The fact that so much of its area was in the depressed regions would not have helped: 
there was perhaps not the incentive to develop facilities to collect commercial 
information if the area was dominated by "old industry" such as shipbuilding, iron and 
steel. It seems that the Midlands and South were the areas for new and growing 
markets. This gave the LMS and GWR reasons to try and develop traffic.
Outside Research: The Railway Research Service
Research was also conducted by all of the railway companies through the offices 
of the London School of Economics. The origin of this organisation seems to lie with 
experience gained from the US Bureau of Railway Economics established in 
Washington around 1910.48 The main areas of research were those concerning overseas 
activity.
An example of the type of information collected and its use is seen in the 
development of Containers. Its task was to "..arrange connections with Railway 
correspondents abroad." They would provide special reports on topics at the request 
of the companies, with periodical reports also being published.49
Between 1927 and 1931 there were several reports detailing the use of 
Containers on US railroads.50 The first report noted details of the New York Central’s 
experience including the rates charged, loading and technical details. The advantages 
cited were economies in packaging and less damage, which was placed in context by 
a description of the routes travelled and traffics handled. By the early thirties the
48 C.E.R.Sherrington "Britain's part in the International Exchange of Railway Information" 
Journal of the Chartered Institute o f Transport, September 1955. Sir Felix Pole (GWR), Sir 
Ralph Wedgwood (LNER), and Sir Herbert Walker (SR) were prime movers in this.
49 RAIL/390/381 Railway Research Service, Memo to the Traffic Committee "Proposed 
Establishment of a Railway Research Establishment at the London School of Economics" dated 
13 November 1923.
50 See "Use of Containers on American Railroads," Vol.6, No.3, March 1927; "The Development 
of Containers in the United States," Vol.8, No.5 May 1928; "Costs of Handling Freight in 
Containers," Vol.12, No.6 June 1930; "Use of Containers by American Railways," Vol.13, 
No.4 October 1930; "Container Services and Rates," Part One, Vol. 15, No.4 October 1931 and 
Part Two, Vol. 15 No.6 December 1931, Railway Research Service Monthly Bulletin.
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Service was reporting details of the Inter State Commerce Commissions cost studies of 
container traffic. The final reports, published in 1931, noted the prevailing rate 
structure in the US when containers were being used. By this time the principle was 
accepted on Britain's railways and probably accounts for the ending of reports at this 
time. However during the early phases of container development the Service offered 
examples of practice overseas which may have persuaded managers that the system was 
worth investigating.
This is given credence by internal company reports: the LNER, in a review of 
funding, noted that "The Research Service continues to prove of value to the Railway 
Companies in providing up to date information in regard to transport developments in 
other countries. It has come to be regarded as part of our railway organisation. "51
To understand fully the role of commercial information we need to examine the 
context in which it was used. Once contact had been made with a trader it was 
necessary to then develop a service at a given price. We have seen how the different 
categories of information collected brought together the operating and commercial 
aspects. We now need to go further into the rate making process. Many decisions 
affected the other companies, and so were referred to the RCH for consultation. If 
necessary these would then have to go to the RRT for confirmation of the charge. The 
RCH acted so as to present a united front to external agents such as the RCH and 
traders. It also provided an opportunity to utilise, and share, commercial information, 
as well as generating its own. By the twenties and thirties, the RCH was providing a 
forum for commercial as well as technical information to be investigated and 
exchanged.
The Railway Clearing House
The story of the RCH down to 1922 has been told in Chapter Three.52 Its role 
in coordinating technical standards and as a forum for Rate Conferences proved very
RAIL/390/381 Railway Research Service, Memo, to the Traffic Committee "Railway Research 
Service" 26 June 1939.
See P.Bagwell (1968) The Railway Clearing House in the British Economy, 1842-1922, London 
George Allen and Unwin.
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successful. Certainly at the end of its life it was much more than a means of 
reconciling receipts between companies. What is perhaps less well known is the role 
the RCH played in the inter-war years. Here it is important for several reasons: it was 
a key part of the rates setting process, continued to advise on technical standards and, 
as we have seen, helped instigate a system of traffic costing.
An example of how operating and commercial elements came together may be 
found in the "Goods Managers, Superintendents' and Engineers Sub-Committee" which 
was involved in establishing the best way to move a long load.53 It established a 
standard for all the companies to use in moving such loads. Given the problems 
involved with such loads and the fact that they often travelled over more than one line, 
this was the perfect task for the RCH. This case was the transit of 90 foot steel rails 
from Cargo Fleet Iron Works, Middlesborough to London. The RCH used Inspectors 
to monitor procedure noting any particular problems that arose. Chief Mechanical 
Engineers Department representatives and Traffic Department managers were present 
from each of the affected companies. From the Inspectors report, the RCH drew up 
detailed instructions as to procedure, including drawings of the ideal load.
We will consider the activity of the Rates Conference and Goods Managers 
Meetings. These give a clear indication of the sort of issues being addressed and their 
relationship to other aspects of commercial management.
The RCH Rates Conference
The Rates Conferences dealt with the detailed, everyday tasks of pricing. It was 
a forum where companies could propose ideas and have them investigated by the 
associated Rates Clerks Committee. These clerks produced reports at the request of the 
main Conference. These would then form the basis of decisions. There were some 
similarities in what this Conference did and the Goods Managers meetings, except that 
we find more specialised aspects of rating coming under scrutiny.
RAIL/1080/235 Goods Managers Minutes, Goods Managers, Superintendents' and Engineers 
Representatives Committee 16 May 1935, "Conveyance of Long and Projecting Loads."
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The case we have chosen centres on the quoting of rates in the context of 
increasing road competition.54 Details were given as to why road transport was 
attracting the business: lower rates, less breakages and next day delivery were cited 
along with the advantage that road could obtain more bulk loads in proportion to the 
size of the vehicle. This is, of course, familiar. The research conducted by companies 
and the their Conferences had reported much the same. The function of the Rates 
Conference was to bring together the experiences of the companies in the hope that 
solutions could be offered.
In this case it was thought likely that a 4 ton rate be applied to any weight of 
traffic. A detailed profile was provided of the traffic: the stations, rate per ton 
conditions of carriage and road competition were presented. A selection of "Bolts, 
Nuts, Rivets, Spikes and kindred commodities" were carried in a representative month. 
How this was determined is unclear, although local Agents would be aware of the most 
opportune times for the railway due to their local knowledge. Here at least the average 
was a useful measure, provided there were know capacity or peak loading problems. 
It allowed both parties to use it as a foundation for negotiations. The Rates clerks 
discussed the proposals and pointed out the problem in quoting these charges. In this 
case a reduction of 10 shillings per ton would have to be made in other categories, on 
rates of between 25 and 49 shillings. Their decision was backed up by details of the 
carryings, including road and rail tonnages and their recommendation was accepted.
The clerks were clearly specialist purveyors of this type of information and 
important parts of the decision making process. This is not surprising given the nature 
of the classification. It demonstrates the advantage of the RCH as a coordinating body 
where managers could meet on neutral territory and discuss what in any other industry 
would be commercially confidential.
RAIL/1080/449 Minutes of the General Rates Conference, Minutes 7472, 8 September 1937; 
7513 5-6 October 1937; 475c Rates Clerks Meeting 29 October 1937, and 7554 9-10 November 
1937, "Castings, Iron or Steel of Light Type - Scottish Castings Trade Group."
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The RCH Goods' Managers' Meetings
This meeting seems to have been one of the most important, generating 
numerous sub-committees and reports. It was the forum within which all aspects of 
commercial operation could be discussed. The Container, Road and Rail 
Representatives, Storage and many others would report to this Committee, aiding 
discussion of a specialist nature. Traders were asking for quotes from different 
companies separately and any differences to the detriment of their operations were 
questioned.
For the purposes of analysis, a case arising out of the transport of Motor Spirit 
will be discussed. This was typical of many cases coming before the RCH from the 
railway companies in that it involved dispute resolution and the testing of traffic 
flows.55 In this instance, following a disagreement with traders involved with the 
refining of motor spirit, the LMS reported to the RCH. There seemed to be a problem 
with the rate structure which was preventing the LMS from quoting competitive rates. 
A meeting of Goods Managers Representatives compiled a report entitled "Rates for 
Kerosene and Motor Spirit in Owners' Tank Wagons."56 This provided an opportunity 
for the railway companies to "confer," to ensure the sanctity of the overall rates 
structure. A comparison was made of the different company charging policies giving 
both rates and the tonnage carried. The road charges for each oil company were also 
compared, alongside a calculation of how far this was below the standard rate.
It was apparent that the GWR was quoting rates below standard, as a matter of 
policy, while the LMS and LNER were not. These latter companies believed that to do 
so was to risk the entire rates structure. This was important as the charges could be 
applied to other companies’ traffic and made legally binding by the RRT. It was 
however agreed to extend reductions on selected traffics for an experimental period as 
the threat from road transport was considered great.
RAIL/1080/235 Minutes of Goods Managers Meetings Minutes 4102, 11 April 1935; 4173,20 
June 1935; 4206, 18 July 1935; 4239, 19 September 1935; 4274 17 October 1935, and 4392, 
20 February 1936.
RAIL/1080/235 Minutes of Goods Managers Meetings, Memo of Meeting of Goods Managers 
Representatives, 5 June 1935. This report is bound in with the Goods Managers Minutes and 
so has no independent reference only by date.
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The results from this test were not encouraging: for the 6 months of 1935, 
compared with the same six months in 1934, the GWR had increased its revenue by 
£4,145. However the LNER and LMS had decreased by £4,886 and £14,798 
respectively and this despite overall imports in oil having increased.57 The GWR 
proposed to still quote these rates, and the LMS and LNER realised that they would 
have to follow suit. Otherwise the rate structure as a whole would be challenged, 
creating expense and possibly souring relations with traders. An Appendix to the 
report gave details relating to the proposed new rates. The station and distance were 
noted along with the ownership of the property. The latter would presumably relate 
to the likelihood of the trader leaving the location if rate reductions were not granted. 
The applicant’s tonnage was compared to other, similar, trader’s accounts. Present and 
required rates were given as a percentage below standard. Finally the rate 
recommended for the purpose of negotiation and its value below standard was stated. 
The document presented the stance that the companies were to take on this particular 
rate. More details were collected at a follow on meeting, when the number of privately 
owned tank wagons and the tonnages carried was collected. The tonnage and number 
of depots went toward an estimate of likely demand. The number of depots which had 
closed or relocated could then be used as a guide to how the market was developing 
spatially.58
It seems that most traders were happy with the new rates, but one of them, 
Shell, was not. As one of the original complainants they wanted the rates to be 
backdated to when the initial approach was made ie January 1935 as opposed to 
November 1935. This the railways refused to do and the case drops from view. 
Whether the rates were eventually adopted, or the traffic lost to competition, is not 
clear.
RAIL/1080/235 Minutes of Goods Managers Meetings, Memo of a Meeting of Goods Managers 
Representatives 16 and 30 August 1935, "Rates for Kerosene and Motor Spirit in Owners' Tank 
Wagons."
RAIL/1080/235 Minutes of Goods Managers' Meetings, Memo of the Goods Managers 
Representatives "Rates for Kerosene and Motor Spirit in Owners' Tank Wagons," 10 October 
1935.
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The role of other committees will be seen in later sections when we discuss 
particular examples of commercial information being used in the development of road 
services and the adoption of the container. What we have seen is the way that the 
commercial information was utilised outside of the internal company structures. It has 
been claimed that the process of grouping was facilitated by the RCH, and even that it 
was a substitute for nationalisation.59 Certainly it had always facilitated the operations 
of a network industry with all the problems that entailed. What we see after the 1921 
Railway Act was an enhanced RCH becoming involved in all aspects of commercial and 
operating activity. We are now able to bring together the commercial activity of the 
companies with that of the RCH. The response to road competition provides us with 
an example of how commercial information was applied to combating road competition.
Road Competition
This chapter so far has examined the procedures by which companies monitored 
the commercial environment. We can now place this in context by considering the 
response of the companies in terms of action: how were decisions influenced by such 
information? We have already seen how the threat perceived from road hauliers by the 
railway companies dominated the thoughts of railway companies. Not only were they 
able to consult railway rate books as to prices, but they were also better able to obtain 
backloads. The reactions of managers reveal something about how management met 
competition within the regulated environment, utilising commercial information,
There is some paradox in this: many managers believed that it was the railway 
industry rather than transport that was their core business, and this was encouraged by 
the framing of the 1921 Act. In fact most of the legislation in the previous 50 years 
pointed to this. By the time of grouping, although the railways had been involved with 
shipping and dock interests, it seems that road haulage was considered a thing apart. 
Most would have agreed with the GWR report that stated "The cardinal point of policy
P. Bag well describes the potential problems of not having a Clearing House when setting Rates, 
pp266-268 The Railway Clearing House.
206
has been, and will be, to retain as much traffic as possible to the railway. ,,6° The LMS 
certainly did, at least in the twenties. It noted that road conveyance would only have 
been used if business "would have been lost from the railway. "61 This was consistent 
with profit maximisation. Perhaps one of the reasons for this reluctance was the 
prohibition of railway companies from carrying goods by road. Throughout transport, 
whereby the company’s own lorries would take the traffic without recourse to rail, was 
prohibited until 1928. However, companies were extending their collection and 
delivery services. Once granted road powers, they planned to use them to the full. 
There were certainly profits to be made: the LMS realised a 42 per cent profit on a 
road service between Leeds and Bradford, indicating that revenue was possible from 
such operations.62
By 1933 the LMS had reconsidered its road services. There were three reasons 
stated for such a move: firstly it would reduce costs, both those of transhipment and 
terminal. Secondly it would provide additional net revenue and finally competition 
would be reduced by driving out private hauliers. It was estimated that as of January 
1932 60 per cent of traders in LMS territory had their own road transport.63 
Technology was also forcing the railways to adjust. A visit to a Commercial Motor 
show in London by the LMS, noted the availability of bulk liquid vehicles. These gave 
to the road hauliers "regular bulk traffics giving full loads for moderate distances."64 
The general means of combating road competition were stated in the retrospective view 
of the commercial manager:
RAIL/257/42 Draft Report on Road Competition by Motor Lorries and How the GWR are 
Meeting the Position, p i; See also ppl37-138, Burtt Railway Rates.
RAIL/418/102 LMS General Reports to the Board, pi "Throughout Road Transport for 
Merchandise Traffic."
RAIL/418/102 Throughout Road Transport for Merchandise Traffic, Memo to the Board 
January 1929, p3.
RAIL/418/105 LMS General Reports to the Board, "Road Competition for Merchandise 
Traffic" January 1932, plO.
RAIL/418/163 LMS Chief Goods Managers Conference, November 1925 "Commercial Report 
for October 1925," p4.
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It has not been practicable at any time to meet road competition by any general 
modification of rail rates and the railway companies have been compelled to 
confine their action, in the main, to particular traffics between specific points, 
or principal streams or classes of traffic, as such have become more vulnerable 
to attack.65
In cases where outside haulage was used, the objectives of the company were explicit: 
such services were developed with "a view to undermining the stability of private 
haulage concerns.n66 As we shall see, their ability to do so was somewhat limited by 
legislation and their own suitability to carry loads. However to even consider pursuing 
such a policy required good commercial information
By 1931, it was noted that the "Railway Companies in their present 
circumstances can only expect to maintain their carryings of many of their important 
merchandise traffic at the expense of a loss in gross receipts." Furthermore, road 
transport revealed "a situation, the gravity of which cannot be disguised. "67 To monitor 
the activity of road hauliers, to help the legislative campaign against road transport, the 
company engaged in what they called "organised observation," to prove that "goods 
commercial vehicles are constantly exceeding the speed limit." The company also had 
evidence from local authorities on overloading which they planned to use at meetings 
of the traffic licensing authority.68
By 1933 the LMS Chief Goods Manager, Ashton Davies, would open his report 
on "Goods Traffic Receipts and Road Competition" thus:
RAIL/418/209 Review of the LMS Commercial Organisation, p35.
RAIL/418/105 LMS General Reports to the Board "Road Motor Competition for Merchandise 
Traffic," January 1932, p9.
RAIL/418/104 Road Motor Competition for Merchandise Traffic, p9.
RAIL/418/104 Road Motor Competition, p i8-19 For example Liverpool made 39 test weighing 
of lorries to find 34 overloaded.
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If it is inevitable, with road vehicle costs as they are, that the railway be 
continuously undercut, and traffic has to pass to the road, why shouldn’t we go 
"all out" on the road ourselves and get what profit there is?69 
Even here the railways would have difficulty in attracting traffic as many traders had 
their own fleets of lorries. Nevertheless the LMS along with the GWR and LNER did 
attempt to develop throughout road services once they were legally in a position to do 
so.
Because of the government regulation and the co-operation afforded by the 
RCH, the basis for rate reduction was similar throughout the companies. Failure to 
follow the procedures outlined above would lead to censure from the Railway Rates 
Tribunal. As an example of how railway companies in general calculated rate 
reductions was as follows, we will examine this case from the LMS.70 Given the 
degree of cooperation we have seen from the rates procedure this was not unreasonable.
First there had to be "reasonable proof" that traffic would increase, the gross 
level of rates would have to be maintained and the loss from such reductions would 
have to be less than that from "inaction." The task for the Goods manager was to 
mediate for the company between the Rates Tribunal and customers. This was by no 
means straightforward: for example one reduction in rates for fruit, sugar and groceries 
led to a call for iron and steel charges to be dropped.71 The company analysed how 
much traffic was going by road and how much by rail from Liverpool to Manchester, 
and the rates were then compared. Any special rate quoted in order to attract traffic 
back from the road would prejudice rates for iron and steel traffic between Liverpool 
and Manchester. A decrease in rates to attract traffic would of necessity reduce rates
RAIL/418/106 LMS General Reports to the Board, "Goods Train Receipts and Road 
Competition" January 1933.
RAIL/418/106 LMS General Reports to the Board, "Goods Traffic Receipts and Road 
Competition" January 1933, pii.
RAIL/418/102 LMS General Reports to the Board, Half Yearly Memo. "Road Competition" 
Appendix A, p6.
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for existing traffic. To prevent undue preference the Rates Tribunal would forbid such 
charges lest the net revenue would be threatened. The company had to defend itself 
against such requests, a task which required evidence regarding the economics of each 
particular traffic. A "Progress of Combative Measures" report was used to describe 
the reports to the Board of such action. This discussed the various reductions available 
for large amounts, special quotes, adjustment of minimum weight and the 
reclassification of traffic.
The policy of revenue maximisation was carried out even when it was clear that 
profit was not forthcoming. In the late twenties the rates on grain and oil cake were 
reduced.72 The upshot of this was an increase in tonnage carried from 210,656 in 1928 
to 226,999 in 1929. However the amount of revenue fell by £686. Not much on a 
turnover of £295,426 but this was with an increase of 16,343 tons carried. This 
delighted the LMS management who saw it as a deduction from the "road hauliers at 
the expense of their earning capacity." However in 1930 both receipts and tonnage had 
fallen.73 A comparison with rates existing in 1928 revealed the extent of the problem: 
gross revenue would have been £70,000 higher, but of course the railway would then 
not have been competitive enough.
Using an exceptional rate was seen as a solution, by adjusting price and service 
to specific circumstances. The standard rate was gradually being eroded not just by 
these but by charges based on "Average rates per ton or per consignment covering a 
variety of commodities and destinations."74 The problem with this was that it could 
backfire: it was not at all clear to the LMS that extra traffic would be attracted or that 
the gains would not be eroded by concessions to other traders who would have used the 
railway in any event. The law regarding undue preference eroded further any gains.75
72 RAIL/418/102 LMS General Reports to the Board, Half Yearly Memo, "Road Competition" 
Memo. 5 November 1928.
73 RAIL/418/104 LMS General Reports to the Board, Memo Road Motor Competition for 
Merchandise Traffic, July 1931 from Chief Goods Manager, p3.
74 RAIL/418/105 LMS General Reports to the Board, Road Competition for Merchandise Traffic, 
January 1932, p7.
75 For an example of undue preference due to the granting of exceptional rates see p6, 
RAIL/418/106 LMS General Reports to the Board "Goods Traffic Receipts and Road
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Overall it was estimated that rate reductions would have to be of the order of 20 to 30 
per cent at least. However it was also noted, again because of undue preference, 80 
per cent of road traffic could not be competed for.
The GWR argued that the response to such competition lay with the pursuit of 
speedy delivery and good transhipment. As we have seen this later activity was 
pursued by their operating departments with the aid of the Traffic Research 
Committees. As with the LMS rate reduction was vital, but not at the expense of 
existing rates. However as early as 1921, the GWR was testing the market for schemes 
which hint at later developments.
Responses to Competition: Road Services
The information collected by the railways on the extent of road competition was 
soon put to use developing their own road services. Once more extensive powers had 
been granted in 1928, a more integrated system of transport could be developed. The 
GWR in particular emphasised the gains to be made by introducing improved 
transhipment. All companies introduced "Country Road Services." However all were 
impressed by the need to operate integrated road services. What was being suggested 
now was a far more systematic service based not only upon the delivery requirements 
of customers, but also whether the speed of service could be improved. This was the 
basis of the throughout road services offered as well as the Country Lorry Services.
The extension of railways into road operation required a new approach to 
commercial matters. This involved the restructuring of delivery services on a more 
systematic basis. The Country Lorry Services and the Railhead Distribution schemes 
sought to do this. These required careful planning and knowledge of traffic flows 
obtained from working experience and specialised reports. In all cases close 
monitoring and cost estimation were undertaken. The information collected sometimes 
verged on the provision of the railways providing a total transport service. They would 
ask the company exactly what their requirements were and attempt to meet them. This 
was the province of the Goods Agent who could also call on special representatives
Competition" January 1933.
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from the operating department. These were able to advise on any special facilities 
required and offer solutions to particular transport problems. For example the GWR 
had appointed Development Agents whose task this was.76 It was only a small step to 
move from the provision of C&D to these more specific services. It was considered 
by the LMS more as a service supplementing rail charges. It could be offered at below 
cost as it was being seen as being able to "maintain the railway rate itself at a higher 
level, thus reducing prejudice in other directions." Thus it was explicitly seen as a 
means of attracting revenue rather than earning profits.77
Some companies were willing to further extend road services. The LNER 
considered the use of road vehicles to transport heavy and out of gauge loads. 
Limitations on the gauge coupled with improved transit times made this an attractive 
proposition. In the event it was decided that this would not be appropriate, because it 
meant that heavy loads were less likely to be banned from the highway. The railways 
could hardly be seen to be condoning such traffic giving that they were proposing 
legislation banning such traffic from the roads.78
The LMS reports to the Board on Road Competition noted the targeting of 
"particular blocks of traffic," with the use of "radial collection and delivery service."79 
These presented information of the effect on revenue of the various measures being 
taken to combat road haulage. The company could then determine the service to be 
provided. These were divided into three main categories: Contract, Regular and hybrid 
road/rail. The first dealt with local "about town" haulage and loads which were short 
haul and so uneconomic for rail carriage. The criteria for establishing these varied 
according to local conditions: the traffic on offer, both type and amount, local
RAIL/250/767 GWR Goods Conference, Minute 6420 September 26, 1922 "Appointment of 
Development Agent."
RAIL/418/102 General Reports to the Board, "Road Competition," October 1929, p l2,.
RAIL/390/2035 Meetings of Goods Managers - York, Minutes 2760, 26 April 1929, and 2764 
8 October 1929, "Increased Tendency for Heavy Loads and Out-of-Gauge loads to be Conveyed 
by Road."
RAIL/418/102 LMS General Reports to the Board, Half Yearly Memo: "Road Competition" 
March 1929, p8. This regularly included an appendix detailing the "state of play" in the freight 
business produced by the Chief Goods Manager.
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competition and the degree to which traders had invested in their own road transport 
fleets.
Rates were subject to similar constraints as the rail charges. Cost data was used 
as a basis for calculating at least some of the charges. For throughout road transport 
it was a simple calculation of the cost of operating various vehicles according to the 
variables of time and distance. For example, ale and stout from Blackburn and Bolton 
to the Lancashire coast was carried at a per vehicle per day rate, with due allowance 
for tonnage. This earned over a 4 week period revenue of £221 at a cost of £149.80
The extension of road services by the railways was not limited to C&D. Once 
road powers had been granted they provided Railhead Distribution schemes. It is to 
these that we now turn.
Responses to Competition: Railhead Distribution
As the C&D service developed, so it became clear that rail transport could be 
extended further. The goods would arrive at the rail terminal for delivery by the 
company. If collection or delivery could not be effected at once then it was sometimes 
possible for storage in the Goods shed or its attendant warehouse to be offered. This 
was eventually developed into what became known as Railhead Distribution.
According to K.G.Fenelon, Railhead Distribution "combines rapid transit by 
rail in bulk loads, warehousing of goods, and retail distribution by road."81 
Transportation by a railway company was moving away from just movement, towards 
a function more closely associated with what we would now call logistics. The purpose 
of Railhead Delivery was the provision of road services within a given area supported 
by rail deliveries. They provided a focus for the other services on offer such as express 
delivery and the breaking of bulk. It was also a means of facilitating the coordination 
of road and rail. As Fenelon put it "The railways now are not merely carriers, but 
have become, in a sense, retail distributors."82 We can see this reflected in the type of
RAIL/418/102 LMS General Reports to the Board, "Road Competition" October 1929, pl2. 
K.G.Fenelon Railway Economics, p202.
Fenelon Railway Economics, p204.
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consignments attracted to these schemes. Cadbury and Rowntree used these schemes 
to distribute confectionary. Express freights and containers were used to serve the 
depots.83
As early as 1924 the GWR was investigating the possibility of establishing a 
system of railhead distribution. The first customer was a biscuit manufacturer from 
Gloucester, Macfarlane, Lang and Co. However it was noted that "There appears to 
be a lack of enthusiasm in most district in respect of railhead distribution. "84 By 1926 
schemes were still limited and it was stressed via the Goods Conference that "It is 
impossible to lay too much stress upon the importance of interesting firms in the 
companies storage facilities and the distribution of traffic." Indeed there was implicit 
criticism from the chairmen of the performance of management in this respect. This 
seems to have succeeded in motivating the agents and their managers, as it was later 
reported that "A good deal of interest has been aroused" in such schemes. This was 
manifested in the signing up of various tobacco companies had signed up for the 
schemes.85 The GWR seems to have seen the development of Railhead Distribution as 
part of the wider rail delivery system. Hence the concern with transhipment 
management and the extensive Country Lorry service. A Booklet, Speed in Transport, 
provided details of the service charges and facilities available at the different depots. 
In 1930 the GWR had 54 schemes in operation, split between four districts. Of these 
only Cardiff and Swansea were in a position for comparison. For a cost of £8,433, 
receipts were taken of £7,455.86
The LMS began in 1922 with 63 depots, which by the end of 1927 had risen to 
over 400. A wide variety of commodities were making use of the service including
See Lamb Modem Railway Operation, Chapter XVIII "Traders and freight Distribution."
RAIL/250/767 GWR Goods Conference, Minutes 6685, June 12 1924 and 6740, November 24 
1924, "Road Motor Competition."
See Minute 6975 July 16 1926 and Minute 6995 November 3 1926, "Road Motor Competition." 
Evidence of the companies involved comes from Minute 7150 November 18 1927, "Road Motor 
Competition," RAIL/250/742 GWR Goods Conference.
RAIL/250/743 GWR Goods Conference, Minute 7441 February 5, 1930 "Railhead 
Distribution," A copy of the booklet issued by the GWR can be at the PRO Reference 
RAIL/268/71.
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cement, groceries and cars.87 Express freight trains were despatched to the depots, 
there to be unloaded straight to the warehouse. Then they could be broken down to be 
delivered by road. For example, Cadbury sent wagons daily from their Bourneville 
works at 5.30pm to Camden where they arrived at 2.00am. They were unloaded at 
8.00am when the depot opened. A system of pallets called cages were used to convey 
loads within the vans for ease of handling. Cadbury had asked the LMS in 1921 for 
a service "..more comprehensive and complete than the general conception of a 
depot.."88 This particular distribution centre consisted of a (un)loading clerk, a 
stockroom and an office.
By 1932 the LMS was developing purpose built distribution centres in 
conjunction with traders. Cadbury's Finchley Road depot was designed by the Chief 
Engineers Department of the LMS in conjunction with Cadbury. This was a clear 
example of a railway company developing its services specifically with the trader in 
mind. The LMS Agents had to fully understand the business of the customer and be 
able to taylor their own services to fit. This was the payoff for the collecting of 
commercial information by the company. Traffic would hopefully not be lost because 
the service could utilise the advantages of road and rail. LNER experience shows how 
far companies had come from the view that they were only involved in rail transport. 
By 1938 Railhead Distribution had replaced "smalls" traffic on the branch lines: 83 
Railheads served over 3,000 villages, using 134 vehicles.89
The growth in such delivery services led to the RCH being called in to mediate 
disputes between companies. As schemes were established the zones covered expanded 
and met other railways delivery areas. In Taunton, the LMS, SR and GWR were vying 
for traffic. The latter had apparently established a scheme without first consulting the 
others. As a result they were requesting the payment of compensation that was the 
norm in these instances. The Goods Managers (Commercial and Road Transport)
87 For what follows see Railway Gazette Anon "Railhead Freight Distribution on the LMSR" 
December 23, 1927 and Anon "Railhead Distribution Depots" July 5 1929.
88 Anon "Railhead Distribution" Railway Gazette, July 5 1929.
89 A.A.Harrison (Road Motor Superintendent, NE Area, LNER), "Road Transport in the North 
East" Railway Gazette, September 23, 1938.
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Representatives first discussed the problem before passing it on to the main body of the 
Goods Managers for a decision.90
As we would expect, the RCH also played a more proactive role in establishing 
and coordinating distribution by road. In 1936 the GWR was approached by 
Silvertown Lubricants Limited concerning the distribution facilities offered to another 
company, N.C.C.Wakefield.91
Railhead Distribution enabled closer working between the railway and the trader 
to be achieved. This had implications for the handling infrastructure. Railhead 
Distribution enabled materials handling to be better integrated into the business process 
of the client. The development of palletised loads would have to await war time 
experience but this, together with the container shows that some progress was being 
made pre 1945. A clearer understanding by the transportation company of the Trader’s 
business enabled better techniques and technologies of handling to be developed. It was 
noted by the Railway Gazette that the use of Containers was being developed alongside 
the Railhead system of distribution. It was certainly true that there were similarities 
between the two. Both offered a door to door service and containers may be seen as 
an extension of the loading practices developed under railhead distribution: packaging 
was being reduced and loads homogenised. It is to this that we now turn.
Responses to Competition: Containers
The introduction of Containers demonstrates several important areas of business 
practice on the railways. We can see how the commercial functions of the RCH helped 
to coordinate activity across all the companies through the RCH Container Committee, 
established in July 1933. This dealt with operational issues such as the design of the 
Containers, the devising of technical standards etc, as well as the commercial, such as 
what type of traffic should be carried and at what rate? This illustrates the complexity
RAIL/1080/235 Goods Managers Minute, Goods Managers (Commercial and Road Transport) 
Representatives Meeting 10 February, 1936.
RAIL/1080/618 Goods Managers and Road Transport Representatives, Minutes 1, 17 July 1936 
"Storage and Distribution of Lubricating Oil;" 2, 2 September 1936 "Services in Connection 
with Conveyance of Lubricating Oil in Bulk."
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of incorporating new products into the existing system of rates. It involved establishing 
a new Classification of commodities based on the use of Containers.92 The RCH seems 
to have become a part of the marketing organisation of the railways. As an example 
we will see how the Container was used to attract fiimiture traffic form the roads to the 
railways. First we need to be clear in what exactly a Container was. After all 
packaging had long been an important part of the railway business. What set the 
Container apart?
According to the LMS "The function of a container in a railway sense is its 
ability to hold a large number of small units of traffic and permit of their being handled 
as one package by mechanical power. "93 The use of Containers was seen as a means 
of both minimising costs and improving the service. Door to door delivery was seen 
as a vital selling point in the competition with road transport. It offered the elimination 
of packaging with a decrease in damage to goods.
All three of our companies developed Containers, although some were more 
enthusiastic than others. Early experiments with "containers" were carried out on the 
GWR as early as 1921. However these were much smaller than those developed in the 
late twenties; they could fit four, six or eight to a truck.94 A GWR minute from 1927 
reveals the LMS as keen proponents and the LNER relatively antagonistic towards 
Containers. Evidence that the LNER was not a prime mover in these matters also 
comes from memoranda which refers to the fact that the company had been borrowing 
Containers from the GWR and LMS.95 It was the LMS that led the way in the 
development of Container traffic.96
RAIL/1081/92 Container Committee Minutes, Minute 1 26 January 1936 "Minute of 
Appointment." This Committee was appointed as a result of discussions by the Goods 
Managers Conference.
RAIL/421/146 Freight Trains In Container Trucks, Paragraph 120.
RAIL/250/767 GWR Goods Conference Minute, Minute 6359 "Use of Containers" January 27,
1922.
RAIL/390/906 Memo to the Locomotive and Traffic Committee, "Containers for brick etc 
traffic" 27 July 1933.
96 See Bonavia Railway Policy, p56.
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The outcome of these early experiments was that by 1930 it was clear that the 
Container was viable. It was reported that "the container facility often turns the scale 
in favour of rail, and its employment is a necessity to the continued rail conveyance of 
a large and growing volume of high rated traffic."97 As evidence of this, calculations 
were made as to the amount of traffic accruing to the LMS over a four week period. 
From this the amount of estimated traffic which would have been carried anyway, was 
deducted, with the result that a net gain of £4,950 was reported.98 From over 13,000 
loads in 1927 to over 48,000 in 1929, an increase from 24,833 to 92,655 tons, the 
Container had established itself on the LMS.
Once introduced, the performance of the concept was monitored. As with other 
specialised equipment there were problems of coordinating loads with wagons. In this 
case the problem of return loads was particularly acute and all companies experienced 
difficulties in this area. At various times the GWR Goods conference monitored the 
Average number of journeys per week for each type of Container.99 For the LMS 
reports were made by the Chief Goods Manager in his Memo "Road Motor 
Competition for Merchandise Traffic." The LNER was able to monitor all its specialist 
stock movement from within the Wagon Control System structure. From the individual 
company activity identified above we move now to see how the RCH responded to the 
operational and commercial challenges posed by the container. The story of Container 
development illustrates the role of the RCH in developing both technical standards and 
commercial cooperation.
The RCH and the Marketing of the Container
The role of the RCH in coordinating the development of Container operations 
is best seen in the light of a specific example. In 1932 the conveyance of new furniture 
from London was addressed by the Container Committee. In a series of Minutes, the
RAIL/418/29 The Development of Container Operation, Memo 17 November 1930,p5.
RAIL/418/29 The Development of Container Operation, p3.
See for example RAIL/250/745 GWR Goods Conference Minutes, Minute 8102, "Provision and 
Use of Containers."
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question of rates, service and costs were addressed. The starting point for such 
analysis was the amount of traffic estimated at passing by road: 16,000 tons by road out 
of a total 20,000 tons with the rail traffic limited to small consignments. A report was 
prepared for the Goods Managers which outlined the reasons for this.100 There were 
several perceived causes, not least the ability for the road hauliers to be able deliver 
door to door and at a lower rate. They could do this because there was no minimum 
load if furniture was being carried as a back load: one chair would suffice as a return 
load. This was made possible by the ease of obtaining a return load. Damage was also 
minimised, despite having less packaging. The railways noted the changing nature of 
the furniture business with traders offering delivery and less stockholding. The report 
recommended that loads should in future be carried at carriers risk with exceptional 
rates quoted around a minimum load of 1 ton, covering delivery in specific areas. The 
railway companies were also to provide labour to help load and unload. T o
assess the effects of these policies the General Managers Committee requested some 
"hypothetical" calculation that would indicate the effect on Net Revenue. The results 
of LMS research were passed on which calculated the average cost of loading, and the 
amount of labour involved. The average cost was based on a turnaround of 1 load 
every 10 days. This was estimated to be an additional cost of 11/6 per Container, with 
average receipts of £5.1.6d.101 Further experiments were conducted in 1933, covering 
34 loads, most of which had been attracted from the road. The results of these were 
presented by date, destination, nature of traffic, number of containers used, weight, 
rate and conditions, receipts and claims, if any.102 Extra labour costs were calculated 
on the basis of the number of men and their grade, as well as the time spent.
The growth of the Container as an inter-model means of transportation was a 
portent for the future. Even so the railways had made great strides toward their 
introduction on road and rail. By 1937, the LMS had 7,961, the GWR 1,765. Their
RAIL/1081/92 Container Committee Minutes, Minute 492 19 July 1932 "Conveyance of New 
Furniture in Containers from London."
RAIL/1081/92 Container Committee, Minute 5237 December 1932.
RAIL/1081/92 Container Committee, Minute 602 15 June 1933, "Conveyance of Furniture,".
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introduction was perhaps the ultimate recognition of the effects of road competition on 
railway operations with goods carried by rail being packaged to reflect the needs of 
road transport.
Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated how the railways dealt with a complicated 
commercial environment. Government regulation coupled with the nature of the 
pricing mechanism necessitated a system for monitoring the old rates and presenting 
the new. The use of Exceptional rates and Agreed charges meant that information 
gathering was an inherent part of the management practices used in the Commercial 
Departments. If revenue was to be maximised, then the needs of Traders had to be 
known. What we have revealed by understanding this process is that the railways were 
able to understand their market, but were unable to influence it. It was the competitive 
pressures of road transport and the regulatory environment, of prices and conditions 
of service set by law and determined in public, rather than poor management, that was 
the most important component in the failure of rail transport to meet its revenue targets. 
The use of traffic costing reveals that the railways were willing to analyse their costs, 
but only if there were benefits. Similarly improvements in services were possible when 
it was clear that regulation and revenue objective allowed it. Containers, Country 
Lorry Services and Railhead Distribution were all important steps in responding 
positively to the changing commercial environment. These were only possible by the 
use of commercial information applied to operating problems.
They were able to establish services through the Programming and Planning 
mechanisms of the RCH and their own Goods Conferences. Overall, the railways 
produced a system of marketing management which indicates that the railways had 
considerable vigour in this aspect of management.
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Chapter Eight
Conclusion.
The task of this thesis has been to relate how the railways were moving towards 
a scientific, systematic, approach to management. Procedures were adopted in the face 
of a depression that affected the market for transport and increasing road competition. 
The ability of the railways to respond to this was hampered by regulation of rates by 
government. Not only were prices set, but rates had to be published by law. This made 
responding to the adverse market conditions by cutting prices difficult.
Given the circumstances outlined in Chapter Four, the railway sector was not 
managerially moribund in the post 1923 period, as has been claimed by Aldcroft. It faced 
difficult circumstances by trying to develop new ways of thinking about business. The 
different approaches to problems were partly a reflection of organisational culture and 
partly one of circumstance. Both the LNER and LMS had been through radical 
reorganisation, with the GWR alone relatively unchanged. The latter had always been 
conservative compared to most other railways and it continued to be so. For the LNER, 
the main problem was that their business was in areas particularly badly hit by depression. 
Thus financial constraints rarely enabled innovations to be fully developed even if in the 
long run savings could be made.
If we refer back to the model of management control described in Chapter 1, we 
can identify where specific management methods were used. Using figure 1, we may 
locate commercial research as informing the Programming activity by establishing the 
service to offer and at what price. Planning was similarly conducted with the aid of 
commercial research as well as Transhipment and Time and Motion analysis. The service 
was Executed, and general control maintained, by monitoring the transportation process 
via Train Control. Train Control was also important in Evaluating conveyance, a task that 
was conducted for terminal services by Transhipment and Time and Motion analysis.
The response of the railways was to improve both operations and their commercial 
practice. By controlling the process of conveyance many of the items which increased
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cost could be monitored. In Chapter Five, the development of Train Control was seen as 
an important feature by which conveyance could be monitored. Whilst the GWR 
developed exceptionally good train services and its terminal costs were reduced, the lack 
of proper train control, and in particular the utilisation of information for wider 
management control, was a failing. That the LMS did develop such a system should not 
be surprising. It was the largest network, and had the legacy of the MR system to draw 
from. The LNER did not lack in invention either, but did not develop centralised, network 
wide Train Control. However the Wagon Control offices did show that in rolling stock 
distribution at least, the company had developed information systems. In Chapter Six 
we have seen how transhipment practices and depot design were modified according to 
information from analysis and reports. Problems were perceived and solutions sought 
to enable costs to be kept to a minimum. This was not always easy, as the experience of 
the LMS in terminal design demonstrates. What matters for our purposes is not that they 
failed to realise significant economies, as far as we know, in the pre-World War Two 
period. There was, and is, always a problem in achieving economies when using new 
methods. It is the fact that they were approaching management utilising a systematic 
approach to management. The GWR approach was much more successful, but in the long 
run they realised that the LMS approach was valid.
As we have seen in Chapter Seven, although the companies were distinct entities, 
they co-operated to an extraordinary degree on commercial policy. That they were able 
to do this reflects on how little competition there was between railway companies. 
Instead they were cooperating to head off the real competition, namely that of road 
transport. The railways developed Commercial Research as a means by which to 
ameliorate the decline in traffic due to the aforementioned market and regulatory 
conditions. The RRT and RCH provided a forum for such cooperation. The nature of 
the industry was also a factor: by definition a network has to find some means of co­
operating on technical specifications. This was the main task of the RCH. In the period 
after the amalgamation, it was to deal with more commercial as well as operating aspects. 
It was no accident that Traffic costing was first introduced through the offices of the 
RCH. The research from all the companies had long been put to use there for pricing and
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matters of technology. The growth of railhead distribution, the use of containers and 
increased speed of service were all adopted by our companies. The RCH formed a 
valuable conduit through which these could be utilised to everybody’s benefit.
The advent of road competition was compounded by the view of regulators that 
railways operated in a monopoly transport market, which created a far from ideal 
commercial environment. Both government intervention and, to a lesser extent, 
management prevented the railways from becoming integrated movers of freight. Nor was 
the government’s intervention particularly helpful to attaining "efficient and economical" 
working. We have seen how regulation could produce information which firms found 
useful. Thompson, Miranti and Yates all found this to be the case in US regulatory 
practices.1
To summarise the case studies, the LMS was more systematic in its use of ideas 
than either the GWR or the LNER. This was due partly to the size of the company. Its 
inherited managerial cultures mixed well with the arrival of Stamp who was able to 
motivate many of those around him with an enthusiasm for relatively sophisticated 
management practices. The Executive Research Committee was the most visible of these. 
The GWR was conservative and eventually it was recommended to follow the LMS type 
train control procedures by the 1940 Committee on Congestion. Its record on terminal 
and commercial management practices was good, however. The LNER was limited by 
financial pressure and the nature of its inherited companies. Nevertheless it clearly 
recognised that some form of train control was necessary and recommended time and 
motion studies for its own depots.
The study of how management information was used to develop certain 
management practices can be used to discern if management was performing well or not. 
In general increasing profits, or in this case net revenue, are not a good indicator of 
management’s performance if they are defined by events outside management’s control. 
Given that much of the microeconomic statistical data no longer survives, how these
1 See Chapter One, and in particular references to Thompson The Passenger Train in the 
Automobile Age; Miranti "The Minds Eye of Reform" and Yates Control.
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problems were approached is a more means by which we can assess performance.
If there was little attention paid to what we might call the more mainstream elements of 
systematic management, it was not because it was rejected. A more likely explanation 
is that railway managers were already debating such issues- within their own research 
infrastructure.
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